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USSR REPORT  
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SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES

No 4, Oct - Nov - Dec 1986

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## CONCEPT OF 'UNIFORMITY' UNDER CONDITIONS OF REORGANIZATION

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[Article by Aleksandr Sergeyevich Tsipko, candidate of philosophy and supervisor of the Ideological Problems Group of the Institute of the Economics of the World Socialist System, USSR Academy of Sciences. Author of the books "Optimizm istorii" [The Optimism of History] (1974), "Ideya sotsializma" [The Idea of Socialism] (1976), "Sotsializm: zhizn obshchestva i cheloveka" [Socialism: The Life of the Society and the Individual] (1980), and "Nekotoryye filosofskiye aspekty teorii sotsializma" [Some Philosophical Aspects of the Theory of Socialism] (1983). Author of the article "Possibilities and Potential for Cooperation" published in our journal (No 2, 1986); passages rendered in all capital letters printed in boldface in source]

[Text] The failure of the social sciences to keep up with the development of economic and sociopolitical practice is one of the tendencies of this time of decisive changes. We can say quite definitely that many of the statements in the Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th Party Congress and the resolutions passed on this basis have moved us decades ahead in our understanding of the essential purpose and goals of socialist construction. Everything that has become commonplace since the congress was likely to be resisted just 2 or 3 years ago.

We could cite many examples of vigorous struggle against common sense, objective facts and, ultimately, living realities. A great deal of harm was caused, for example, by the characteristic tendency of past years to discredit economic methods of production management on the grounds that they supposedly undermined the basis of socialist production--the principle of planning.

Today much has been accomplished in developing scientific, realistic views of socialism and its economy and in surmounting the gap between dogmatic inertia and life's requirements. There is a natural need, however, to disclose the causes of the past tenacity of dogmatism and scholastic theorizing.

Many recent works have analyzed the economic causes of dogmatism and scholastic theorizing and have suggested that the ideological obstruction of long overdue reforms in the economy was of some benefit to certain people. It is true that specific individuals were responsible in some specific cases of outdated ideas about socialism and its economy. They either advanced or



vigorously supported these ideas and formed emotional and material attachments to them. In our opinion, however, the matter should not be oversimplified or "over-economized." The people who derived material benefits from dogmatism were usually far removed from the scientific community. The ideological struggle against the advocates of radical changes in our economic mechanism, against the idea of cost accounting and self-funding, and against a stronger role for the market in the socialist economy benefited the economic managers who were accustomed to the old methods of work, without keeping track of the expense, and were afraid of the effective economic control of their operations by the society. Market control puts the hack worker at a disadvantage, and this is why he will always insist on the distribution of products by the state. Cost accounting frightens the functionary with no experience in considering the economic consequences of his decisions. As a rule, however, the struggle against the idea of the development of commodity and money relations did not give its direct participants any particular advantages.

I may be slightly oversimplifying the matter, but I am firmly convinced that economic factors are not the only causes of scholastic theorizing. In any case, the dogmatic view of the world also has a social, emotional basis. Schematic beliefs about socialism are often held not only by professional researchers of the theory of socialism. Furthermore, for some people these established beliefs about socialism turned out to be worth more than the economic interests of the country, worth more than the welfare of people and the health of the economy. In addition, we must not forget that the prophets who promised the simplest solutions to the most difficult problems were always the most popular. In general, it is difficult for people to resist the temptation of simple solutions. Even now that the misconceptions of the past have been discredited, it is difficult not to believe that turning kolkhozes into enterprises where everything will belong to the state will result in unprecedented economic progress. This is why leftist phrases still sometimes win public support. Some of our people still believe in the simplest interpretation of communism, stipulating the confiscation and distribution of the wealth of property-owning classes. It is indicative that this common opinion is sometimes even expressed by some sociologists who vigorously advocate a new redistribution of property.

The average individual loves to talk about the more just distribution of goods but is absolutely indifferent when it comes to the production of these goods. It is not surprising that the importance of individual incentives to work was underestimated for decades. Now that the first steps are being taken to implement the program set forth at the 27th CPSU Congress for stricter economic control of labor and demand for the institution of cost accounting in industry, some of our philosophers and sociologists have been frightening the public with references to more pronounced differences in income and social status. Now that the family contract is being introduced in agriculture and it is so important to revive the interest in working with the land and the sense of personal responsibility for work, some party and state personnel are trying to discredit this form of labor on the grounds that it will give some families excessive incomes. Many people feel that equal poverty is preferable to unequal incomes.

This onesided, strictly "distributional" approach to problems in the development of socialism could be quite dangerous. It impedes the use of socialism's potential and resources in the production sphere and effectively prevents the distribution of labor. It is much simpler to let emotions run wild and to worry about large inheritances and high fees than to investigate the reasons for people's insufficient interest in the results of labor, mismanagement and economic losses.

Emotional upsets over the possibility of more pronounced differences in income lessen interest in all other, more complex social matters, such as the need to heighten the effectiveness of economic activity and to develop labor skills and abilities.

All of this suggests that there are psychological reasons for the schematic approach and the tendency to regard the theory of socialism in isolation from the actual requirements of life, stemming from conflicting interpretations of this theory and the difficulty of putting it in action.

An analysis of the theoretical and practical arguments cited by the opponents of long overdue economic reforms reveals the common philosophical basis of their logical premises--the same view of the world and the same beliefs about the good of society. These beliefs stem from the certainty that the purpose of progress is the simplification of living patterns and the economic structure and the achievement of maximum uniformity. In general, in recent years, especially just before the April (1985) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, there was a more pronounced disparity between the natural progression of life itself and theories about its purpose and goals. Social and economic practice gave birth to new methods of stimulating and organizing labor, but in theory all of the many forms of socialist life were interpreted as subversions of the formative structure. It is still difficult to understand why maintaining the relative independence of cooperatives is a bad thing and surmounting it is a good thing. Contrary to the natural progression of social life, contrary to the interests of developing and consolidating socialism, a struggle was waged for decades on behalf of science and on behalf of Marxism-Leninism against anything that might jeopardize uniformity. For example, producer cooperatives and many folk crafts were eliminated in our country, local industry was disrupted, and small bakeries, mills and other enterprises were closed down, all of which undermined the existing infrastructure of life. In the last two decades our financial agencies fought against the brigade contract on the grounds that it violated the uniformity of wages and created conditions for more pronounced differences in income. Now that this contract has been accepted and legalized, there is a new tendency to make all of its different forms conform to a single standard.

Scholastic theorizing has always been related to arbitrary theorizing. The social scientist engaged in so-called "essential" research is not satisfied with mere freedom from practice and from its characteristic processes and facts. To prove his "essential" superiority to the world of "phenomena" and to common sense, which is supposedly incapable of withstanding the pressure of empirical facts, he strives to demonstrate his power over life by making it conform to his abstract ideas. This results in various types of plans for

the improvement of socialist reality which have nothing to do with life and are dangerous because of their indifference to reality and to the real needs and interests of millions of workers.

The second feature of the concept on behalf of which a struggle was waged against new and more effective forms of the socialist organization of labor is the underestimation of the simple and natural human needs of living people and contempt for all of the empirical realities of the present and the actual content of socioeconomic processes in the socialist society. The idea that high ideals were worthless because they could not be reconciled with the economic interests of the broad laboring masses, including their "narrow" vital needs (5, p 408), enraged some authors. In their opinion, the attempt to predict the future with analyses of the present state of the economy and the nature and level of our economic management was tantamount to the infringement of ideals and the strategic interests of socialist development. References to the importance of the basic, primary values and joys of human existence were viewed as contempt for predictions and the importance of these predictions to the present time, as attempts to take the future away from people. In accordance with this logic, the external similarities of forms of organizing production, trade and consumption and the analytical forecast of the communist structure were of greater importance than the actual content of this production and consumption and its ability to serve people. In Moscow, for example, cooperative trade on commissions was virtually eliminated from the market in the 1970's on the grounds that the old cooperative did not belong in a model communist city. No one gave any thought to the actual economic and social cost of this action or to the fact that it would cause market prices to soar and shortages to become more acute.

A vivid example of the attempt to ignore the empirical realities of socialist life and a substantive approach to its needs and interests is the thesis regarding the possibility of assessing a historical type of enterprise irrespective of its level of economic management (the larger the enterprise, the more elements of socialism it supposedly has). In this case, the contrasting of the logical approach to the concrete-historical one, and of the external, formal-organizational aspect to the substantive one, is frank and deliberate.

In our opinion, there is also good reason for the tendency to disregard the actual, substantive side of these matters. The instinctive reluctance to accept all of the realities of life is connected with the fact that reality constantly reveals the practical groundlessness of the strategy of uniformity. In the 1970's and 1980's the socialist countries developed according to more complex patterns than the ones stipulated in the theory of advancement toward the uniform structure. All of the different individual forms of labor organization which remained after the objectives of the transition period had been attained did not evolve into collective and group forms, and group forms did not evolve into state forms. When all of this failed to occur, the advocates of the single standard had to find a specific interpretation of this practice that would relieve them of the need to take all of these patterns of economic development into account. The result was the peculiar interpretation of the dialectics of the theoretical and empirical, of the essence and the phenomenon. In this case, it consists in the absolutization of the "essential,"



"theoretical" approach, and in the attempt to isolate the logical aspect of the matter from practice and to give it a supraempirical existence of its own. When the advocates of uniformity accuse their opponents of an inability to view matters from the "essential" standpoint or to cope with the pressure of empirical facts, they are simultaneously trying to create the illusion that the essence can be judged irrespective of the specific forms it takes.

Some authors, for example, proceeding from the accurate premise that theoretical forecasts of socialism cover a longer period of development than the one our country has undergone, concluded that it was too early to judge the present by past experience. This suggested that the essence of socialism could be judged irrespective of the actual past experience in socialist construction, and that the theory of the new order could be elaborated without taking the trouble to analyze specific socialist practices. The main feature of this illusion is the certainty that theoretical forecasts of communist forms of labor organization are based on complete knowledge about the future, and that if the methods of labor organization of fundamental importance to the communist structure are not producing the desired economic results today, they will certainly produce them tomorrow. This is why the widespread introduction of forms of labor organization of fundamental importance to communism is always hailed as a progressive development because it will sooner or later produce the desired social and economic results.

It is precisely here, in this onesided interpretation of the dialectics of the essence and the phenomenon, that we should seek the philosophical roots of the normative, dogmatic approaches to problems in the development of socialism, approaches inhibiting the necessary changes in the economic mechanism. The advocates of this approach usually consider only one side of the contradiction: the fact that the essence of a particular process is not confined to the specific form it takes but always includes something transcending the boundaries of empirical experience. As a rule, however, they ignore the fact that the essence itself cannot be examined in isolation from the actual forms it takes. Dialectics teaches us that the essence is also "the progression of existence itself." When V. I. Lenin summarized Hegel's "Science of Logic," he singled out the thesis that "the essence...is what it is...through its own INFINITE PROGRESSION OF EXISTENCE" (3, p 116).

An indirect sign of the underestimation of the past experience in socialist development is the assertion that the future will bring a more meaningful phase in the progression of the masses than the one already undergone by the new order. The expectation of something special in the future, differing fundamentally from existing economic experience, is exactly what promotes the skeptical view of socialism as a reality. It is interesting that the authors who believe that the theoretical forecasts of socialism will sooner or later be materialized in pure form--that is, without commodity and money relations, cooperatives or individual forms of labor--generally do not engage in the substantive investigation of socioeconomic processes.

Works of this kind do not refer to specific countries building socialism, to specific stages in its development or to the current domestic and international situation, but to socialism in general. A substantive analysis of the history



of the economic development of a country is replaced either with a repetition of the statements of the founders of Marxism about so-called "complete" or "integral" socialism, or with a discussion of the main natural trends in the development of physical production during the transition from the capitalist to the communist structure. No recent publication criticizing the so-called practice of perpetuating the contradictions of the transition period or the "NEP [New Economic Policy (1921-1936)] atmosphere" in some of the countries of the socialist community has analyzed the socioeconomic and political situation in these countries or the choice of possible alternatives for surmounting new problems. In precisely the same way, a recently published theoretical substantiation of the need for the quickest possible merger of kolkhoz-cooperative property with national property and the quickest possible nationalization of agricultural production contains no analyses of the state of affairs in our agriculture or of the economic and social results of various socialist forms of labor organization in agriculture.

Some authors are so preoccupied with the theoretical side of the matter and with the "essential approach" that they tend to confuse ideas and things and they lose sight of what V. I. Lenin called the necessary distinction between "abstract-theoretical" and "concrete-historical" problems of building a new life (2, p 83). The development of this attitude toward social processes, within the framework of which the theoretical forecast of reality is more real than this empirical reality itself, did much to promote, in our opinion, the earlier oversimplified interpretation of the close connection between thinking and existence. It is related to the illusion that the neatness with which an antithesis is substituted for a thesis, characteristic of scientific thinking, can be reproduced in practice, and that the neatness with which the economic and sociopolitical contradictions of capitalism are logically surmounted in the theoretical forecast of the communist structure can be reproduced during the course of socialist construction (8, pp 16-17). This illusion engenders impatience with anything that does not fit into the theoretical view of pure socialism and the stubborn desire to quickly get rid of all forms of labor organization that are not completely collectivized, of all labor incentives that are "not purely" communistic, etc. Besides this, the oversimplified interpretation of the close connection between thinking and existence impedes the active investigation of social practice and the substantive analysis of distinctive features of development. After all, sooner or later the "abstract-theoretical" side of the matter coincides with the "concrete-historical" side, and the content of socioeconomic practice coincides with the theoretical content of the laws governing its development. Why make the extra effort to analyze concrete empirical processes?

In our studies of the communist structure in recent years, we have been preoccupied with just one side of K. Marx' methodological statement that it is wrong to begin research "with the real and concrete," with "real preconditions," forgetting the other side of the same statement, that "the method of progressing from the abstract to the concrete is only the means by which thinking assimilates the concrete and reproduces it as the spiritually concrete" (1, pp 726-727).

The underestimation of this important fact is the reason for the attempts to portray the abstract as complete and final knowledge and to interpret the

theoretical image of the future as something complete, something with its own existence, independent of practice. The oversimplified interpretation of the principle of progression from the abstract to the concrete and the tendentious contrasting of the historical stability of the conceivable in the theory of the general law with the transitory and historically singular phenomenon, as E. V. Ilyenkov correctly pointed out, lead to the conviction "that the general is something more lasting and stable than any single factor" (9, p 242).

It is a paradox that in several cases the valid and understandable desire of social scientists to base their research on dialectical logic did not strengthen the materialistic basis of their research but, rather, led to an initially incomprehensible skepticism with regard to the concrete, the tangible, that which is perceived by the senses. Familiarization with science and with theoretical knowledge should not turn into the superstitious worship of its laws or a tendency to assign greater importance to general matters than to concrete or specific ones, as V. I. Lenin warned (4, p 400). The social scientist is often misled by the false fear of appearing less than scientific if the processes analyzed in his theoretical works can be judged by all mortal beings. It is true that during the first stages of the development of a revolution the tendency to contrast the general or theoretical forecast of the future with the actual and singular event, with reality, is quite understandable and valid. Under these conditions, the present has no value or significance because it is usually a remnant of the past and is historically doomed. "This has always been the case," V. I. Lenin wrote in this connection, "in every truly great revolution, because the truly great revolutions are engendered by the conflict between the old, between the efforts to improve the old, and the abstract desire for the new, which must be so new that it does not contain a single old element" (4, p 401). It is precisely at a time of revolution, during the first stages of the transition period, that the abstract and normative interpretation of the communist future takes shape, focusing on such economic-organizational definitions as a society in which money and trade do not exist because there is an abundance of everything, and in which many forms of solitary labor are replaced by a huge communist factory (the so-called "national syndicate") with the complete and absolute equality of conscientious workers. All of these definitions of the future are extremely abstract in content because they say nothing about the specific means and methods of attaining the ideal.

All of the atmosphere of the transition period helps to perpetuate the abstract view of the future, based on the most general economic definitions of the communist structure. During the initial period of revolution, when the main economic forms of the previous capitalist civilization are being eliminated, the most general economic-organizational definitions of the communist structure, expressed in terms of a simple denial of the past, are of the greatest importance. Under these conditions, the absolutization of the need to nationalize and officially collectivize the means of production and, consequently, the economic-organizational definitions of communism does not impede forecasting. What is more, form is more important at this time than at any other.

The separation of the economic-organizational definitions of communism from substantive definitions and the separation of the widespread establishment of methods of collective labor of fundamental importance to the communist

structure from substantive tasks connected with the more effective and efficient use of natural and human resources are inevitable during the first stages of the construction of a new society. When the organizational prerequisites for the communist structure are being established, quantitative criteria of social development are inevitably predominant: An indicator such as the number of people involved in a new and historically progressive form of labor organization seems more important than the indicator of its economic effectiveness. During the struggle against remnants of exploitative classes and methods of production, political criteria take precedence over economic and social factors because the basic achievements of the society are connected primarily with the elimination of exploitation and class inequality.

Unfortunately, the separation of political-economic matters from concrete-economic ones (in other words, the separation of the problems of historical development from the problems of satisfying the primary and natural needs of the population), which is characteristic and valid during the transition period, is later viewed as the norm in theoretical thinking. It is no coincidence that some authors are still writing about the possibility of defining the historical type of enterprise irrespective of its economic results. What is more, the belief that the general, formal-economic definition is valid in itself, independent of the level of economic management and the level of public life, begins to leave its imprint on the materialistic interpretation of history. This is reflected in the popular illusion that the essence of a law can be judged irrespective of the specific mechanisms of its realization, and that the natural historical approach to reality is possible in isolation from actual events and personal factors.

There is a close connection between the characteristic practice of recent years of separating the political-economic approach from the concrete-economic one in the science of economics and the natural historical approach from the practical and personal one in the science of philosophy. In both cases this leads to the fatalistic view of development processes in the socialist society and gives rise to the illusion that the laws governing the development of physical production are acquiring an internal power of self-development, which will sooner or later occur, regardless of the subjective feelings of people about these processes.

The characteristic underestimation of social problems and the human factor as the decisive condition of production development in recent years is based on this fatalistic view of the processes of socialist development, with an emphasis on the most general and formal definitions. The desire for the maximum objectivization of the historical process leads unavoidably to the identification of human history with the self-development of productive forces and, consequently, with the sequential change of the economic conditions of their reproduction. The fatalistic interpretation of Marxism leads unavoidably to a onesided view of social life, in which all of the most difficult problems of socialist and communist construction are viewed as the transition to the directly social nature of labor and production--that is, to direct product exchange. And it is true that if the objective laws of the development of productive forces and the laws of production concentration and centralization were capable in themselves of securing the transition to a qualitatively new



state in the development of the socialist society (with historical forces propping up the new society), there would be no need for special analyses of concrete social conditions and ways of stimulating the production and social activity of people, strengthening the family, collectivist relationships and the mental health of people, combating alcoholism and loneliness, etc.

The formation of a realistic approach to the problems of socialist development necessitates the elimination of methodological obstacles in the way of real processes, particularly specific people and the requirements of life. In this case, we must deal with an intricate mixture of philosophical illusions and prejudices, stemming, in the final analysis, from the fatalistic view of the processes of socialist development and the belief in the predestined historical process.

The initial logical and historical point in the formation of the concepts of acceleration, begun at the April (1985) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, is criticism of the false belief that history itself is advancing us, and that the excessive centralization and permanent nationalization of the means of production will sooner or later produce economic and social results. The analysis of the reasons for the slower rates of economic growth in the late 1970's and early 1980's in M. S. Gorbachev's speeches at the plenum and at the CPSU Central Committee conference on the acceleration of scientific and technical progress (11 June 1985) was a great help in surmounting this misconception. The admission that we must solve problems today that could have been solved 20 years ago and that there is no justification for the earlier conservatism in the improvement of the economic mechanism is extremely important. "The acceleration of scientific and technical progress," M. S. Gorbachev stressed, "demands the thorough reorganization of the system of planning and management and the entire economic mechanism. Without this, everything we say today could remain a fond wish. For many years we have been skirting these problems and trying to choose the best approach to them. But there has been little real advancement. The apparent causes are the fear of making a mistake and of taking decisive action, and sometimes outright conservatism. Today we are encountering essentially the same problems that arose decades ago, but now they are more acute and we are more aware that inaction and delays can no longer be tolerated" (7, p 22).

The experience of recent years has given us a better understanding of the Marxist maxim that progress is possible only when the internal connection between the individual interests of people alive today and the interests of society and of world socialism is discovered. Even the spiritual and moral activity of people should be stimulated by society.

Progressive reforms depend largely on the degree to which the successive decisions and actions of administrative institutions meet the deepest needs of society and the expectations of the broad laboring masses. The ability of party organs to secure the necessary political and socioeconomic conditions for displays of mass activity is of decisive significance in this context. The main lesson we have learned from the past, M.S. Gorbachev said at the 27th CPSU Congress, is that "the success of any cause depends most on the degree of active and conscious participation by the masses. Convincing



broad segments of the laboring public of the accuracy of our chosen course, providing them with emotional and financial incentives, and reordering the priorities of personnel are essential conditions for the acceleration of our growth. The speed of our advancement will depend on the degree of discipline and organization and on the responsibility of each individual for his assigned work and for its results" (6, pp 23-24).

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## FORMATION OF SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE OF WEST SIBERIAN OIL AND GAS COMPLEX

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 4, Oct-Nov-Dec 86  
(signed to press 20 Oct 86) pp 11-17

[Article by Aleksandr Nikolayevich Averin, candidate of philosophy and docent of the Department of Marxism-Leninism at the USSR Council of Ministers Academy of the National Economy, Yevgeniy Petrovich Antropov, auditor at the academy, and Viktor Dmitriyevich Filatov, chief of the social infrastructure planning and development subdivision of the USSR Gosplan Interdepartmental Territorial Commission for the Development of the West Siberian Oil and Gas Complex. This is their first article for our journal]

[Text] Economists, sociologists and other social scientists are studying the social infrastructure in newly developed regions. An all-union conference on the development of productive forces in Siberia and the need to accelerate scientific and technical progress in the region (6) was held in Novosibirsk in July 1985 and included an extensive discussion of the social problems of the West Siberian oil and gas complex. The speech presented by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M.S. Gorbachev at the conference of the party and economic aktiv of Tyumen and Tomsk Oblasts on 6 September 1985 (1) was of great value as a policy statement defining the prospects for the social development of the region. The social problems of West Siberia were also discussed at length at the 27th CPSU Congress.

The authors of this article will attempt to analyze the most acute problems in the social infrastructure of the West Siberian oil and gas complex, particularly in Tyumen Oblast, and to specify the means of its further development with the aid of statistics and the results of several studies.

First a few words should be said about the term itself. Although several recently published works have discussed the place and role of the social infrastructure in the national economic complex (3), there is still no unanimous opinion. We agree with Zh.T. Toshchenko, according to whom "the social infrastructure represents the permanent group of material elements establishing the overall conditions for the efficient organization of the main types of human activity" (4). In newly developed regions the social infrastructure has a considerable impact on personnel stability and on migration. This is attested to by the data of an expert poll in which the authors participated in 1985. (Footnote 1) (In all, 55 experts were surveyed, including representatives of

local soviets, planning agencies (Gosplan, Goskomtrud [State Committee for Labor and Social Problems], Gosgrazhdanstroy [State Committee for Civil Construction and Architecture], and Stroybank [Bank for Financing Capital Investments]) and economic administrative bodies (Minnefteprom [Ministry of the Petroleum Industry], Mingazprom [Ministry of the Gas Industry], Minneftegazstroy [Ministry of Construction of Petroleum and Gas Industry Enterprises] and the Ministry of Geology of the USSR), administrators of sectorial research institutes and higher academic institutions, and the Tyumen Oblast correspondents of central newspapers) Among the main methods of reducing migration and ensuring personnel stability, the improvement of social and consumer conditions and a higher level of cultural services for the population were mentioned by 89.1 percent of the experts, the improvement of working conditions was mentioned by 3.6 percent, and better financial incentives were mentioned by 7.3 percent.

The data of the expert poll are corroborated by statistics. Housing construction in the region is being conducted on an intensive basis: The average living area per person increased from 3.3 square meters at the beginning of the 8th Five-Year Plan to 10.8 square meters at the end of the 11th. Nevertheless, there is still a housing shortage, and this leads to the loss of manpower.

There is no adequate housing for 20 percent of the population of the West Siberian oil and gas complex. More than 40,000 people in Nizhnevartovsk and 13,000 in Novyy Urengoy are living in trailers and vans. Per capita housing in Novyy Urengoy, Noyabrsk and Langepas is 8.8, 8.7, and 9.6 square meters respectively, and the figures are even lower in the settlements of Mamontovo, Novoagansk and Pangody--4.3, 6.4, and 7.2. Furthermore, it is significant that the actual indicators in many cities are slightly lower because 6-10 percent of the living area is used as hotels, stores, pharmacies and administrative buildings.

Medical services in the complex, where the natural and climatic conditions can be described as extreme, cannot be called satisfactory either. Many new residents come from regions with a more temperate climate. Besides this, most of the work is performed in low temperatures, strong winds, and heavy rainfall. It is not surprising that almost half of the illnesses recorded in medical statistics here are colds, and the rest are disorders of the nervous system and organs of sense, accidents, and infectious diseases. In the last two decades the level of hospital services per 10,000 inhabitants has not exceeded 56 percent of the standard. The indicator is particularly low in Novyy Urengoy (11 percent), Raduzhnyy (20.6 percent), Noyabrsk (33 percent), and Surgut (43 percent).

The new settlers in Tyumen Oblast include many families, with children of school and preschool age. This is connected with certain social problems. General educational schools for 124,000 students have been built in the West Siberian oil and gas complex in the last 20 years, and almost half of the new construction took place during the 11th Five-Year Plan. Nevertheless, it is still too early to speak of the complete adequacy of schools. The situation is particularly unsatisfactory in Novyy Urengoy, Raduzhnyy and Langepas and in several worker settlements located near oil and gas deposits.

The shortage of space in preschool establishments is the main reason that women are not employed in the national economy and one of the main causes of personnel turnover. The rate of the construction of these establishments has been high in the complex as a whole. Average annual new kindergarten admissions (per 10,000 inhabitants) were 48 in the 10th Five-Year Plan and 60 in the 11th. Available space in kindergartens has increased from 34 to 55 percent of the standard in the last 10 years. The construction of preschool establishments was an uneven process, however, in new cities. In Noyabrsk, for example, there was space for only 3,000 at the beginning of 1985 instead of the required 7,900, and the establishments in Novyy Urengoy could accommodate only 2,800 children instead of 7,400. Kindergarten space was equivalent to only 27.2 percent of the necessary level in Raduzhnyy, 37 percent in Novyy Urengoy, 38 percent in Noyabrsk, 54 percent in Surgut, 57 percent in Nizhnevartovsk, and 60 percent in Nadym. The number of children attending preschool establishments exceeds the number of seats in them in almost all of the cities and settlements in the region. The need for kindergartens and nurseries is particularly great in Langepas, Raduzhnyy and Nyagan, which recently acquired the status of cities. Many preschool establishments are located in buildings and facilities not equipped for these purposes, and this has an adverse effect on the health of the children.

Cultural and consumer establishments are expected to play an important role in stabilizing the labor force. There are many shortcomings, however, here as well. For example, there are no movie theaters, athletic facilities, hotels, laundries or dry cleaning establishments in Raduzhnyy, and Nizhnevartovsk, with a population of over 200,000, does not have a single movie theater either. Although the general plan of the city, approved several years ago, envisaged the construction of a technology and cultural center, movie theaters, athletic fields, and other elements of the social infrastructure, the funds intended for sociocultural and consumer construction have remained unused, are frozen, or are used for other purposes. The construction of social, consumer, cultural, and educational establishments and enterprises has been postponed for many years.

The organization of trade, public catering, and consumer services does not meet modern requirements either. The material base of trade developed more slowly in the 11th Five-Year Plan than commodity turnover, and this had an adverse effect on the level of trade services. Most of the stores opened in the cities of the complex were grocery stores. The supply of stores selling manufactured goods does not exceed 40 percent of the necessary number. In Nizhnevartovsk, for example, the merchandising area of stores selling manufactured goods was equivalent to only 10,100 square meters instead of the required 26,900. A special study of public dining facilities in Surgut revealed that 55 of the 73 enterprises serve only their own workers, and only for short periods during the day. There is a shortage of such important foods as potatoes, vegetables and fruit. It would also be difficult to call the state of consumer services in new cities and worker settlements satisfactory. The consumer service sales volume of 40 rubles per inhabitant of the complex is distributed quite unevenly. It is 38.38 rubles in Nizhnevartovsk, 31.60 rubles in Surgut, 15.14 rubles in Noyabrsk, 10.10 rubles in Langepas, 8.34 rubles in Novoagansk, and 4.96 rubles in Mamontovo.



What are the reasons for this? According to experts, the main factors impeding the development of the social infrastructure in the region are the long standing practice of building industrial facilities first, the weak construction base in the complex, and the unsatisfactory work of contractors and clients. Some of the less significant causes mentioned were shortcomings in the activity of local soviets and transport enterprises and the extreme natural and climatic conditions (see table).

Table. Expert Assessments of Causes of Insufficient Development of Social Infrastructure of West Siberian Oil and Gas Complex, %

<u>Causes</u>	<u>First</u>	<u>Second</u>	<u>Third</u>	<u>Not a main cause</u>
Long-standing practice of building industrial facilities first	45.5	12.7	7.3	34.5
Shortcomings in planning the development of branches of social infrastructure	27.3	25.5	16.4	30.8
Weak construction base	14.6	30.9	30.9	23.6
Unsatisfactory work of construction organizations	9.0	10.9	14.6	65.5
Unsatisfactory work of client organizations (developers)	3.6	10.9	14.6	70.9
Shortcomings in work of local soviets	--	9.1	7.3	83.6
Shortcomings in transport services for population	--	--	5.5	94.5
Severe natural and climatic conditions	--	--	3.6	96.4

The active construction of new cities and settlements began only after the region became one of the largest oil and gas complexes in the country. The capacities of construction industry enterprises satisfy 60 percent of the demand for housing construction. Most of this construction relies on shipments of large-panel structural elements from the Bashkir ASSR, Belorussia, Moscow, Leningrad, the Urals, and the Ukraine. Contracting organizations have not secured the fulfillment of plans for new housing, preschool establishments or hospitals in 20 years. During the settlement of the complex the development of the transport system did not keep up with new construction. The new cities of Sredneye Priobye and Pripolyarye grew up virtually in the absence of railways and highways. River transport is the main form of transportation. Motor transport is used primarily in winter on temporary roads.

The departmental barriers that are seriously inhibiting the development of the social infrastructure warrant special discussion. Subdivisions of four construction ministries (Minneftegazstroy, Minpromstroy [Ministry of Industrial Construction], Minstroy [Ministry of Construction] and Mintransstroy [Ministry of Transport Construction]) and of around 30 construction trusts of the

Minnefteprom, Mingazprom, Minenergo [Ministry of Power and Electrification] and the Ministry of Geology of the USSR operate within the territory of the complex. There is no single body managing the formation of the social infrastructure. The great number of contracting organizations and the absence of an agency coordinating their work ultimately led to a sectorial approach to the construction projects of the social infrastructure. In Novyy Urengoy, for example, there are 60 construction organizations, and they are served by 7 transport bases and 3 communications centers. Surgut has 138 construction and 29 supply organizations and 7 worker supply divisions of various ministries, each of which has its own bases, cafeterias and stores. Five organizations supply the city with heat and an equal number provide it with communication services. There are more than 20 housing and municipal service offices, each of which has its own material base. All of this leads to the inefficient use of capital investments and to errors in the territorial distribution of facilities. They often do not meet the needs of the population and cannot provide service of high quality. The sectorial approach is one of the main reasons for the attempts of ministries and departments to lower costs and to solve problems by putting up temporary structures. The ultimate result of the underdevelopment of the social infrastructure is the reduced effectiveness of basic production.

The results of the expert poll suggest that the substitution of a balanced combination of sectorial and territorial principles of management for the departmental approach will have a beneficial effect on the future development of the social infrastructure in the complex. According to 69.1 percent of the experts, it is time to transfer the functions of the head sociocultural and consumer project planning organization to a single institute located in the region. Another 12.7 percent of the experts feel that this should be done in the future, and only 18.2 percent believe that this transfer of functions would be inexpedient. The assignment of general contractor authority in social infrastructure construction projects to a smaller group of main administrations was advocated by 72.7 percent of the respondents. The rest believe that the present practice is acceptable.

Most of the respondents said that the functions of the developers of new cities should be transferred to local soviets, and 71 percent felt that this should be done immediately after the acquisition of city status while another 18.2 percent felt that it should be a gradual process. In the opinion of 9 percent of the experts, there is no need for this innovation. Around 65.5 percent of the experts said that the facilities of the social infrastructure should become the responsibility of local soviets immediately following the acquisition of city status, 25.5 percent did not object to this but did believe that the transfer should be gradual, and 9 percent disagreed with this point of view.

In our opinion, it would be expedient to allocate capital investments for the social infrastructure precisely to local soviets. Past experience suggests that the decentralization of resources is one of the main reasons for the underdevelopment of the social infrastructure. In Surgut, for example, where the situation is much worse than in other northern cities of the region, the enterprises of six ministries are the main developers. They manage 90 percent of the available housing, while the city soviet manages only 0.2 percent. The

lack of departmental unity is the reason that Surgut resembles a collection of isolated farmsteads. The clients were 26 developers working in their own neighborhoods.

Another reason for the underdevelopment of the social infrastructure in the region is the insufficient financing of construction projects. For example, expenditures on the social infrastructure in Raduzhnyy in the 12th Five-Year Plan are supposed to total 500 million rubles, but less than one-fifth of this sum has been allocated to date. In 1986 builders are prepared to perform 60 million rubles' worth of work, but 45 million has been released. The concentration of capital investments in utilities and municipal construction projects for the social infrastructure makes it more economical to build a single city with a population of 150,000 than five cities with a population of 30,000 each. In the 12th Five-Year Plan the population of the complex will increase by more than half a million, and the majority will be living in newly developed regions with an underdeveloped social infrastructure. New construction projects will require over 6 billion rubles.

The use of the labor pledge method of organizing labor in our country's northern regions and the central section of BAM [Baykal-Amur Trunkline] has already been discussed in this journal (5). This form of labor organization provides opportunities for the better satisfaction of the consumer, material and spiritual needs of workers and the intelligent use of free time. Summarizing the positive experience in the use of these pledges in Tomsk Oblast, Ye.K. Ligachev stressed that "the method will be used more extensively in northern regions, and not only in the economic sectors where it has already 'been given the go-ahead,' but also in new areas of the economy connected with the exploitation of natural resources" (2).

The experts gave the pledge form of labor organization a high rating, but over 80 percent stressed the need for a reasonable combination of the pledge method with a permanent labor force. In our opinion, three methods should be used in the exploitation of oil and gas deposits. The first will require the resettlement of workers in communities directly adjacent to the deposits, without pledge services. The second will entail settlement in the base center and work in accordance with the pledge method in a particular area (the "base city and pledge settlement" option). Finally, the third option would entail the extensive use of support cities (the "support city-base city-pledge settlement" option). Obviously, each option would require a developed social infrastructure to secure normal working and leisure conditions for people.

The support cities for intraregional pledges could be Tyumen, Tomsk, and Tobolsk, which would supply the pledge workers and their families with housing and the complete set of social, cultural and consumer facilities. According to 25.5 percent of the experts, this could be accomplished within the near future. Nadym, Novyy Urengoy, Labytnangi and Salekhard were mentioned as base cities and settlements for intraregional pledges.

Summing up the previous discussion, we will briefly describe recommended improvements in the social infrastructure of the region.



1) The subprogram for the formation and development of the social infrastructure, a section of the comprehensive regional program for the period up to the year 2000, should be drawn up in greater detail, and the production and economic features of the complex should be coordinated with the social development of all its territory. 2) The balanced development of the production sphere and the social infrastructure should be secured with a higher scientific level of regional planning. The allocation of resources to some participants in the development of the complex to the detriment of others should cease, because this planning practice could preclude the completely balanced development of productive forces in the complex. 3) There should be an increase in capital investments in the non-production sphere and improvement in the planning, organization and management of infrastructure construction projects. This will require the allocation of funds to a single client: the executive committees of local soviets; the concentration of social infrastructure construction projects in main construction administrations specializing in the construction of residential buildings and sociocultural and consumer facilities and endowed with the rights of the general contractor; the establishment of a head project planning institute to plan projects for the social infrastructure of the complex directly within the region; the more extensive enlistment of the services of construction organizations specializing in social infrastructure construction projects in other parts of the country. 4) The gradual transfer of social infrastructure facilities in cities and worker settlements in the complex to executive committees of local soviets. 5) More extensive reliance on pledge forms of labor organization, which could secure the simultaneous prospecting, extraction, refining and shipment of hydrocarbon resources and development of the social infrastructure. 6) The compilation of more precise settlement forecasts with a view to improvements in pledge forms of labor organization.

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## SOCIOECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OPTIONS FOR CENTRAL ASIAN REGION

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[Article by Dmitriy Isaakovich Zyuzin, candidate of economic sciences and senior research associate at the Scientific Research Institute of Labor of the USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems. Author of the monograph "The Quality of Specialist Training as a Social Issue" (1978). His articles for our journal include "The Causes of the Low Mobility of the Native Population of Central Asian Republics" (No 1, 1983), "The Social Challenge as a Form of Labor Resource Redistribution" (No 2, 1985), and others; passages rendered in all capital letters printed in boldface in source; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics in source]

[Text] The Basic Directions of the Economic and Social Development of the USSR in 1986-1990 and During the Period up to 2000 stipulate the better use of labor resources, additional progressive advances in the distribution of productive forces, and the coordination of the number of jobs with available labor resources on the sectorial and territorial levels (1). This is one of the most acute problems in the Central Asian republics. There has been a labor surplus in the region for a long time, especially in rural areas. Furthermore, no significant changes are anticipated in the situation by the end of the century. According to the forecasts of the Central Statistical Administration and USSR Gosplan, the growth of the working-age population will slow down to some extent, but it will still be quite high in comparison to the previous 15 years.

The rate of population growth is particularly high among native nationalities. In Uzbekistan, for example, the number of Uzbeks will increase by more than 3 percent a year right up to the end of the century, and the percentage of Uzbeks in the republic population will rise from 70.4 percent in 1980 to 73.1 percent in 2000. The more rapid growth of the rural population will continue (whereas the number of rural inhabitants in the country as a whole is constantly decreasing). It is highly probable that the rural working-age population of Central Asia will represent an even higher percentage of national rural labor resources by the end of the century.

How is the problem of labor resources being solved? At present, there is an emphasis on employing the entire able-bodied population locally. The decline

of the employment indicator (associated directly in this case with the efficiency of labor resource use) is due to the insufficient expansion of the employment sphere. This has served as grounds for the conclusion that there is a need for the accelerated growth of capital investments in production. Another argument cited is the low mobility of the native population. In this process, several obvious facts are either overlooked or are ignored for the purpose of meeting methodological requirements. There has been virtually no consideration of the fact that the labor surplus in the region as a whole has been accompanied by an acute need for manpower in urban industry. And after all, the future of the region will depend on the development of industry, because agriculture has natural limits--limited water resources and, in Tajikistan, for example, limited land resources. It is true that a "solution" has even been found for this--the channeling of part of the runoff of northern rivers to southern regions has been suggested, among other things. In short, extensive patterns of development are seen as the solution. The fact that the region is not an isolated socioeconomic entity, but part of the national economic complex, all of the links of which should operate according to the same principles, is actually being ignored. The economy of the Central Asian republics cannot develop extensively while other regions make the transition to intensification. The Central Asian region is facing an equally urgent need for the dramatic augmentation of the productivity of social labor and the more efficient use of resources, including land, water and manpower.

Under present economic, social and demographic conditions, the attempt to develop production with primary reliance on the local employment of the entire increase in the able-bodied population will inevitably slow down the augmentation of social labor productivity: It was lower in agriculture here in 1984 than in 1970 (in all of the republics but the Kirghiz SSR, and in industry the indicator here rose only half as quickly as the national average) (2).

The emphasis on intensification demands that the efficient use of resources, particularly manpower, serve as the main criterion of socioeconomic development. Various trends in the development of a region or sector should be assessed with a view to this. The inclusion of the corresponding standards in the system of planning indicators of economic and social development in large economic regions (or union republics) will establish important prerequisites for the efficient use of manpower.

The indicator of the economic effectiveness of manpower use, or national income per able-bodied inhabitant, is employed extensively in scientific literature. The advantage of this indicator is its connection, through employment, with the productivity of social labor--the main indicator of the economic effectiveness of production at a time of transition to intensive methods of economic management. Let us attempt to judge the situation in the region with the aid of this indicator. In the last 15 years the amount of national income produced per able-bodied inhabitant rose at a much slower rate than the national average. As a result, the indicator in question declined.

What will happen in the future if the current model of development (which is still preferred by the majority of experts) is retained as a guide--that is, if all of Central Asia's human resources are employed locally?

Table: Parameters of Models of Socioeconomic Development for Central Asian Republics in 1985-2000

Models	National income per manpower unit, % of national average	Necessary growth, % of 1985		Manpower redistribution, in millions
		National income	Fixed capital	
First				
Option I	49.0	200	200	--
Option II	100.0	420	415	--
Option III	70.0	295	290	--
Second				
Option IV	70.0	200	200	7.1
Option V	70.0	250	245	3.4
National	100.0	200	200	--

This would leave room, as they say, for several options.

OPTION I. Calculations indicate that the doubling of national income and the employment of the entire increase in labor resources locally up to the year 2000 will result in the following situation. The amount of national income produced per able-bodied inhabitant will increase by 82 percent in the USSR as a whole and by only 36 percent in Central Asia. What is more, the absolute value of the latter indicator will be equivalent to less than half of the union average (see table). It will be difficult to cover individual consumption funds with national income, little income will remain for public consumption funds, and absolutely nothing will remain for accumulations. It is clear that this would require larger state grants to the Central Asian republics from the public budget, and this would certainly have an adverse effect on several unionwide programs--the Food Program, Energy Program, etc. The percentage of people engaged in private farming and housework would also rise. This indicator depends largely on labor productivity. If the rise in productivity here keeps up with the national average, the number of people engaged in individual forms of labor could reach one-third of the entire working-age population.

A simultaneous rise in employment and in the economic effectiveness of manpower use within the framework of the existing approach can only be accomplished in one way--a constant increase in construction projects in industry and the non-production sphere. To what extent, however, is this possible? For the moment we will not consider the degree to which this strategy meets the needs of maximum improvement in capital investment patterns and the concentration of investments in enterprise retooling and remodeling projects. We will examine the matter from only one vantage point, the vantage point of the necessary growth rate of production volume and producer goods. These indicators are calculated with the aid of the level of manpower use effective enough to secure expanded reproduction with local financial resources. This is promoted by a situation in which the use of regional labor potential corresponds to the national average. If a term of 15 years is set for the attainment of this objective, the amount of national income produced should increase 4.2-fold by the year 2000, and producer goods should almost quadruple in this time, with the retention of the current rate of return on investments.



The proportional quantity of producer goods in the Central Asian economic region should almost double. We will call this strategy OPTION II.

It would be virtually impossible to realize this option in such a short period of time. Apparently, it is also unrealistic over the long range, especially in view of the fact that this would entail a radical reversal rather than the reinforcement of a current trend. This goal is unattainable not only because no plans have been made for the necessary centralized capital investments, and local investments will not be sufficient, but also because the use of such huge sums within such a short period of time is beyond the region's capabilities. /It does not have the necessary quantity of skilled manpower/. It will need several times the present number, and the proportional number of workers in industry will have to rise to 30 percent of all the people employed in the economy. After all, industry will be responsible for most of the increase in producer goods. The possibilities for the extensive development of agriculture were exhausted long ago. Furthermore, according to this option, it is precisely agriculture that is to provide much of the available manpower.

All of this convinces us that the effectiveness of manpower use in Central Asia is not likely to reach the union average in the near future. In our opinion, it cannot do this even under the most favorable conditions.

Of course, there have been periods in the history of the Central Asian republics (1950-1970) when production capacities and production output grew more quickly. At that time, however, this required the mass recruitment of skilled manpower from other parts of the country--central Russia and the Ukraine. Now the situation has changed. Industry here must rely on its own skilled personnel for its development. The proportional number of workers of the native nationalities, however, is still quite low, especially in metalworking and the extractive industry. Consequently, there is a need for a fundamentally new approach to the problem of labor resources, and this is a need which still has not been acknowledged in the republics or in central planning agencies.

Let us take a look at what will happen if the regional economy is charged with a less strenuous task: to keep the amount of national income produced per able-bodied inhabitant in the year 2000 at the national average for 1985. In other words, the indicator of the economic effectiveness of manpower use in 2000 should be around 70 percent of the union indicator (OPTION III). Of course, this is not the best option. It will not secure expanded reproduction with regional sources of financing and full employment. Apparently, however, it would be extremely difficult to accomplish more than this under present circumstances. Even the attainment of this minimum necessary level will necessitate compliance with a number of stringent requirements.

The employment of the entire increase in regional labor resources means that national income will have to almost triple by 2000. The increase will be over 13 percent a year on the average. This option will also require the rapid growth of capital investments--over 12 percent a year on the average. Of course, the current rate of return on investments of around 40 kopecks per ruble must be maintained. This, however, is quite doubtful. After all, the increase in national income and producer goods in the 11th Five-Year Plan was

only from one-half to two-thirds as great as the increase envisaged in this option, and the return on investments today is even slightly lower than it was in 1980. For this reason, the program of regional socioeconomic development described above is also likely to be ineffective. Should the initial indicator of the economic effectiveness of manpower use in the region be lowered? No, as we have already pointed out, this would only increase the number of able-bodied persons engaged in individual forms of labor and require additional state grants to Central Asian republics from the union budget.

Within the confines of the first model of regional development, therefore, the chances for the cardinal improvement of the situation are not great, particularly in view of the fact that we deliberately simplified the matter by disregarding the shortage of water resources, which will be unavoidably exacerbated if the area of farmland is augmented and production capacities are increased dramatically. In addition, there are also some ecological problems connected with the development of industry in deserts and semideserts, etc.

The effectiveness of manpower use in the region could also be augmented in another way--through the redistribution of labor resources. This model also leaves room for different options, depending on the assigned scales of redistribution and level of effectiveness. If we base our calculations on the present level of economic effectiveness, equivalent to 70 percent of the national average, and the rates of development stipulated in the basic directions for the 12th Five-Year Plan, we find that at least 7 million working-age people will have to be moved out of Central Asia. In other words, more than 80 percent of the increase in labor resources, or 450,000 people a year, would have to be resettled (OPTION IV). To what degree is this program feasible? Nothing of this nature has been undertaken in the history of our country's development (excluding the war years). It is true that 90 percent of the natural population increase was moved out of the Volga-Vyatsk region during a process of automatic migration in the 1960's, but in absolute terms this amounted to just over 800,000 people.

What unavoidable difficulties will option IV entail?

1. The most expedient method would be the redistribution of the rural native population with a low level of mobility. The encouragement of the migration of non-native inhabitants, known to be concentrated in cities, has been proposed in literature. There is no question that this would be much simpler, and a spontaneous process of this type has already begun. The people who are leaving, however, are the most highly educated and highly skilled people with experience working in industry. A survey of migrants leaving the Kirghiz SSR revealed the following facts. (We surveyed 820 people in June and July 1983 when their documents were being drawn up in the registration offices of MVD rayon divisions. The sample group was formed in two stages. First the rayons were chosen at random, and then all of the people leaving the republic were surveyed.) Before their departure, 80 percent of the respondents lived in cities and 20 percent lived in rural areas. Only 19 percent were natives of the Central Asian republics--Kirghiz, Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Turkmens. Around 4.5 percent of the migrants were employed in agriculture, and 84.4 percent were employed in industry and non-production sectors. Around 73 percent had

a secondary or higher education; the skill category of 76 percent of the workers was at least the third; 70.6 percent of the employees had a secondary specialized or higher education. In other words, the spontaneous migration is causing the region to lose its most valuable labor resources, the kind of workers the developing industry of the region needs the most. The continued expansion of the scales of migration could have severe negative effects on the economy. For this reason, there is an urgent need to increase (however difficult this might be!) the mobility of the native population.

2. People will have to be moved from the region to locations with a lower level of material welfare. The indicator of real wages in Uzbekistan, for example, is the highest in the country, although nominal wages are comparatively low. It must be said that the growing labor surplus is causing the growth rate of nominal wages in the region to fall below the average for the country and the Russian Federation. This, however, could encourage the migration of the non-native population. This will have little effect on the mobility of native inhabitants because wages represent a relatively small part of their income in comparison to the products of subsidiary farming.

3. Human resources in the region will have to move to locations with a heavier workload. A single fact will corroborate this: The level of annual employment of kolkhoz workers in the public farming sector is much lower in Central Asia than in the RSFSR, the Ukraine, and Belorussia (3). These problems are connected with the first stage of redistribution, namely the development of potential mobility. Many other difficulties will arise during the process--that is, during the actual transfer to new jobs. The fact is that the spontaneous migration of the native population on a broad scale is virtually impossible at this time, and there is no reason to believe that it will increase in the next few years, even if the augmentation of potential mobility can be accomplished. Only organized redistribution can produce tangible results. The existing forms, however, have not been adequately adapted to meet the needs of the native population, and the agencies for this purpose have not been adequately developed in the region.

Therefore, it is unrealistic to assume that 7 million people from Central Asia can be resettled in central regions within a short time. We must seek methods of increasing employment locally. We must strive for production growth rates exceeding the national average and involve young people and women of the native nationalities in this process. More dramatic acceleration is also necessary here because the Central Asian republics, in spite of some advances, are still lagging far behind in their industrial development. The percentage of people employed in industry ranges from 13 to 16 percent--that is, less than half as high as the national average.

What should the rate of economic growth be? In the last 15 years national income in the Central Asian republics increased more quickly than the average for the USSR. This, however, was not enough to maintain the indicator of the effectiveness of manpower use at the national average for 1970. With a view to the need for accelerated socioeconomic development, higher indicators will have to be set. A 2.5-fold increase in national income in Central Asia between 1986 and 2000 seems quite realistic, although it will also be quite difficult



to attain (OPTION V). This option will necessitate the redistribution of part of the labor force outside the region. The scales of this redistribution, however, will be much smaller than in option IV, calling for the resettlement of around 40 percent of the annual increase in labor resources.

It is true that this will also necessitate fundamental improvements in the management of labor resources, its careful planning, and the precise definition of the role of each organizational form. Besides this, the appropriate social conditions will have to be established in the locations of resettlement, and additional material and financial resources will have to be allocated to republics, especially the RSFSR and the Ukraine, for housing and consumer construction. In short, the successful permanent resettlement of these people will have to be secured with the aid of material and organizational support.

My many years of research have led me to the conclusion that migration policy in Central Asia should be based on the following principles. Above all, resettlement should be planned not "forever" (although this possibility cannot be excluded), but should envisage the possibility of returning to the republic after a certain period of time--for instance, after from 3 to 5 years. It is a fact that the possibility of returning is essential in the management of migration. In Central Asia, in view of the distinctive features of its history, it is especially necessary to adhere to this principle. This is connected, first, with the fact that the growth of industry in the region will require more skilled personnel and, second, with the strong attachment of the natives to their birthplace. This approach, with all of the ensuing consequences (the migrants' retention of their place on lists of applicants for housing, jobs in their profession, etc.), will encourage the mobility of the native population, especially youth. For example, our survey indicated that more than 40 percent of the young people between the ages of 18 and 30 want to work outside the region and learn how other people live, but only on the condition that they will return to their homes (4). The following fact is interesting: The desire to leave the republic was expressed most definitely by respondents from regions with the greatest labor surplus.

The second important principle is that migrants must be guaranteed an opportunity to acquire basic vocational training and a modern profession. Training in a vocational and technical institute or on-the-job training should be mandatory for migrants seeking work in a new location. The work contract should also include a point prohibiting the use of migrants in unskilled labor.

A third principle is connected with the equal consideration of the interests of the republics receiving the labor resources and the republics supplying them. Whereas the former have sufficient capital investments but are experiencing a shortage of manpower, the latter have a labor surplus but need both capital investments and skilled manpower. The modern system for the redistribution of labor resources considers the interests of regions with a labor shortage, but it ignores the needs of republics with a surplus of manpower.

Among the existing forms of manpower redistribution, social recruitment and agricultural resettlement warrant special consideration. The effectiveness



of the first method could be enhanced primarily by establishing academic-production combines on all-union key construction sites, building residences, and establishing rules to prevent the early departure from the place of employment without a valid reason. Within the framework of the second method, it would be expedient, in our opinion, to undertake the following. Kolkhozes and sovkhozes with a labor shortage and fallow land in Khabarovsk Kray, Amur Oblast and other regions should be directly under the jurisdiction of agro-industrial administrations in the Central Asian republics. They should become full-fledged managers in charge of material and financial matters and should be responsible for the development and settlement of the land, the production and distribution of products, and the organization of consumer and cultural services.

The patronage of regions with a labor shortage has also proved to be quite effective. Using capital investments allotted to oblasts in the Nonchernozem Zone, other republics are establishing construction trusts here for sovkhoz and kolkhoz development, land reclamation, and housing and consumer construction projects. This work must be based on contracts. In particular, the patron republics must be obligated to hire natives. Exceptions can be made only for specialists. The contracting parties should probably be the ispolkoms of oblast soviets and government agencies of the Central Asian republics. The geographic scales of patronage should be much broader and should take in oblasts with a labor shortage in the Ukraine and Siberia.

There is a spontaneous seasonal migration from regions with a labor surplus to the Nonchernozem Zone and the Ukraine. Most of the people who come here take jobs in construction or do agricultural work on kolkhozes and sovkhozes. Migrants from Central Asia are few in number, but this migration could be encouraged. In this case it would also be best to sign contracts, which should be initiated by the ispolkoms of oblast soviets.

Travel for educational purposes should play a much more important role in the system of organized manpower redistribution. This form is used on a fairly broad scale only in Tajikistan, and to a lesser degree in the Turkmen SSR. Young people from these republics are sent to vocational and technical institutes in the Russian Federation and the Ukraine. Around 10,400 people were admitted to the program from 1981 to 1984, and another 3,500 were sent in 1985, more than 400 of whom were young women. Besides this, Azerbaijan sent 215 people, Tajikistan sent 1,964, and the Turkmen SSR sent 1,143. It is indicative that organized moves give rise to spontaneous migration. Last year 252 people made this move independently (without an assignment). Some of them were from Uzbekistan, where this form of skilled manpower training is not being used for some reason.

Past experience suggests some ways of improving the situation. Above all, each institute admitting young people of the native nationalities should offer classes in the more thorough study of the Russian language. The RSFSR State Committee for Vocational and Technical Education is not aware of the situation, however, and instructs local recruiters to choose young men and women who are fluent in Russian. In our opinion, the agency is not fully aware of the social role of this form of personnel training either. An effort

is made to place graduates in jobs in the republics from which the young students came. Only 26 percent were sent to the RSFSR from 1981 to 1984. The inaccuracy of this decision is obvious. The graduate of a vocational and technical institute is not a career worker yet. It should be a rule to place young people from the Central Asian republics in their first jobs at the best enterprises in large cities of the RSFSR, where proletarian traditions are strong, the standards of production are high, and labor discipline is strong. This approach is certainly not contrary to the interests of the Central Asian region.

According to the projections of the Tajik SSR Gosplan, most graduates, over two-thirds, are to be placed in jobs in the Russian Federation, and less than a third will be placed at enterprises in Tajikistan from 1986 to 1990. This is probably an acceptable ratio for other republics as well. On-the-job personnel training for the Central Asian republics was instituted on a broad scale a comparatively short time ago in the RSFSR. The experience that has been accumulated is not great, but it is quite valuable. State Bearing Plant No 1 in Moscow is training specialists for Uzbekistan. On-the-job training is supplemented with a probationary period of work in mass production at an enterprise. This method is convenient for everyone, it has a considerable economic and social impact, and it does not require capital investments or an increase in housing construction.

Travel for educational purposes can aid in the rapid redistribution of many young people, and within the region as well as outside it. What is more, I am convinced that Moscow is the shortest route from the Central Asian village to an oblast center. Why? Conversations with young people revealed the reason: Many came from villages but plan to return to cities in the republic. It is difficult for young people from rural areas to acquire a highly skilled worker profession at enterprises in the region. They have to perform ancillary operations for several years. In Moscow, on the other hand, there is a strict rule that people on work assignments from Uzbekistan can be employed only in skilled jobs. The experience of State Bearing Plant No 1 warrants the closest scrutiny and dissemination, especially in large cities and at enterprises with an acute need for skilled workers.

Of course, other methods of manpower redistribution also exist. The main thing is that all of them must be planned, coordinated and managed by a single central agency. This difficult problem cannot be allowed to drift or be made the responsibility of the Central Asian republics. The scales of the problem require nationwide undertakings. These undertakings must be planned and carried out within the framework of the comprehensive program for the development of productive forces in the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan.

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## PROFESSIONAL TRAINING OF TAJIKISTAN'S WORKERS

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[Article by Emin Mansurovich Nasyrov, first deputy minister of municipal services of the Tajik SSR. This is his first article for our journal]

[Text] Major social changes have taken place in Tajikistan, just as in other Central Asian republics, during the years of Soviet rule. The most important has been the creation of national working class personnel. "But our achievements should not create the impression of problem-free ethnic processes" (1, p 53). There are many problems here. They include the issue of the quantitative (and especially the qualitative!) growth of national segments of the working class. This is an especially important process in Tajikistan: After all, there was virtually no working class here before the revolution.

In the last 25 years there have been perceptible qualitative advances in the development and distribution of productive forces and in the introduction of the achievements of the technological revolution in the republic. The higher speed and broader scales of industrial construction and the creation of new sectors of the national economy have all resulted in the absolute and relative numerical growth of the working class. Workers and their families represented 53 percent of the population of the Tajik SSR in 1979, as compared to 31.5 percent in 1959 (2, p 24). Whereas the republic population increased 1.9-fold in 10 years, the number of workers tripled (including a 2.4-fold increase in the number employed in industry).

The number of workers of the native nationalities (Tajiks and Uzbeks) is rising quickly, and, as a result, their proportional number is gradually approaching the proportional number of members of these nationalities in the employed population. Particularly rapid changes are taking place in the most progressive and technically equipped branches--electrical power engineering, the chemical industry, nonferrous metallurgy, machine building, and instrument building. Workers and employees are combined in employment statistics for different branches of the national economy; in view of the fact, however, that the rate of increase in the number of both is approximately the same, we can use this indicator (see Table 1).

As we can see, in spite of the high rate of increase in the number of workers and employees of the native nationalities, their proportional number is still



lower than their proportional number in the total population. But this is not simply a matter of more proportional representation. Substantial unutilized manpower reserves exist in the republic. The national economy's need for skilled personnel, however, is not being fully satisfied. The main problems in developing the national segment of the industrial working class are connected precisely with these facts.

In the last 25 years the population of the republic increased 2.2-fold. In 1984 the natural increase was 3.24 percent, which is much higher than the national average, and the figure is not expected to decline in the near future (4, p 35).

The development of the economy, however, is not securing the sufficiently effective use of labor resources. For objective and subjective reasons, the republic is lagging behind in the efficient use of manpower. As a result, the level of employment of the working-age population in social production was 4.9 points lower in 1980 than in 1970.

This is much lower than the national average and it is still declining. It is interesting that housework and private subsidiary farming are "absorbing" not only mothers of young children, but also young adults and the graduates of secondary schools. The continuation of the trend toward individual forms of labor will be inconsistent with the need for the accelerated socioeconomic development of the republic. The sphere of employment must be expanded in the public sector, especially in industry.

The underdevelopment of the production and social infrastructures delayed processes of social mobility—from the peasantry to the working class, from rural areas to cities, and from the stratum of semiskilled workers to the stratum of highly skilled workers. The low social mobility of native inhabitants in general and rural natives in particular, their attachment to the rural way of life and to tenacious national traditions, and the village youth's lack of fluency in Russian are all impeding the inclusion of the native population in social production, especially in industry. The fact that industry is concentrated in big cities did not promote the higher social mobility of the rural population either. Dushanbe and Leninabad Oblast are the most highly developed areas in the industrial sense. For example, the capital of the republic, where 12.6 percent of the population lives, is where 31.7 percent of the workers and employees of industrial branches and 17.1 percent of all people employed in industry are concentrated. The respective indicators for Leninabad Oblast are 31.4, 31.6, and 19.4 percent, the figures for Kulyab Oblast are 11.7, 6.6, and 1.9 percent, and the figures for Kurgan-Tyube Oblast are 20.1, 13.1, and 4.9 percent.

The 27th CPSU Congress stipulated the need for the intelligent combination of large, medium and small enterprises (1, p 37). In Tajikistan the establishment of medium and small enterprises in small cities, settlements of the urban type, and rural locations would promote the better use of labor resources and the growth of the national segment of the working class. The efforts to locate branches and shops of enterprises of local and light industry in villages have been inadequate to date (3).

Table 1: Percentage of Native Workers and Employees in Tajik SSR Economy

Sectors	1967	1973	1977	1983
Industry	35.1	42.4	46.4	57.2
Transportation	47.4	54.3	59.2	66.3
Communications	33.9	45.1	48.7	66.0
Construction	38.7	44.3	46.6	53.5
All workers and employees	46.9	55.9	60.5	68.1

Table 2: Skill Structure of Industrial Workers, %

Years	Categories			Average wage category
	I-II	III-IV	V-VI	
1969	24.6	47.7	27.7	3.5
1972	24.7	47.7	27.6	3.4
1982	27.7	47.5	24.8	3.0

Of course, the leading detachment of the national working class is formed under the conditions of large-scale industrial production. This creates prerequisites for higher cultural and technical standards and for the ideological tempering of workers. This is cogently attested to by the data of a sociological study we conducted in 1984 at a number of industrial enterprises in the Tajik SSR. Around 2,000 workers (963 natives and 968 people of other nationalities) were surveyed. Besides this, 203 students from Tajikistan in six vocational and technical institutes in the RSFSR were surveyed. The research program was compiled (with the author's participation) by the research associates of the Department of Marxism-Leninism at the USSR Council of Ministers Academy of the National Economy.

What were the respondents' motives for choosing their present jobs? Above all, diversified and meaningful labor, highly mechanized operations, and the possibility of participating in industrial production appealed to them. Among the workers of the native nationalities (hereafter called group "A"), the people citing these reasons represented 39.7, 11.8, and 7.1 percent of the total; the respective figures for non-natives (hereafter called group "B") were 39.6, 16.5, and 4.3 percent. Wages were the main factor for 23.3 percent (and 14.7 percent). Their answers were influenced by the subjective feelings of the respondents and by the actual production situation. Most of the members of group "A" (80.5 percent) were employed in basic production (71 percent of the members of group "B"), and 19.5 percent (and 29 percent) were employed in ancillary production. Around 21.8 percent (20.6) used machines and mechanisms, and another 46.9 percent (45.8) performed manual operations with the aid of machines and mechanisms. Only around a third of the workers were engaged in strictly manual labor (including the repair and regulation of equipment). As we can see, from the standpoint of job characteristics, the state of affairs in general corresponds to average national indicators. Nevertheless, the republic is lagging behind in labor productivity growth rates. For example, whereas the productivity of labor in USSR industry increased by 76 percent and whereas it doubled in Belorussia and Azerbaijan between 1970 and 1984, it increased by only 34 percent in the

Tajik SSR, and the last increase was recorded in 1981 (4, p 146). This is directly related to the gradual decline of the level of skills among industrial workers. This is corroborated by the declining indicator of the average wage category (see Table 2).

In the last two decades the percentage of semiskilled workers has increased and the percentage of highly skilled has decreased. The number of people with the intermediate skill rating has remained relatively constant. This group consists mainly of the people employed at enterprises of light industry, the textile and food industries, machine building, and metalworking (excluding instrument building)—that is, in industries distinguished by relatively simple labor. Incidentally, the decline of the average wage category from 3.3 in 1969 to 2.9 in 1982 in light industry was one of the reasons for the deterioration of product quality.

As we have already pointed out, however, significant progressive changes are taking place in the skill structure of workers in industries with complex production. For example, the percentage of semiskilled workers in electrical power engineering declined from 18.5 percent in 1969 to 13.4 percent in 1982, and the proportional number of highly skilled workers rose from 29.3 to 45.7 percent. The proportional number of these workers in nonferrous metallurgy rose from 34.1 to 38.4 percent, and in instrument building the indicator reached 61 percent.

From the standpoint of skills, workers of the native nationalities are still lagging behind workers of other nationalities (both permanent residents of the republic and migrants). However, research findings, including ours, testify that this gap is being reduced (see Table 3). It is interesting that more than half of the semiskilled and highly skilled workers in group "A" are people between the ages of 20 and 40—that is, people full of strength and energy (see Table 4). Most of the people whose skills can be improved considerably are in this age group. This suggests that significant progressive changes in the skill structure of native workers could take place within the near future. Obviously, this will not happen by itself, and it will require several immediate measures: The network of training combines should be enlarged dramatically so that workers can raise their professional level and acquire on-the-job training in a related profession. The use of the production facilities of vocational and technical institutes needs radical improvement, and more contracts should be negotiated for the training of specialists at large related enterprises in the country.

The development of career workers is a vital and creative matter, but republic enterprises have not always displayed an interest in it. In any case, the skill structure of jobs and the projected numbers of highly skilled workers in labor plans are still doing little to promote this. Existing shortcomings are attested to by the following facts: 47 percent of the respondents were dissatisfied with personnel training at their enterprises, and another 17.1 percent in group "A" and 15.7 percent in group "B" said that decisions on skill categories were not always fair. The solution to this problem is thought to be the quicker certification and optimization of jobs, the reduction of the percentage of heavy manual operations, and the renewal of fixed production capital.

Table 3: Skill Composition of Native and Non-Native Workers, %

<u>Workers</u>	<u>Basic production</u>	<u>Ancillary production</u>
<b>Natives</b>		
Unskilled	7	11
Categories I-II	23	18
Categories III-IV	45	49
Categories V-VI	25	22
<b>Non-natives</b>		
Unskilled	8	5
Categories I-II	25	13
Categories III-IV	33	42
Categories V-VI	34	40

Table 4: Skill-Age Structure of Native Workers

<u>Skill group</u> <u>(wage category)</u>	<u>Percentage of workers in age groups:</u>				
	<u>Under 20</u>	<u>20-29</u>	<u>30-39</u>	<u>40-49</u>	<u>50 and over</u>
V-VI	1.7	9.1	9.0	3.1	0.9
III-IV	5.5	26.4	9.6	3.6	1.4
I-II	2.8	13.2	4.1	1.5	0.5
Unskilled	0.1	3.8	3.2	0.3	0.2

Table 5: 10th-(and 11th)-Graders' Plans for Period Following Graduation from Secondary School, % responding (n=2,735)

<u>Categories</u>	<u>Work</u>	<u>Continued day studies</u>	<u>No exact plans</u>
Total	31.4	54.6	14.0
From worker families	34.5	53.6	11.9
From employee families	14.4	73.3	12.3
From kolkhoz families	34.4	51.1	14.5

It is indicative that most of the respondents wanted to raise their professional level. This desire was expressed by 73.2 percent of the respondents in group "A" and 65.7 percent in group "B." In particular, 56.5 percent were willing to travel to related enterprises in other cities for this purpose. This intention was expressed by 43.6 percent of the workers of native nationalities.

The system of vocational and technical education and general educational schools must play a much greater role in the formation of the industrial segment of the working class. In 1983 vocational and technical institutes accounted for only 29.8 percent of worker training. According to our survey, only 19.7 percent of the native workers learned their profession in vocational and technical institutes.

Considerable efforts are being made in the republic to develop the network of vocational and technical institutes, but it is still incapable of admitting



more than 18-20 percent of the graduates of general educational day schools each year. The Tajik SSR Government has begun sending young people of the native nationalities with a secondary education to study in vocational and technical institutes in the RSFSR and the Ukraine, and 9,500 people were sent there from 1981 to 1985. Another 3,000 school graduates will be sent in 1986. It goes without saying that the career plans of the young people are taken into account. Most of them have no objection to learning a worker profession or working outside the republic. According to our survey, 61.5 percent of the young men and women sent to vocational and technical institutes in Gorkiy and Tula Oblasts from Tajikistan feel that many of their comrades would like to attend Russian institutes. Parents also approve of this. In our survey, 37 percent of the workers said it was possible that their children would work outside the republic, and this included 39 percent of the native workers. It is significant that 45.4 percent of the students expressed the wish to work at local enterprises after they had graduated from the institute. It is true that only 25-30 percent stay at this time.

The significance of this initiative, including its importance in satisfying the manpower needs of regions with a labor shortage, has already been discussed (5). For this reason, we will discuss a few of the problems and shortcomings reducing the effectiveness of the experiment. Young men and women are chosen for study in vocational and technical institutes in a largely haphazard manner. Representatives of the institutes do not arrive in the designated regions of the republic until just before 1 September, and their vocational guidance has essentially only one purpose--to secure the planned number of students at any cost. As a result, they sometimes conduct their work formally, without paying the necessary attention to the specific interests of young people. Only 32 percent of the respondents said that they were learning the profession they had originally wanted, and 40 percent said that they had not been given a choice. The result is a high level of dissatisfaction with the profession being studied and, consequently, a high drop-out rate. Furthermore, most of the young students have little knowledge of the Russian language (60 percent of the respondents). This naturally makes their studies more difficult.

The effective training of skilled personnel depends largely on the system of vocational guidance and labor training in schools. In 1983 labor training courses were offered in 72 percent of the secondary day schools in the republic, and the classes were taken by 64 percent of the 9th- and 10th- (or 11th)-graders. Only 8.4 percent have continued studying the profession they studied in school full-time, and the number of those working in the national economy is even lower--7.5 percent. One of the main reasons is the tendency to teach these students primarily agricultural professions. In the 1983/84 academic year these were the professions studied by 51.1 percent of the upperclassmen. Only 12.5 percent were trained in industrial professions, and another 3.9 percent were trained in construction professions (2, p 227). Only 17.9 percent of the students in rural schools were trained in industrial professions (6). It is quite obvious, however, that priority should be assigned here to worker professions.

Vocational guidance in the schools is inadequate. According to a survey of upperclassmen by the Tajik SSR Central Statistical Administration, the career

choices of only 15.3 percent were influenced by their labor training. Another 6.9 percent acknowledged the influence of student production brigades. Only a third of the students intend to go to work after graduation, while the majority want to continue their studies (see Table 5). Of these, 51.4 percent want to attend VUZ's, 26 percent want to attend tekhnikums, and only 14.6 percent want to attend vocational and technical institutes.

The facts cited here are another argument in favor of the quick and efficient institution of the measures envisaged in the reform of general educational and vocational schools. Without purposeful and systematic efforts, most of the young people will continue to end up in agriculture. This process, however, is an indisputably negative one in our republic. The quantitative and qualitative growth of the industrial segment of the republic working class, primarily through the inclusion of members of native nationalities, is an essential condition for the intensification of social production, the acceleration of scientific and technical progress, and the dramatic augmentation of the Tajik SSR's contribution to nationwide programs.

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## LABOR BIOGRAPHIES OF GENERATIONS (SOME RESULTS OF A UNIONWIDE STUDY)

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[Article by Fridrikh Rafailovich Filippov, doctor of philosophy and head of the Department of the Social Structure of the Soviet Society at the Institute of Sociological Research, USSR Academy of Sciences, Larisa Grigoryevna Gaft, candidate of historical sciences and research associate, and Yelena Davydovna Igithkanyan, candidate of philosophy and senior research associate. All of the authors work in the Department of the Social Structure of the Soviet Society]

[Text] The increasingly dynamic nature of our society and the difficulty of managing its social development demand the constant attention of sociologists. Changes in the social class structure, in the nature and content of labor, and in the educational and cultural level of various population groups have a direct effect on the lives of individuals and whole generations. "Policy produces the necessary results when it is based on the thorough consideration of the interests of classes, social groups and individuals. This is true of the management of society and even more true of ideological and indoctrinational matters. The society is a group of specific individuals, with specific interests, their own joys and sorrows, and their own beliefs about life and about its real and imaginary values" (2, p 87).

The biography of any individual is part of the history of the people, part of their common biography. Each generation is not only influenced by social changes, but also makes these changes and makes national history. By analyzing the past and the present, sociologists can also look into the future and predict some tendencies toward social changes. In their most concentrated form, these are reflected in changes in the social structure, stemming from the evolution of production relations and from the social mobility of people--from generation to generation and within generations. The study of this mobility, in our opinion, is one of the most important aspects of the study of the dynamics of the Soviet society's social structure, of its reproduction and modification.

These were the considerations motivating the organization of a unionwide sociological study in 1982-1985, based on a single questionnaire entitled "Your Labor Biography." The ISI [Institute of Sociological Research], USSR

Academy of Sciences, was the head scientific organization with which specialists from scientific establishments in several parts of the country worked on the study.<sup>1</sup> It must be said that this was not the only study of its kind. At virtually the same time, Baltic sociologists were conducting a similar study (3, 4), and an international project was being carried out (5).

In view of the fact that the program and procedural materials of our study have been published (6) and some of the more general findings have already been revealed (7), we feel that we can make a few introductory remarks and then confine our discussion to several empirical results of what we regard as fundamental importance.

The main topic of the research was the role of social mobility within generations in the dialectically contradictory process of the reproduction and modification of the Soviet society's social structure and of its main elements and subelements--the social composition of the country's population. The purpose of the study was to disclose the mechanisms of social mobility and the most effective methods of regulating them. The research findings can be used on the analytical level and can be applied in the forecasting of basic tendencies toward change in the social structure of society. The age-group analysis of social mobility that was undertaken during the study revealed the connections between the mobility of generations and the socioeconomic and other features of the corresponding period of societal development.

A combination of unionwide and regional approaches helped to determine the degree to which social-territorial differences influence social mobility within generations.

The study was conducted in three stages. The first was a pilot study, the second<sup>2</sup> was based on a unionwide sample group (55,000 respondents), and the third (covering all elements of the program) was conducted in 11 regions of the country.

The last sample group was formed in several stages: Typical populated points (urban and rural) were chosen in each region in accordance with the degree of representation of national economic branches and professions; this was followed by the choice of typical enterprises, and then by the choice of primary labor collectives at these enterprises, after which all of the members of the collectives were surveyed.

V.I. Molchanov drew up a special descriptive document to define the main social features of the labor collective. All of the respondents were then divided into five different age groups, measured in decades: those who had begun working prior to the 1950's, in the 1950's, the 1960's, 1970's and 1980's.

This interval was dictated by the expediency of "relating" the results of the study to population census data, which aided in distinguishing so-called "structural" mobility--that is, mobility stemming from general changes in the social structure and the structure of employment.



## Social Mobility Within Age Groups

The intensity and direction of social mobility were examined in connection with the individual's membership in a particular age group. It must be said that the analysis of age groups has been used quite extensively in analyses of the reproduction of the social composition of the employed population. The year of birth is generally used as the main criterion in defining the age group (the "real generation"). This was the case, for example, in the studies by E.K. Vasilyeva, L.A. Gordon and V.V. Komarovskiy (8, 9). Our point of departure, on the other hand, was not the year of birth, but the year the person began working, and this helped us obtain more precise information.

In this connection, we should recall that the population of the USSR increased by 82 million (or 42 percent) between 1940 and 1985. During these years the urban population doubled, the percentage of workers also doubled (from 33.7 to 61.6 percent), the percentage of employees and specialists increased 1.6-fold, and the percentage of kolkhoz peasants fell to one-fourth of the previous figure (10, pp 5, 7). The percentage of employed individuals with a higher or secondary (complete or partial) education rose from 12.3 to 86.8 percent, or more than sevenfold (*ibid.*, p 29). These changes are organically related to mass social mobility, including mobility within generations. Around a third of all the respondents in the unionwide sample group changed their class affiliation between the time when they began working and the time of the survey, including 26.5 percent of the workers, 37.7 percent of the employees and specialists, and 30.9 percent of the kolkhoz members.

The analysis of age groups indicated that 61.7 percent of the people who began working before the 1950's, 61.3 percent of those who began in the 1950's, 57.4 percent who began in the 1960's, 41.9 percent who began in the 1970's, and 20 percent who began in the 1980's were included in these social transfers. It is understandable that young respondents have not accomplished these transfers on as broad a scale as earlier generations. Another factor, however, is also at work here: the increasing stabilization of the social composition and the reduction of transfers out of a class, primarily in the case of the kolkhoz peasantry (whereas the number of kolkhoz members decreased by 7.2 million between 1940 and 1960, it decreased by 5.2 million between 1960 and 1970, by 3.5 million between 1970 and 1980, and by only 400,000 between 1980 and 1984) (10).

We learned that more than 90 percent of all these transfers took place during the first decade after the respondents began working, 9 percent took place in the second, and less than 1 percent took place in the third and subsequent decades. The initial period was also the time of the majority (95 percent) of so-called reverse transfers (that is, cases in which respondents returned to the social position they had left earlier). This indicator is also lower for the younger respondents: for example, from 32 percent in the first age group of workers to 19 percent in the fourth. Around 17 percent of the employees (non-specialists), 13.5 percent of the specialists, and almost 11 percent of the kolkhoz members returned to their earlier social positions.

The younger the respondents, the older they were when they began working: Whereas more than half of the respondents who began working in the 1950's

were under 18 at the time, in the 1970's only around 30 percent were under 18; the respective figures for those who began working between the ages of 18 and 21 are 40 percent and 60 percent; four-fifths of all the respondents who began working in the 1980's were from 18 to 21 at the time. As a rule, women begin working later than men, usually because they are having children and raising them.

Data on changes in the educational level of respondents during their careers are important in the analysis of transfers from one class to another. For example, 23 percent of the workers who had only an elementary education when they began working had a general secondary education by the time of the survey, and 8.3 percent had a secondary specialized education; 56.2 percent of the specialists who had a general secondary education when they began working later acquired a specialized secondary or higher education. Incidentally, this is the most common channel of social mobility for young people. We learned that 37.2 percent of the employees and specialists came from worker families, 26.3 percent came from kolkhoz families, 32.4 percent came from families in their own social group, and the rest did not respond to this question. Almost two-thirds of the specialists, however, had parents engaged in mental labor. As we moved from the oldest age group to the youngest, we found an increase in the percentage of "workers from workers" (1.4-fold) and "employees (including specialists) from employees" (1.7-fold), but the percentage of "workers from kolkhoz members" decreased by half. The "educational mobility" of kolkhoz members turned out to be quite low: 78.2 percent of those who had a partial secondary education or less are still at the same level; only 13.5 percent received a complete secondary (general) education, and 8.3 percent received a secondary specialized or higher education. For the sake of comparison, let us consider that 25.7 percent of the workers who began with a general secondary education later acquired a higher or secondary specialized education, and 22.8 percent with a partial secondary education later received a secondary school certificate. Among the workers who acquired a secondary specialized education during their careers, 41.4 percent began with a partial secondary education (or less), and 51.3 percent of those who acquired a higher education began with a complete secondary education.

All of these data attest to the clearly defined socialist nature of social mobility in the Soviet society. Transfers from one class to another are equally possible for all segments of the laboring public, without any antagonistic conflicts or the suppression of some segments by others. Educational opportunities are offered to everyone without exception and are constitutionally guaranteed. The socialist society itself has an interest in encouraging the most talented and industrious people to climb the social and professional ladder, the people capable of "realizing their potential, developing their abilities, and revealing the talents that were an untapped spring in the people and were trampled, choked and smothered in thousands and millions by capitalism" (1). This statement by Lenin is similar to a statement made at the 27th CPSU Congress: "The fact is that if we cannot raise production and economic competition and competition in fields of science and the arts to a new and incomparably higher level, we will not accomplish the accelerated socioeconomic progress of the country" (2, p 51). Competition and the selection of the best, and not the automatic "equalization of chances," should lie at the basis of social advancement.

We must admit, however, that changes in social status entail certain difficulties even in the socialist society—material, psychological, etc. One of the aims of the regulation of social mobility is to help gifted and talented individuals overcome these difficulties. The increasing stabilization of the social composition and the changes in the domestic situation in the late 1970's and early 1980's in connection with certain economic difficulties, however, have made social transfers more difficult and undesirable for some categories of laborers. The coefficient of the correlation between the initial social position of the respondent (at the start of his career) and the position recorded at the time of the survey was 0.539 for the men and 0.566 for the women in the first age group, and the respective figures for the other groups were 0.560 and 0.470 for the second, 0.601 and 0.790 for the third, and 0.846 and 0.816 for the fourth. In the entire group, therefore, the distance between the initial and current positions is being reduced, and women are more mobile than men.

Transfers within the class are of special interest—transfers from simple to more complex labor. Here the men are ahead of the women. For example, 4 percent of the men and 13 percent of the women in the first age group did not improve their skills by the time of the survey, 34.3 percent became skilled workers, and 54.6 percent became highly skilled workers. The transfer from the semiskilled stratum to the highly skilled stratum was made by 47.2 percent of the men and 10.8 percent of the women. Among the same semiskilled workers, 29.1 percent of the men and 19.5 percent of the women became specialists. In the category of skilled and highly skilled workers, on the other hand, women are much more mobile than men. The transfer from this category to the specialist category was made by 26.5 percent of the men and 37.2 percent of the women, and 23.5 percent of the men and 50 percent of the women among the highly skilled workers became specialists. In all, social transfers within classes, including the intelligentsia, were made by around half of the respondents. In combination with those who transferred from one class to another, they represent an impressive group—80 percent of the socially mobile employed population. Besides this, 43 percent of the respondents experienced social-territorial mobility.

This is the picture of social mobility revealed by the results of the union-wide survey. It reflects the contradictory nature of this process: In spite of the extremely high level of social mobility, there is a more pronounced tendency toward the increased stability of the main social groups, the reinforcement of their self-reproduction (including reverse mobility), and the prevalence of intraclass mobility (and transfers of a similar nature within social groups).

Our findings were close to the results of other studies, particularly the one by L.A. Gordon and V.V. Komarovskiy. Their analysis of all-union census data revealed that almost half of the new generation changes its socio-professional status in comparison to the previous one (8, 9, p 104). We must remember, however, that the matter in question here is "structural mobility." The international study conducted under the supervision of V.N. Shubkin indicated that intergenerational transfers (in all social groups) involve 72 percent of the young laboring public, but 8 percent of the cases were reverse



transfers, and the final indicator of mobility was 64 (in our study it was around 70). Similar trends are characteristic of the main directions of social changes from one generation to another. As for intragenerational transfers by youth, the authors cite the figure of 42.8 percent for the USSR (in our study it was around 30 percent). The divergence of these indicators is quite understandable in view of the higher mobility of youth (5, pp 166, 178).

It is understandable that specialists are interested in the intragenerational mobility of Soviet workers. This is the main topic of E.V. Klopov's study. We must say, however, that conclusions based on a survey of 30 or 40 (?) workers in Moscow and Taganrog and comparisons of a few personal biographies could hardly be called representative general conclusions. Incidentally, the author's discussion of the interprofessional and intersectorial mobility of workers is more valid, although the purely social aspect of these types of mobility is not articulated (11, pp 160, 193).

V.I. Lukin and S.B. Nekhoroshkov examine the intensity of the social mobility of the laboring public with the aid of the results of a sample study of labor books. They report that the average number of transfers per year per person between the ages of 16 and 50 for men was 0.0606 in 1940-1949, 0.1065 in 1950-1959, 0.1042 in 1960-1969, and 0.1497 in 1970-1979, and that the respective figures for women were 0.1369, 0.1598, 0.1470, and 0.1944 (12, p 14). As we can see, women are more mobile than men, and the intensity of transfers increases from decade to decade. This conclusion seems to conflict with our findings, but because these authors did not divide the people into age groups, we can assume that this is the reason for the discrepancy.

The Estonian researchers made note of the clearly defined stabilization of the social status of respondents as they grew older (4, p 334). Differences in research methods, however, make the complete comparison of their data to ours impossible.

### Regional Features of Mobility

Let us move on to the regional features of mobility, especially transfers from one class to another. Because the rates at which the absolute and relative numbers of kolkhoz peasants varied in different regions for a long time,<sup>3</sup> their role in augmenting the working class also varied considerably. In the Central Asian republics, for example, the percentage of workers from the kolkhoz peasantry is approximately three times as high as in the European part of the USSR. The augmentation of the ranks of the intelligentsia by workers is also a more intensive process here than in the "old" industrial regions. In the Kirghiz SSR, according to the survey, one out of every four children of workers, primarily highly skilled workers, entered the specialist category. Among the students of secondary specialized and higher academic institutions in this republic, there are 3.2 times as many children of highly skilled workers as of semiskilled workers, and 1.6 times as many as of skilled workers. It is indicative that reverse transfers (from specialists and employees to workers) were also much more intensive in the Central Asian republics than in the RSFSR. Apparently, in contrast to the more stabilized social structure of industrially developed regions, the structure here has not "found its balance" yet.



We also had an opportunity to compare the intensity of social transfers by the native and non-native laboring public. In the Tajik SSR, for example, the percentage of Tajiks transferring from the working class to the peasantry is 2.5 times as high as the percentage of other nationalities making this transfer. Conversely, Tajiks engaged in mental labor are only one-fifth as likely to become workers as non-natives.

The general tendencies of intraclass mobility are present within regions. Here it is particularly noticeable that the category of semiskilled workers is reproduced by the same stratum. The advancement from semiskilled and skilled to highly skilled labor is somewhat more intensive for Russian workers in the Central Asian republics than for natives, although the difference is not great (respectively, 45 and 50 percent, and 37 and 40 percent). The initial level of skills and the rate of advancement to more complex labor are still much lower for women there than for men.

Another fact is also indicative. Because of the slow development of the system of vocational and technical education in some republics, the local population begins working without any preliminary vocational training, while young people who come here from other regions usually have this training. In the Tajik SSR, for example, 20 percent of the Tajik workers surveyed and only 4 percent of the Russians did not graduate from vocational and technical institutes. On the other hand, 10 percent of the Tajiks, but only 2 or 3 percent of the Russians, acquired professional skills in a general educational school. The percentage of graduates of vocational and technical institutes is low in general in the Central Asian republics, and it is therefore more accurate to treat this as a regional feature than as a national one.

Research on the regional level revealed that skilled workers and specialists with a higher education were distinguished by the greatest stability. E.K. Vasilyeva arrived at this conclusion when she studied the urban population of the Tatar ASSR in the middle of the 1970's, and so did E.A. Saar when she conducted a survey in two Estonian cities, Tallin and Rakvere, in 1984 (8, p 149). This certainly does not exclude the possibility of other types of mobility--intersectorial and interprofessional. We can even say that a higher level of education and professional training increases the probability of intersectorial and professional mobility. There are also noticeable differences in the direction and intensity of intersectorial transfers in different regions. In Central Asia, for example, the most stable personnel are in industry: 85 percent of the respondents were still in the same place. In Voronezh Oblast, however, personnel moved from industry to transportation, to construction and, in particular, to consumer services, municipal services, and trade. The situation is different in the Central Asian republics: Only around half of the people who began working in construction, transportation and communications were still there at the time of the survey.

The length of training and the level of skills of workers in different parts of the country have grown more equal through the years. The Central Chernozem region is compared to the Central Asian republics in terms of these indicators in the table. However, this fact, which is indisputably positive in itself, could prove to be purely formal on closer examination and might not promote

the social advancement of the individual. For this reason, the qualitative assessment of the educational level of people living in large, medium and small cities and in rural locations is important here. Whereas most of the population of a specific region has an education of approximately the same quality and it can serve as a criterion for social advancement, quantitative indicators (the average length of training, etc.) cease to play the decisive role in interregional mobility, particularly when people move to regions where the quality of education is better.

This important consideration was one of the working hypotheses in our research program. Unfortunately, the degree of its validity cannot be judged during the current stage of empirical data processing.

To analyze the regional features of social mobility, we chose two areas--Tyumen Oblast in the RSFSR and the Abkhaz ASSR. Our reasons for these choices will be discussed below.

Table: Dynamics of Education (1) and Average Skill Category (2) of Generations

Start of career	Voronezh Oblast		Tajik SSR		Kirghiz SSR	
	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>
Before 1950's	7.5	4.3	5.9	3.3	6.4	4.2
1950's	9.1	4.3	7.6	4.1	7.6	3.9
1960's	9.9	4.2	9.4	4.2	9.6	4.0
1970's	10.4	3.8	10.0	3.8	10.1	3.6
1980's	10.3	3.5	10.1	3.2	10.1	3.4

Tyumen Oblast is one of the regions displaying the quickest development in the last two decades. The population increased from 1.1 million in 1959 to 2.6 million in 1985 (10, p 16; 13). There was almost a threefold increase in the number of people employed in the national economy, and a sixfold increase in the number of specialists with degrees. We learned that more than one-fourth of the respondents who began their careers as workers later entered the specialist category. Less than half of those who had started work as kolkhoz members were still peasants at the time of the survey: 48.6 percent were members of the working class, and the rest had become employees and specialists. Interclass mobility was supplemented with territorial, intersectorial and intraclass mobility. The advancement of workers and of engineering and technical personnel to more complex and responsible types of work was particularly intensive. Almost two-thirds of the workers did not change their professions, however, and less than 14 percent of the specialists changed their professions. Over 40 percent of the workers surveyed said they had prospects for advancement at their enterprise; furthermore, the higher the skills, the higher the percentage of people certain of the possibility of advancement (only 16 percent of the semiskilled workers expect promotions within their own enterprises).

In general, the results obtained in Tyumen Oblast distinguish it from others, where the rates and scales of intraclass mobility are not as impressive and the number of people arriving from other regions is lower. A newly developed region creates, therefore, certain advantages for the realization of the individual's social expectations.

The Abkhaz ASSR is not a typical region. It was precisely its distinctive features that interested the researchers. The population here is multinational and highly educated, and the economy is diversified and distinctive. The Abkhaz ASSR ranks fifth among the 20 ASSR's in terms of educational level (886 out of every 1,000 people employed in the national economy have a higher or secondary--complete or partial--education). Vocational training, however, has developed slowly here: The first secondary vocational and technical institute was not opened until 1973, and there are only four of them today. In combination with the huge numbers of people from rural locations who are joining the working class, this circumstance has given rise to several conflicting tendencies. For example, whereas most of the people who began working before the 1950's and in the 1950's had an intermediate skill rating, the level dropped slightly in the 1960's (it was precisely during these years that rural migration to the cities of the republic reached its "peak"). The percentage of workers with an average skill rating rose again in the 1970's, but this tendency did not extend to highly skilled workers. It is indicative that half of the respondents who began working as kolkhoz peasants still have a low skill rating, and only 8 percent of them are categorized as highly skilled workers. On the other hand, 60 percent of those who remained in rural areas are now professional machine operators. It is interesting that 18 percent of the machine operators on kolkhozes came here from the working class. In this case, the researchers encountered something they did not see in other regions--the transfer of workers and other population strata to the kolkhoz peasantry, especially the machine operator category (the indicator is 82 percent for machine operators).

The number of new personnel in Abkhaz industry is high. Furthermore, the personnel here display the greatest stability: Around 80 percent of the respondents had been working constantly since the beginning of their careers, around a third had transferred to industry from construction, 54 percent had come from transportation, and 23 percent had come from agriculture. According to our research findings, trade and services ranked second in terms of personnel stability: Almost two-thirds of the respondents had always worked in these fields. Construction and agriculture were the most likely to lose personnel.

Therefore, despite the clearly defined uniqueness of each region, trends in inter- and intraclass mobility and changes in the nature of labor and the educational level of generations are becoming more common.

An analysis of our research findings suggests to us that the information could be used in social planning or in the resolution of personnel problems. The 27th CPSU Congress and the June (1986) CPSU Central Committee Plenum focused attention on the role of personnel. Under these conditions, studies of social mobility are an important source of scientific information aiding in the choice of the most effective ways of controlling the movement of national labor resources.

There is no question that these methods include the system of vocational training for youth and the state system of vocational guidance that is being established in accordance with the vocational and general educational reform.



The party's planned reorganization of the system of higher and secondary specialized education should also lead to the more efficient placement of specialist personnel.

The measures envisaged in the state plan for the economic and social development of the USSR from 1986 to 1990 for the fundamental reorganization of the entire national economic complex, the reinforcement of the social orientation of production, the elevation of the material welfare of the population, the development of education, culture and public health services, and the improvement of the system of national economic management will create new prerequisites for the social mobility of the laboring public and for its regulation according to plan on the national scale and within the boundaries of specific regions. Studies of new trends in social mobility will become an important part of the study of the dynamics of the Soviet society's social structure.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. The people who conducted the survey and processed the results along with the authors of this article were ISI research associates N.V. Andrushchak, I.V. Kazarinova, A.N. Kasatkin, I.Yu. Petrushina and N.P. Chepul'skiy, trainees and post-graduate students A.A. Kuvatova, S.N. Kurusenko, A.V. Serdyuk and A.G. Laumyanskayte, and researchers from the Institute of Philosophy and Law of the Latvian SSR Academy of Sciences (headed by M.Ye. Ashmane), the Institute of Philosophy, Sociology, and Law of the Lithuanian SSR Academy of Sciences (A.A. Matulen's), the History Institute of the Estonian SSR Academy of Sciences (A.V. Kirkh), the Department of Philosophy and Law of the Tajik SSR Academy of Sciences (V.V. Vybornova), the Frunze Polytechnical Institute (K.I. Isayev), Kazan University (Ya.Z. Garipov), the Ufa Aviation Institute (N.A. Aitov), the Tyumen Industrial Institute (K.G. Barbakova), the Voronezh Construction Engineering Institute (A.A. Utukov), and Abkhaz University (Sh.V. Misabishvili and L.V. Kansuzyan).
2. With the aid of researchers in the social statistics division of the USSR Central Statistical Administration.
3. The rates still vary dramatically in different union republics--from 6.4 percent in the RSFSR and 4.4 percent in the Kazakh SSR to 16.3 percent in the Ukraine, almost 19 percent in Uzbekistan, 16 percent in Moldavia, and over 27 percent in the Turkmen SSR (10, pp 300-301; authors' calculations).

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## LIGHT AND DARK SIDES OF COLLECTIVE CONTRACT

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[Article by Yevgeniy Ilich Khrishchev, candidate of economic sciences and docent at Kishinev State University and author of the monographs "The Encouragement of the Activity of the Production Collective" (1979), "Labor Initiative and Its Stimulation" (1981), "The Potential of the Brigade Contract" (1983) and "A Concise Guide to Economics for the Brigade Leader at an Industrial Enterprise" (1986) and of the article "The Socioeconomic Impact of the Brigade Contract" in our journal (1984, No 3), and Lidiya Ivanovna Kozhokar, instructor at Kishinev State University. This is her first article in our journal]

[Text] The introduction of the brigade form of labor organization requires the reorganization of enterprise management. It is unlikely that anyone would disagree with this fact today. The nature of the changes, however, depends largely on the type of brigade created. There have been fairly extensive discussions in scientific literature of the most effective types (comprehensive, full-cycle, self-contained manufacturing brigades, etc.). Most of these discussions, however, have focused on organization within the collective. The latter, however, is certainly affected by the principles of management and planning. This was the precise conclusion suggested by the results of a study of production brigades at a number of enterprises in Kishinev. It was conducted in 1985 by the Labor Economics Department of Kishinev University. Around 1,000 brigade members and 200 administrators, employees, and engineering and technical personnel were surveyed.

Above all, the study indicated that the expansion of the rights and powers of the primary labor collective has come into conflict with the existing principles of cost accounting. It is being impeded to a considerable extent by a variety of regulations. The higher demands of workers on the administration are a characteristic feature of the current production situation, but their complaints, however justifiable they might be in general, often conflict with enterprise interests. The reasons are well known. Above all, they are the formal approach to the organization of brigades and the preoccupation with the quantitative side of the matter. The brigades at the enterprises surveyed were often established through the automatic unification of workers with individual assignments, without any reorganization of intraplant planning, technology or wages. It is not surprising that most of the respondents (including

administrators) could not cite any qualitatively new features of today's brigades in comparison to those of the 1940's, 1950's and 1960's.

The comprehensive brigades, especially the self-supporting ones, stand out from the rest. The effectiveness and quality of their work are far superior. Changes in the level of labor discipline, in worker participation in management, in the system of wages, in the mechanization of labor, and in the use of advanced experience are particularly noticeable here, in comparison to primary collectives of other types. Comprehensive brigades are far superior to specialized brigades in terms of these indicators, not to mention to those working "individually." For example, around three-fourths of the workers in the first type and only one-fourth in the second type armed themselves with the advanced experience of their comrades. In the comprehensive brigade, where norms for each individual operation have been replaced by comprehensive norms and where wages are paid in accordance with final results and a single work order, three times as many people described their wages as equitable and their collectives as unified.

Brigades made up of people with a single specialty are superior in terms of only one parameter--the level of skills. (It is significant that all references to indicators here and further on in the article concern the changes that have taken place in recent years, and not absolute indicators.) The reason is that training in vocational and technical institutes and on the job is essentially geared to the acquisition of skills in a narrow field. In the comprehensive brigade, on the other hand, each member performs several related operations but usually learns them independently.

What secures the high productivity of brigade labor? Above all, the rules of cost accounting and responsibility for the technological cycle. For example, at the Kishinev Tractor Plant, the comprehensive full-cycle brigade of core workers headed by I.P. Morar, deputy of the republic Supreme Soviet, performs the complete set of operations here--from drying the sand and preparing the core mixture to cleaning and transporting the finished product to the shop. With the help of efficiency experts (10 suggestions were implemented in 3 years), the foundry machines were modernized, the delivery of the working mixture was mechanized, and quick-change furnaces were incorporated. The overall level of mechanization has reached 75 percent. Labor productivity increased by 18.1 percent just in 1985. All cases of defective output have been completely excluded, and there has not been a single violation of labor discipline in the brigade since 1978. The brigade of assembly workers in the compression welding shop of the same plant, made up of 28 fitters and mechanics, is responsible for the complete assembly of the tractor cab. The collective receives an assignment for output, labor productivity growth, and labor-intensiveness reduction and instructions on total wages and personnel limits from 5 to 10 days before the beginning of the year. The brigade council ensures the scheduled delivery of intermediate products, submission of documents, etc. Wages are paid according to the final result--the delivery of the complete vehicle. Special orders are paid for separately. In this brigade, 20 of the people mastered all of the operations. Within a year, its numbers were reduced by 8, and the productivity of its labor increased by 17 percent.

In many comprehensive full-cycle brigades, however, despite the introduction of remuneration according to a single job order, factor of labor participation and so forth, the anticipated rise in labor productivity did not occur. Why not? Above all, because wages still depend not on the final output, but on various relative indicators--the percentage fulfillment of output norms and other limits assigned by a superior agency. For example, the collective of furnace operators in the iron foundry of the tractor plant increased the casting output by 12 percent over the year, and the number of brigade members was reduced by 5.6 percent. As a result, output per worker increased by 18.5 percent, and average wages were reduced by 12.6 percent (from 302 to 264 rubles). Average wages stayed the same in the comprehensive full-cycle brigade of the forge, although labor productivity rose 18.2 percent (three mechanics were released from the brigade). It is true that these wages are quite high and that they surpass the plant average. In itself, however, this does not encourage workers to seek and use internal reserves. The activity of brigades should be based on long-term normatives, clearly defining the relationships between productivity, final output, and wages. Product plans with no limit on average wages must be distributed to collectives.

Cost accounting is still being introduced too slowly. In 1985 only one out of every three brigades in Moldavian industry operated on this basis. For example, at the tractor plant, where it has been relatively difficult to establish the new method, assignments for expenditures of materials, fuel and energy are distributed to only 28 of the 181 brigades. The reason is the absence of detailed calculations of material and labor expenditures: Brigades are informed only of their limits. This does not aid in the comparison of results or in the transfer of many production organization functions to primary collectives--functions that are now largely an administrative matter. The experience of the Moldavlabe (in Bender) and Moldavizolit (in Tiraspol) plants proves that full-cycle comprehensive brigades responsible for the entire production cycle (from the acquisition of raw materials to the delivery of products to warehouses) can and should be informed of annual plans for product output and variety. In 1985 more than 98.5 percent of the products of Moldavizolit collectives of this type were accepted on first submission and the plant settled all accounts with its 1,500 consumers.

Brigade cost accounting does not produce the anticipated impact if large production subdivisions and the enterprise (or association) as a whole do not make the transition to the new conditions of economic management. We can offer clear evidence of this. Around half of the conflicts between self-funding brigades and administrations occur because the latter are more interested in the continuous functioning of the expenditure mechanism than in high final indicators and their organizational, material and technical support. One of the main principles of this mechanism is the minimization of expenditures on organization and management. For example, the brigades of the Monolitstroy Trust systematically submit requisitions for the equipment they will need the next working day. These orders, however, are not processed in the construction administration or the trust. Machines and materials are distributed "by sight" or, more precisely, by doling out "one earring to each sister." As a result, resources are dissipated among the construction subdivisions of various departments. The effectiveness of the contract is diminished by the



absence of reserve inventory and a lack of coordination in work with project associates, who are still being paid not on the basis of final delivery volumes, but on the basis of each cubic meter of earth moved, each kilometer of cable laid, etc. Brigades do not feel responsible for the fulfillment of a contract, because they are frequently assigned to work with other collectives with no specific operational assignments and are ordered to "rush" other projects. Long distances between construction sites and the constant travel from one project to another also interfere with the work. All of this suggests that the time has come to add engineering and technical personnel and production organizers to the large comprehensive brigades or to at least offer them bonuses for the fulfillment of contractual obligations stipulated in the work order.

The most effective solution, however, is the transfer to the full-cycle contract. Certain objective prerequisites for this exist in the republic. Consolidated production collectives (brigades, brigade-sections, and technological chains) are becoming more common.

There is also a need for the reorganization of the workers themselves. The proposal that technological chains become the main link of the intraorganizational structure was supported by 68 percent of the members of comprehensive brigades and 66 percent of the members of specialized brigades, 75 percent of the brigade leaders, and from 68 to 70 percent of the foremen, economists, and engineering and technical personnel of production-technical divisions. The idea of uniting the brigades of a single cycle in a self-funded collective was supported by 75 percent of the economists and more than 60 percent of the brigade leaders and foremen. Therefore, the natural trends in the development of the brigade method have given rise to an urgent need for the reorganization of planning and management and for the inclusion of new production structures in the orbit of brigade organization.

The improvement of brigade competition is one of the main ways of developing this method. Research findings distinguish between three groups of workers. The first do not view themselves as participants in competition. They represent 10 percent of the total, and not the 4 percent recorded in trade union reports. Most of them are the workers in ancillary shops, the personnel of plant management divisions, and semiskilled workers. The second group are the people who participate in competition but have no desire to surpass their comrades or to enter into labor contests with them (40 percent). The third are active participants in competition and the organizers of competition who strive to win contests (50 percent).

Only one out of every two young workers participates in competition, and the figure is even lower in some brigades. It is interesting that 80 percent of the young recent arrivals at the enterprise regard competition as an effective method of enhancing the efficiency of brigade operations and of self-affirmation in the collective. After an encounter with the reality of competition, the percentage of people with this opinion declines sharply. There is a revival of interest after around 5 years.

These different categories of workers were compared and contrasted in terms of production indicators (shift assignment fulfillment, material expenditures,

product quality, and percentage of products accepted immediately upon submittal), creative activity (participation in efficiency proposal submission and in enterprise management), the use of advanced experience, job satisfaction, and satisfaction with the organization of competition. The third group was the leader in all areas. A personal stamp has been issued to 12 percent of the workers in this group, 6 percent of the "middle-of-the-roads," and 3 percent of the people in the first group. Socialist commitments are always fulfilled by 66, 53, and 30 percent of those in the respective groups. In all, 82.3 percent of the participants in competition are keeping up with shift assignments and are competing for the fulfillment of the 5-day norm in 4 days. 43 percent have an almost perfect record of product acceptance upon submittal, and 12.5 percent submit efficiency proposals. In the first group, only 41.3 percent of the workers can cope with shift assignments, and 5.6 percent regularly exceed them. A fourth of the people in this group said they saw no particular point in the submission of efficiency proposals, and many of them stressed that wages were the main consideration in their work. As we have already pointed out, most of the people in this group work in ancillary shops, and many have been members of their collectives for less than a year (one out of every four plans to leave the enterprise). The members of repair brigades and tool workers in general are more highly skilled, however, than the workers in basic production. But it is not easy to make use of this factor. The absence of basic standards of service, material expenditures, and the quality of work and shortcomings in the organization of labor preclude fully valid competition in many brigades of ancillary shops.

The introduction of the brigade form of organization establishes favorable prerequisites for the development of competition and for its closer coordination with the economic mechanism, and it encourages collectives to reduce expenditures, improve quality, and fulfill production assignments in their entirety. These advantages, however, have not been realized in full to date. One reason is the use of many frequently incomparable criteria in summing up the results of competition. For example, the Vibropribor Production Association uses 17 basic and associated indicators: the fulfillment of the brigade plan for output and product sales (for the month and since the beginning of the year), labor productivity growth, coefficient of operational quality, submission of high-quality products, number of workers with personal stamp, reduction of labor-intensiveness, including reduction initiated by workers, percentage of technically sound norms, use of wage fund, material and instrument expenditures, number not fulfilling output norms, and percentage of people studying in VUZ's, tekhnikums and schools for working youth. The accident rate, violations of law and order, and number of commitment points fulfilled are also taken into account. A point system is used to calculate the final indicator. A brigade receives a point for a perfect record of product acceptance upon submittal and a point for the fulfillment of the labor productivity assignment, and loses a point for the overexpenditure of the wage fund or for the nonfulfillment of the output norm, etc. It would seem that this method should exclude the possibility of subjectivism and equalizing. In fact, however, it promotes both, but in an impersonal, numerical form. For example, in the previously mentioned association, the brigade of assembly workers fulfilled the output assignment by 100 percent, the presser brigade overfulfilled it by 18 percent, and the fitter brigade overfulfilled it by 1 percent. The first collective was declared the winner. It had higher indicators in important but nevertheless secondary areas--operational quality, percentage of technically sound output norms, etc.

The number of competition indicators should be reduced, especially in view of the fact that many reflect intermediate results rather than final ones. After all, an increase in the number of people performing more than one job is not necessary in itself, but only as a means of augmenting labor productivity. An increase in the number of people competing by mutual agreement is also meaningful only if it enhances operational efficiency. There is not much sense in considering the content and appearance of visual propaganda, the number of workers performing public duties, etc. All of this should affect the results of collective activity and the rate of personnel turnover. Indicators which either do not depend on the brigade or depend exclusively on it and are achieved with the aid of internal reserves should not be considered. For example, in the abovementioned collective of assembly workers (the winner of the competition), the labor-intensiveness of the assembly of many items was reduced perceptibly on the initiative of workers. In a situation of this kind, the collective should be rewarded immediately and should not have to wait until the summing up of competition results.

A minimum number of basic indicators should be selected for each brigade, and these should only be indicators reflecting the brigade's contribution to the final plantwide results. Priority should be given to indicators planned and calculated for the enterprise by a central agency: the fulfillment of product sales plans with consideration for assortment and delivery dates (and above all, the augmentation of labor productivity and the reduction of overhead costs). The rest could be selected with a view to the social-production situation and the problems in shops, brigades and sections. For some brigades it would be the augmentation of labor productivity, for others it would be the achievement of the projected labor-intensiveness of items, for still others it would be a larger output of usable parts, etc.

The present system of calculation suffers from another defect. It does not provide for the consideration of the initial conditions of the brigade's work. These can differ depending on the experience and skills of workers, organizational-technological potential, the weight of the parts the brigade works with, and labor conditions. Today the problem of comparison is solved either by using correction factors or by conducting competitions among collectives with similar labor conditions. The first diminishes the objectivity of the calculation of results, and the second diminishes the impact of competition. It has been proposed that all workplaces be equipped in accordance with the standards of the scientific organization of labor, and that sectorial "standard" normatives (the use of producer goods, labor and material resources, etc.) be determined and then be compared with the actual results.

Counterplans play an important role in enhancing the impact of competition. When the brigade method is used, they are given new momentum by the collective's interest in seeking and using internal reserves. At leading enterprises in the republic, counterplans are adopted by brigades and individual workers as well as by sections and shops. This is the case, for example, at the Elektromashina Plant in Kishinev. Here around 90 percent of the workers take part in drawing up the plans. Local initiative is also promoted by the certification of workplaces. For example, specialists at the Kishinev Tractor Plant have developed a method of evaluating the elements of workplaces



on a flexible scale. This has created an opportunity to compare various factors and technological elements and to employ computers in the evaluation process. The main result has been the comprehensive approach to technical, organizational and social problems. The certification has resulted in the release of 35 workplaces, 11 staff members, and 13 pieces of equipment.

The brigade organization of labor requires substantial changes in relations between enterprise subdivisions. The total number of brigades manufacturing the same products is reduced. The primary collective acquires "personal" suppliers and consumers, providing opportunities to establish contacts with associates on the basis of contracts. For example, the creation of full-cycle brigades at the Tiraspol Garment Association imeni 40-Letiye Komsomol connected all of the links of the technological chain with stringent reciprocal commitments--the preparation section, the pattern cutters, the sewing conveyor, and the product warehouse. A brigade performing an operation depends completely on its supplier and cannot surpass its output. For this reason, production rhythm and product quality, and not output, are areas of competition. Relations of comradely cooperation, mutual demandingness, and unwritten rules as compulsory as official regulations have been established between associated brigades. In short, competition combined with the brigade contract can help in surmounting departmental barriers and establishing universal control of the accuracy and effectiveness of production relations.

The continued development of the brigade method at a time of economic reorganization will require heightened flexibility and efficiency. This will necessitate, first, the creation of comprehensive, full-cycle brigades on a broader scale and the incorporation of large technological chains working on contracts; second, the transfer of some administrative functions to primary collectives; third, the fundamental improvement of the calculating and coordinating activities of the main offices of enterprises (or associations) and the elimination of the practice of authoritarian administration. The number of plan indicators for brigades and the number of various regulations and instructions must be reduced dramatically. Brigade activities must be based on long-term normatives--in short, on the kind of mechanism that will stimulate the initiative and responsibility of workers.

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## SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF AGRICULTURAL SPECIALISTS AND THE QUALITY OF THEIR WORK

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[Article by Genriyetta Aleksandrovna Pchelintseva, senior research associate at the All-Union Research Institute of Vegetable Breeding and Seed Growing. Her article "Keeping Specialists in Agriculture" was published in our journal (No 1, 1985)]

[Text] The problem of supplying kolkhozes and sovkhozes with specialists has grown more acute in recent years. There is a high rate of turnover among farm administrative personnel, and many agronomists, zootechicians and so forth have found a niche in all types of rayon and oblast agricultural offices. In line with the USSR Food Program, a series of measures has been taken to stabilize agricultural managers and specialists and to use them more efficiently. In particular, their wages have been increased, they have been offered privileges in the acquisition of all the household amenities, etc. How have these undertakings affected the working and living conditions of specialists? To answer this question, the Scientific Research Institute of Labor of the USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems conducted a study on 10 farms in Saratov, Orenburg, Alma-Ata, Dzhizak, and Syrdarya Oblasts in 1984 and 1985. A questionnaire was distributed to 280 specialists with degrees occupying managerial positions and to 92 laborers who had graduated from VUZ's or tekhnikums. Besides this, the effects of the abovementioned Food Program undertakings were analyzed on farms in three administrative regions where 3,420 managers and specialists work.

The research findings indicated that the wages of 86.4 percent of the specialists had increased by an average of 29.8 percent, and the average monthly salary had risen from 165 to 214 rubles. In Orenburg Oblast 70 percent of the specialists with a higher education and 60 percent of the tekhnikum graduates were satisfied with their wages, and the figures for other oblasts were 90 percent for Alma-Ata, 75 percent for Dzhizak, and 90 percent for Syrdarya. Most of the respondents noted that wage increases were the main factor in the growth of their family income. This also had a positive effect on job satisfaction (see Table 1).

Other measures stipulated in the program had less influence on the working and living conditions of specialists on the farms we surveyed. The main

reason is that the people eligible for many of the privileges were few in number. For example, young specialists accounted for only 3.6 percent of the total. Of these, only one-fifth were making use of free living quarters, heat and electricity, and only one out of every six had received the special household acquisition grant (of around 1,045 rubles). Therefore, the privileges were actually extended to 0.6-0.7 percent of the specialists. Residential construction materials were allotted to 2 percent of the personnel. Sales of passenger cars and motorcycles increased slightly. Whereas 5.2 percent of the specialists acquired cars in 1980 and 1981, 6 percent acquired them in 1983 and 1984, and the respective figures for motorcycles were 1.2 and 1.8 percent. Around 0.2 percent of the members of this group use their own cars in their jobs, and not one has ever made use of technical maintenance privileges.

Table 1: Specialists' Opinions Regarding Desirable Work (number of responses)\*

What kind of work would you prefer?	Specialists	
	With higher education (n=94)	With secondary education (n=83)
With higher pay	11	11
With the possibility of advancement	8	6
In a solid establishment	2	2
On an advanced, economically sound farm	11	12
The kind that would give me the most free time	9	9
Creative work	4	4
I am completely satisfied with my job	37	46

\* Respondents were allowed to choose more than one answer.

The impact of these measures can be judged from the following facts. Just 33 people in the regions we surveyed transferred from rayon and oblast administrations and organizations to jobs on farms (in other words, the number of managers and specialists here increased by 1 percent). Only a third of them are being paid the differential envisaged in these cases (of 30-90 rubles a month), equivalent to the difference between their previous salary and the average wage in their new job. Only 20 percent received the one-time grant stipulated in these cases (averaging 814 rubles).

In short, although the number of new specialists arriving on farms has increased, it is still not high enough, and the rate of personnel turnover is still too high (see Table 2). It is interesting that experienced specialists are more likely to leave farms. The turnover pattern in Orenburg Oblast, for example, is the following: 38.4 percent of the specialists with from 1 to 3 years of service, 40.8 percent of those with from 3 to 15 years, and 20.8 percent of those with more than 15 years of service. The situation is similar at agricultural enterprises.

Here are two other interesting facts. First of all, a high percentage of the specialists with a higher education graduated from VUZ's as correspondence

students. For example, they represent around a third of the total in Orenburg Oblast, and more than half of the total on farms with the least satisfactory conditions. Most of them have been working for more than 15 years and already had a great deal of experience when they enrolled in the institution. The second fact is that most of the respondents with a higher education were men. On sovkhozes in Saratov and Orenburg Oblasts they represented three-fourths of the respondents, in Alma-Ata Oblast they represented four-fifths, and in Dzhizak and Syrdarya Oblasts virtually all specialists with VUZ degrees were men. There were more women, on the other hand, among the individuals with a secondary specialized education.

Table 2: Mobility of Agricultural Managers and Specialists, % of Total on Farm

Sovkhozes	Arrived		Left		Balance	
	1981-82	1983-84	1981-82	1983-84	1981-82	1983-84
Saratov Oblast						
Zhdanovskiy	55.5	54.5	59.5	39.5	-4.0	+15.0
imeni Chernyshevskiy	10.5	8.6	15.8	17.1	-5.3	-8.5
Orenburg Oblast						
imeni Gagarin	114.0	45.2	60.0	30.4	+54.0	+14.8
Chkalovskiy	15.2	12.5	10.9	16.7	+4.3	-4.2
Kazakh SSR						
Kazakhstan	48.9	56.6	37.6	14.0	-7.7	+23.6
Uzbek SSR						
Pakhtakor	17.2	41.8	10.1	12.1	+7.1	+29.7
Druzhba	9.4	0	9.4	0	0	0
imeni Rakhimov	12.5	23.3	3.6	11.3	+8.9	+12.0
imeni Zhdanov	8.4	8.4	1.7	4.2	+6.7	+4.2

The work schedule of managers and specialists is still an acute problem. Only a few of the ones on the farms we surveyed were satisfied with their schedule, and most of these were personnel with no direct connection with production: economists, lawyers, and breeders. The lack of free time gives rise to the most complaints. Local administrators, however, are not taking any steps to improve the situation and are even lengthening the work day artificially by holding all types of "planning meetings." They usually take an hour and add an extra 6 hours to the work week. At these meetings, specialists report to the managers on the work performed that day. The discussion usually pertains to supply and transport operations--in other words, to information which could be obtained from the production control office.

Because the manager almost never keeps track of the work schedule of his subordinates, the latter frequently introduce changes in the schedule without seeking authorization. For example, on one of the sovkhozes we surveyed, veterinarians and zootechnicians agreed on their own to institute a flexible work schedule. As a result, they regained their second day off.

The unsatisfactory organization and conditions of labor are among the main reasons for the low level of specialist initiative. They rarely make suggestions, take steps to improve the organization and conditions of labor, promote



the incorporation of new equipment and technology and the dissemination of high-yield plant strains and highly productive livestock breeds, etc. Only 18.7 percent of the respondents answered yes to the question of whether they had been responsible for any kind of innovation in the last 3 years. What is more, more than half of the ones who answered yes worked on two sovkhoses in Orenburg Oblast. But this was not all. The main undertakings listed were the introduction of the collective contract and the new forms of accounting, the use of new machines and equipment, and so forth--in other words, the measures specialists were obligated to take on orders from the administration or in line with plans. Some reported undertakings that are obviously part of the routine. For example, the chief veterinarian on a sovkhos in Saratov Oblast wrote that the walls and cages on the animal husbandry farm had been white-washed, the livestock had been vaccinated, sanitary regulations had been observed in breeding facilities, and the care of calves was improving. In short, most managers and specialists regard the maintenance of the existing production process and organization of labor as their main duty, and sometimes as their only duty. Incidentally, this practice is virtually sanctioned by existing job descriptions.

To heighten the initiative and responsibility of specialists, it will first be necessary to change the form of remuneration for labor, making it directly dependent on tangible results in the improvement of production, labor conditions, and social, cultural, and consumer services. In our opinion, the wage fund of managers and specialists should consist only of income resulting from the incorporation of new equipment and technology, the use of new plant strains and livestock breeds, and the institution of organizational changes. The maintenance of the existing level of production, on the other hand, is the job of middle and lower management personnel. The wages of the latter should be calculated on the basis of output or sales volume with a view to the climatic and economic conditions that year. Each manager and specialist should be obligated to draw up a specific plan of measures each year (and when he first takes the job) and estimate their impact, including the number of personnel released and the reduction of material expenditures. He should then be paid an advance based on the anticipated impact, and a bonus based on the actual results. By the same token, when several people participate in an undertaking, they should share the profits in line with their actual contribution to the work. Furthermore, they should be paid all of the income derived the first year, and from 10 to 20 percent in subsequent years. If the innovation should spread to other farms, the specialist should receive additional compensation, similar to royalties.

In addition to wages, methods and forms of management must also be changed. Specialists must be allowed more independence, and it must be actual rather than nominal independence. They should be relieved of the petty tutelage of superiors. Specialists in rayon offices today serve primarily in a supervisory capacity instead of giving farms genuine assistance in fundamental areas of production improvement. Although there is no particular need for this, rayon office administrators make frequent trips to kolkhozes and sovkhoses to oversee the wintering of livestock, sowing, and harvesting work, and thereby prevent personnel from performing their main duties. Usually the only result of these inspections is the ascertainment of already well-known facts, connected with the shortage of feeds, their poor quality, soil that is



too wet or too dry, the inadequate supply of fuel, etc. Many rayon and oblast administrators are still demanding the completion of work by dates corresponding to last year's calendar dates, although they are fully aware that the necessary prerequisites for this do not exist today (weather conditions differ, part of the equipment has not been repaired yet, etc.).

Table 3: Worker Professions in Which Specialists with Degrees Are Engaged

Profession	Number of workers		Specialty acquired in VUZ or tekhnikum
	With higher education	With secondary specialized education	
Machine operators (32)	2	18	Engineer
		1	Reclamation engineer
		8	Agronomist
		3	Zootechnician
Laborers			
Farming (7)	2	3	Agronomist
		1	Zootechnician
		1	Economist
Animal husbandry (19)	3	11	Zootechnician
		1	Veterinarian
		1	Veterinary assistant
		1	Veterinary technician
		1	Engineer
		1	Economist
Electricians (2)	1	1	Engineer
		1	Agronomist
Sanitary engineers (1)	1		Electrical engineer

The lack of independence and of initiative, stemming from passivity, is reflected, in our opinion, in the indifference of most specialists to the issue of professional advancement. Only 9.6 percent of the respondents expressed dissatisfaction with the speed of their advancement (furthermore, an increase in wages was cited as the main consideration). The people with a secondary specialized education were more likely to express an interest in their career (16.2 percent) than the VUZ graduates (5.5 percent).

Of course, the lack of concern about professional advancement might also stem from the fact that the rate of advancement is quite high in general for specialists, at least for those with a higher education. They are promoted once every 6 years (this is part of the reason for the high rate of personnel turnover on the farms). The advancement of managers and specialists with tekhnikum degrees is much slower—a promotion every 8.4 years.

Some sociologists feel that there is a promotion once every 4 years in the normal or successful career. Proceeding from this figure, we will attempt to

determine the norm for our situation. If the number of people expressing a desire for a promotion is added to the number of people promoted, the total will represent 60.9 percent of the personnel with a higher education and 47.2 percent of the tekhnikum graduates. Therefore, the optimal promotion interval is 4.9 years for the first group and 6.4 years for the second.

It is no secret that some people dream of a career, while others, who have a VUZ or tekhnikum degree in their pocket, make no effort to build a career and work in jobs that do not require this kind of education. On the farms we surveyed, 40 percent of the managers and specialists were in this category. Just over half of the workers with degrees had graduated from day divisions (mainly of tekhnikums). As a rule, the members of this group have worked in ordinary jobs for a long time. For example, the length of service for almost half was over 7 years, and it was over 10 years for a third of them. Many have never worked as an engineering and technical employee or as a specialist, while others have held positions of this kind for only 2 or 3 years.

The current specialty of these individuals usually coincides with the profession they learned in the VUZ or tekhnikum (see Table 3). Therefore, we can assume it was a conscious choice. It is also interesting that more than half of the respondents reported that the farms where they work need specialists in these fields and that managers had offered them engineering and technical positions. Many dreamed of this prospect when they were in school. Nevertheless, 80 percent of the respondents said they would not test their abilities to work in a different capacity. Why not? Around one-sixth of them are performing worker functions on the orders of the administration. The main reason, however, is the lower wage scale for engineering and technical personnel and specialists than for workers. For example, the wages of two-fifths of the respondents ranged from 180 to 300 rubles, while a brigade leader, for instance, is paid an average of 175 rubles. Something else is also interesting. Financial reasons were cited by relatively few of the laborers--20 of the 92. Another 24 said they wanted to acquire practical experience. In view of the fact that many of them have been employed as laborers for a long time, we can assume that wages are not the least important consideration for this group. This is also true of the 23 people who did not cite a specific reason for staying in their present jobs.

The augmentation of the ranks of specialists is also being impeded by the fact that their wages still fluctuate. In Orenburg Oblast, for example, the introduction of the new salary system for agricultural specialists in 1983 has already been followed by the adjustment of salaries twice by central agencies, and these adjustments reduced the salaries of most of the employees in this group. In 1984, for example, in accordance with the instructions of the USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems and the AUCCTU, salaries began to be calculated on the basis of the actual output or sales volume instead of the planned output and sales volume (as in the past). As a result, the wages of specialists on many farms in the oblast, which is in the zone of fluctuating harvests, were reduced.

There is no question that the measures stipulated in the decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers "On the Further

Improvement of the Economic Mechanism of Farm Management in the National Agroindustrial Complex" will have a positive effect on the wages of rural specialists. Our research findings suggest, however, that stronger financial incentives alone will not lead automatically to production growth. The desired results will necessitate the introduction of new progressive methods of management, the actual augmentation of the role and responsibility of specialists, and the establishment of the necessary conditions for the display of their initiative.

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## TERRITORIAL AVAILABILITY OF CULTURAL COMFORTS

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[Article by Leontiy Georgiyevich Byzov, candidate of economic sciences and senior research associate at the Institute of the Economics and Forecasting of Scientific and Technical Progress of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Marianna Ioanovna Yelizarova, junior researcher at the Central Institute of Economic Mathematics of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Tatyana Yuryevna Mikusheva, post-graduate student at the Central Institute of Economic Mathematics, and Natalya Mikhaylovna Rimashevskaya, doctor of economic sciences, professor, department head at the Central Institute of Economic Mathematics, and author of the following articles in our journal--"Methods of Determining Lasting Types of Consumption" (No 2, 1978, co-authored), "Methods of Raising the Standards of Food Consumption" (No 1, 1983, co-authored), and "Structural Changes in Tendencies Toward Increased Well-Being (Results of a Comprehensive Study)" (No 4, 1985). This is the first article the first three authors have written for our journal]

[Text] Current plans for cultural development are based on the following indicators: the size of the network of cultural establishments at the end of a certain calendar period, the growth of this network, and the public supply of cultural establishments. The need for legitimate theaters, concert halls, and circuses is calculated on the basis of norms (number of seats per 1,000 inhabitants). The need for libraries, clubs, movie theaters, and other cultural establishments is also determined for each 1,000 inhabitants (2). In other words, the planning of cultural development is based on indicators of the standard needs of the urban and rural population without any consideration for such factors as the functional classification of the city, its historical cultural ties with other communities, and the number of migrants passing through the given populated point. Besides this, qualitative changes in the sex, age, family, and educational structure of the population are not taken into account.

The planning of a subcomplex of the social infrastructure as important as culture needs new guidelines. The network of cultural establishments should be developed in line with the 27th CPSU Congress' declared aim of familiarizing the general public with cultural values (1).



**Sociocultural Development of Cities:** The development of urban communities is a matter of constant concern to specialists today. This is due to the increasing number of cities and the concentration of the population in big cities, and to the increased interdependence of various types of communities (big and small cities, cities and rural communities, etc.). For this reason, many communities in the country which are not officially categorized as urban are actually within the sphere of the urban way of life. The prevailing values of the national population are urban. The close connection between a city's level of development and supply of cultural comforts, on the one hand, and the way of life, on the other, has been pointed out several times. This means that the standard development of the city almost inevitably gives rise to certain behavioral standards.

The effects of living conditions on behavior in the cultural sphere cannot be judged by examining isolated facts indicating the degree to which the services of cultural establishment are used. Our research indicates that cultural needs form certain patterns. We will try to determine the patterns for various groups and analyze the group of conditions influencing their behavior.

The hypothesis that certain standards exist in the sequential development of urban subsystems dictated the need to determine the basic types of cultural development in cities. With the aid of a cumulative method developed by the authors (4; 5), the cultural potential of 276 cities in the USSR with a population of over 100,000 (at the time of the 1979 census) was calculated. The level of the cultural development of these cities was analyzed according to 21 features of the network of cultural establishments and organizations. The calculations revealed the modal (most common) sequence of the development of cultural establishments, and, on this basis, the main categories of urban cultural development. Cities following a common sequence in the creation of the network of cultural establishments were assigned to the same category.

The most representative was the first category, uniting 227 cities. As a rule, these were big cities (86 percent of them were in this category) and cities of oblast jurisdiction (57 percent), as well as many large cities (86 percent) and oblast centers (76 percent). The category also included three "millionaire" cities--Gorkiy, Chelyabinsk, and Donetsk. The second category consisted mainly of large and giant cities (82 percent), and almost all of them were either the capitals of union or autonomous republics or oblast centers (91 percent). It is interesting that three cities of oblast jurisdiction--Zaita, Sochi, and Kaunas--were in this category. The third category consisted of large and giant cities (63 percent), with the exception of Tartu. The cities in this category were Alma-Ata, Baku, Vilnius, Dushanbe, Yerevan, Kiev, Kuybyshev, Leningrad, Minsk, Moscow, Odessa, Omsk, Riga, Rostov-on-Don, Tartu, and Tbilisi. This was not a homogeneous category because each city has its own rich history and unique pattern of development.

The cumulative method helps in determining the modal sequence of the creation of the cultural subsystem of cities. It does not reflect all of the distinctive features of the development of individual cities but represents something like the mean for all of the cities of a given category.

The modal sequence of the establishment of cultural institutions in the cities of the first and second development categories is presented in Table 1. On the one hand, the standard sequence is a result of existing planning standards. For example, "theaters, circuses, concert halls and planetariums should be planned primarily for cities with a population of over 250,000" (6, p 30). On the other hand, the sequence is influenced by the appearance of unique cultural establishments. Cities of the second category are distinguished by the earlier appearance of museums (apparently because of their "age") and of opera and ballet theaters (because most of them are the capitals of union and autonomous republics).

Table 1: Modal Sequence of Establishment of Cultural Institutions in Cities Belonging to Different Categories of Cultural Development

Category I		Category II	
Type of Establishment	Sequence	Type of Establishment	Sequence
First legitimate theater	1	Museum of local lore	1
Museum of local lore	2	First legitimate theater	2
Symphony orchestra	3	Art museum	3
Art museum	4	Symphony orchestra	4
Museum of history	5	Museum of history	5
Puppet theater	6	Puppet theater	6
Circus	7	Opera and ballet theater	7
Second legitimate theater	8	Second legitimate theater	8
Children's theater	9	Circus	9
Opera and ballet theater	10	Children's theater	10
Musical comedy theater	11	Musical comedy theater	11

As a rule, only cities with a unique history have great cultural potential. This testifies to the need for changes in several standard requirements pertaining to the sequence of building cultural establishments in large cities. An analysis of the cultural development categories of cities indicates that the main factors are the administrative status of the city and its past history.

The classification of cities according to their cultural potential and the sequence followed in the establishment of their cultural institutions allows for the division of the entire group into centers of varying classes. For example, whereas all local centers perform administrative functions because they are the capitals of the oblast or kray, the functional capabilities of these cities vary. For example, each local center must have a legitimate theater but only one out of every two or three needs a puppet theater or children's theater. This attests to the considerable differentiation of oblast and kray centers as far as their functional capabilities and level of cultural services are concerned. Centers of different classes, however, are not distinguished by corresponding differences in their administrative and planning jurisdiction. For example, Kuybyshev (with a potential of 0.40) (footnote 1) (Potential calculated in relation to Moscow's potential) and Odessa (0.47), on the one hand, and Novgorod (0.07) and Kherson (0.04), on the other, perform similar administrative functions because they are centers

of oblasts of approximately the same size. There is a tenfold difference, however, in their cultural potential! As B.S. Khorev correctly points out, "contemporary administrative-territorial entities of the same class quite frequently and unjustifiably differ in terms of population size, level of development, range of influence, etc." (7, p 10). This impedes the creation of equal cultural opportunities for the population.

According to our research findings, the behavior of inhabitants is determined largely by the developmental level of the urban infrastructure. This is certainly normal. The connection between human behavior and the development of the infrastructure is strongest in the local centers. This could be due to the less developed cultural needs of their inhabitants (particularly the relatively low indicators of sociocultural mobility). On the other hand, the weaker connection between the infrastructure and the behavior of the inhabitants of large cities attests to their high level of mobility and heightened awareness.

This means that the sociocultural mobility of the population could be regarded as one of the most important progressive factors in the satisfaction of cultural needs. It can compensate for the excessive differentiation of cities in the developmental levels of their social infrastructure and equalize the conditions of public accessibility to cultural comforts.

**Sociocultural Mobility of the Population:** There are several cultural establishments (theaters, museums, art galleries, architectural and historical monuments, etc.) with unique cultural treasures, and these can be used effectively only within these establishments. These objects are usually concentrated in giant cities--republic and oblast centers--and this objectively makes the cultural opportunities of the inhabitants of rural communities and of small, medium and big cities unequal. The touring companies of theaters, music and dance groups, and traveling exhibits reduce these inequities to some extent but do not eliminate them. This is why the sociocultural mobility (SCM) of the population has always been an important way of raising the cultural level.

This term refers to leisure pursuits outside the home: attending plays, museums, exhibits and movies, taking tours, etc. This means that SCM can be regarded as a specific form of sociocultural activity in which the use of a particular cultural comfort (or satisfaction of a specific sociocultural need) takes place in a cultural establishment rather than in the home. Obviously, this is connected with a considerable amount of travel time. The attendance of cultural establishments is often an additional (secondary) reason for traveling to another populated point or an unplanned (incidental) way in which travelers spend their free time. Therefore, SCM is an element of the migratory process.

We still do not have complete information about the sociocultural mobility of the population. The determination of the frequency and regularity of trips to cultural centers and the attendance of cultural establishments by the center's "own" population and by travelers will necessitate sample surveys of migrants and of the inhabitants of various types of communities.



The results of a sample sociological survey conducted in 1982 by the USSR Ministry of Culture All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Art History and the Central Institute of Economic Mathematics of the USSR Academy of Sciences are presented below. The respondents were asked three questions: "Were you in any cities in 1981?" (to be answered yes or no), "Did you attend any cultural establishments in these cities in 1981?" (yes or no), and "Which cultural establishments did you attend in which city (or cities)?" The survey was conducted in Kursk Oblast (in Kursk, Zheleznogorsk, Oboyan and four rural communities in Medvenskiy and Kastorenskiy Rayons), in Donetsk Oblast (in Donetsk, Zhdanov and Makeyevka and in four rural communities in Marinskiy and Volnovakhskiy Rayons), in Novosibirsk Oblast (in Novosibirsk, Kubyshev and Kupino and in four rural communities in Kubyshevskiy and Kupinskiy Rayons), in Kiev, and in the Lithuanian SSR (in Vilnius, Klaypeda and Telshyay and in four rural communities in Kayshyadorskiy and Kaunasskiy Rayons). The sample group consisted of 2,660 people.

The reasons for traveling to another city were not among the indicators of sociocultural mobility. In some cases the reasons themselves exclude the possibility of sociocultural pursuits during a visit to another city (a short business trip, the illness of a relative, etc.). Besides this, the percentage of these trips is not high, and they do not elucidate the close connection between the person's "sociocultural" trips and the size and administrative status of his own populated point. We can assume that the attitude toward culture and the desire to have experiences of cultural value are directly related to the developmental level of cultural services in a specific location.

In itself, travel to a large cultural center is no guarantee of a visit to a cultural establishment (Table 2). In fact, the opposite tendency has been recorded: The larger a city is and the greater the variety of its own cultural establishments, the more frequently its inhabitants will attend theaters, museums and so forth when they travel to other communities.

There are more non-travelers than travelers in all populated points (with the exception of Vilnius). Furthermore, they represented less than 20 percent of the rural inhabitants in both regions of the RSFSR (13.9 percent in Kursk Oblast and 18.3 percent in Novosibirsk Oblast). The level of sociocultural mobility for the rural inhabitants of Donetsk Oblast, however, is higher than the indicator for the inhabitants of the oblast center. The high mobility of the inhabitants of rural communities in this oblast (and of the rural population of Lithuania) is due to the proximity of the seashore (Azov or Baltic) with well-equipped recreational areas and the high level of urbanization.

A high level of sociocultural mobility is characteristic of the inhabitants of Vilnius. Lithuania's rich cultural traditions, the accessibility of cultural establishments, and the developed system of cultural services are the reasons for the high level of spiritual needs and cultural preferences in the republic. The lowest level of sociocultural mobility was recorded in Kursk Oblast and was due to the high percentage of rural inhabitants. The only exception was the young industrial city of Zheleznogorsk, where the SCM of the inhabitants was quite high (45.6 percent).



Table 2: Intensity of Inter-City Migration and Cultural Activity of Population, %

Type of community	Traveled to other cities		Did not travel to other cities
	Visited cultural establishments there	Did not visit establishments	
Large cities	41.2	10.6	48.2
Cities of oblast jurisdiction and rayon centers	34.2	27.3	38.5
Rural communities	21.1	42.9	36.0
All types of communities	40.4	18.6	41.0

The dependence of the sociocultural mobility of the population on the size and administrative status of their community is illustrated by the mobility indicator of the most mobile age groups in three types of communities (the administrative centers of oblasts or republics, cities of oblast jurisdiction, and rural communities). The proportional numbers of travelers and non-travelers were 46.5 and 53.5 percent in large cities, 57.7 and 42.3 percent in cities of oblast jurisdiction, and 30.0 and 69.2 percent [as published] in rural communities.

The intensity of travel between cities depends largely on the gender of the respondent: The higher mobility of men was recorded in all regions. The inhabitants of rural communities in Lithuania and small cities in Novosibirsk Oblast were the only exception. People over the age of 25 are more mobile. Children and teenagers rarely travel to other cities. A low level of sociocultural mobility was also characteristic of people over 50.

There is a clear connection between the intensity of travel to other cities and occupation. The most socioculturally active people were those engaged in skilled mental labor--engineering and technical personnel, physicians, and teachers. The next group consisted of VUZ and secondary school students, whose relatively high level of sociocultural mobility is an age-related factor. Retired people, housewives and temporarily unemployed individuals are the least active in the sociocultural sense. Although the percentage of workers in the traveler category was higher in some populated points (Donetsk, Zhdanov, Kupino, and the rural communities of Kursk Oblast) than in the entire group, they are not distinguished by a high level of sociocultural mobility in general.

The group of cities performing the functions of the main cultural centers is of special interest. They can be further divided into three groups depending on their functions and their position in the total group of communities.

1. Cities performing the functions of all-union cultural centers (Moscow, Leningrad, Tashkent, Kiev, Volgograd, and Lvov) are distinguished by frequent visits by inhabitants of other cities and by the many distant locations from which travelers come. The cities of this group also attract tourists. They are distinguished by a high level of tour services and many monuments of great artistic and historical value.

2. Cities performing the functions of local cultural centers (Kursk, Donetsk, Zhdanov, Zaporozhye, Vilnius, Kaunas, Novosibirsk, Voronezh, Omsk, Poltava, and Rostov-on-Don): The network of cultural establishments here is intended essentially for the inhabitants of the oblast and neighboring oblasts. They account for most of the sociocultural trips of rural inhabitants of this region.

3. Cities performing a primarily recreational function: The attendance of cultural establishments is a subsidiary pursuit here. This group could be termed the "all-union health spa." It includes the cities of the Black and Azov sea coasts and the Baltic Sea ports.

Therefore, SCM depends on the following factors: 1) the size of the city's population; 2) its administrative status; 3) its level of socioeconomic and cultural development; 4) its geographic location; 5) its position in overall settlement patterns. It is understandable that no single factor can determine the intensity of travel for the satisfaction of cultural needs.

Only a few of the cities (Moscow, Leningrad, and some capitals of union republics) serve as cultural centers for the population outside the oblast. Most of the inhabitants of rural communities and small cities rely exclusively on their oblast center. At this time around 15 percent of the population rarely visits cities with some cultural potential. This happens when the administrative division of the territory conflicts with the historically determined patterns of settlement: The population is drawn to a socioculturally impoverished center (the Kotlas, Velikiye Luki, and Vorkuta agglomerates are examples of this). In these cases the existing oblasts should be reduced in size. According to prominent experts, "oblasts must be divided into smaller units. There has long been a need for regions smaller than oblasts but larger than rayons" (7, p 10). The idea of creating a network of regional cultural centers on the interoblast level is more controversial. Given today's settlement patterns, these centers cannot serve the inhabitants of neighboring oblasts and will only intensify the already pronounced differences in the cultural functions performed by different cities.

The growth of the sociocultural potential of most cities seems valid up to a certain point (up to a population figure of 500,000-600,000 as a point of reference and, consequently, up to 20-25 percent of Moscow's potential) (footnote 2) (This does not apply to the capitals of union republics), after which this will conflict with the efforts to create relatively equal conditions of public accessibility to social and cultural comforts. This matter has not been studied sufficiently yet. The further study of the development of cities serving as cultural centers and of their increasing cultural potential must be combined with an analysis of the cultural and social needs of the population and of the way in which the infrastructure of a large city influences the population's way of life.

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## PRE-DIVORCE SITUATION IN YOUNG FAMILY

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[Article by Vladimir Vladimirovich Solodnikov, post-graduate student at the Institute of Sociological Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences and author of the article "New Form of Aid to the Young Family" in our journal (No 1, 1985, co-authored)]

[Text] When researchers study divorce, they concentrate primarily on the causes and motives. It is just as important, however, to analyze the way in which the pre-divorce situation takes shape, particularly the nature of the couple's relations, the way in which the decision to divorce is made, and the degree to which it is influenced by the couple's social environment. All of this information will reveal certain natural tendencies and will point up ways of preventing the dissolution of families and of preserving viable marriages.

We surveyed couples who had been married only once for less than 5 years and were applying for divorces. The husbands and the wives were under 30 years of age. The survey was conducted in 1985 in civil registry offices and people's courts in three cities. In Moscow 130 couples were surveyed, in Tula 60 were surveyed, and in Voronezh 75 were surveyed.

The questionnaire was filled out in the presence of the interviewer and separately by each spouse.

A crisis in the couple's relations, the dissatisfaction of the husband or wife, or of both, with the marriage, is a prerequisite for the development of the pre-divorce situation. It is indicative that this dissatisfaction frequently affects the emotional state of the spouses, but they are not always fully aware of it. It is in this atmosphere that the pre-divorce situation comes into being and then goes through several critical phases in its development: the decision by one spouse (or both) to divorce; the cessation of marital relations; and the application for divorce.<sup>1</sup> Finally, the legal procedure of dissolution marks the end of the pre-divorce situation.

It would seem that spouses who have made the conscious decision to separate should undergo significant psychological changes by the time of the divorce.



The complete severance of their emotional ties could serve as an indicator of these changes. Judging by our research, however, many respondents still felt some attachment to their spouses: 51.3 percent of the respondents thought about their partner frequently, 23 percent retained positive feelings (love or respect), and another 22.55 percent had difficulty defining their feelings about their spouses, which probably attests to conflicting emotions. The rest felt either indifference (29.8 percent) or had negative feelings (2.3 percent). Another 3.4 percent did not answer the question.

Families in which the emotional bonds between the spouses were completely broken (in which both were indifferent or had negative feelings) represented less than a third of the total. In many families (46 percent), at least one of the spouses (most often the husband) was more likely to have positive feelings for the partner.<sup>2</sup> Finally, in one out of every five couples (21.5 percent), both the husband and the wife retained a mutual emotion attachment. This attachment remained strong in spite of the following circumstances: the cessation of sexual relations (79.2 percent) and the refusal to share household responsibilities (75.3 percent) or income (73.9 percent). A slightly lower percentage (59.1 percent) said that the division of property had been settled. Another 23.8 percent had not discussed the matter yet, and 10.4 percent felt that the matter would have to be settled in court.

This contradiction can mean that the decision has not been carefully considered or that the pre-divorce situation has been of short duration. In fact, 68.2 percent of the respondents reported that the interval between the first discussion of divorce and the application for dissolution was less than half a year, and for 25.8 percent of them it was a month or less. But does the first discussion of the possibility of divorce testify that either of the spouses regards it as the only valid solution?

The arrival at this decision, as a rule, is not a single act, but a lengthy process generated by dissatisfaction with the marriage and unhappiness in the family. The first discussion of divorce indicates the presence of this process, if not its conclusion. According to our data, at least one of the members of 56.6 percent of the couples decided to separate as soon as the possibility of divorce was discussed. In another 19.7 percent of the cases, at least one spouse was hesitant to take this step. And although both partners in 21.1 percent of the cases were against divorce, this did not keep them from deciding to dissolve the marriage later. It is possible that the decisionmaking process was already going on although neither the husband nor the wife was conscious of it.

By the time couples apply to the court or the civil registry office for a divorce, the number of spouses wanting to save the marriage declines dramatically. Furthermore, by this time, it is not uncommon for each partner to take credit for initiating the proceedings. For example, 24.1 percent of the husbands said that they had made the final decision, but only 12.8 percent of the wives agreed with this. Conversely, wives felt that they had initiated the proceedings in 46.4 percent of the cases, but only 29 percent of the husbands shared this opinion. Couples often say that the decision was mutual (38.4 percent of the wives and 42.4 percent of the husbands). The information

we obtained differed from divorce statistics, according to which the overwhelming majority of divorces are initiated by wives. It is probable that women are more likely to call themselves the initiators in the legal process of dissolution.

How do the spouses treat one another in the atmosphere of the pre-divorce situation?

Various types of behavior are possible during this period. Cases in which both spouses try to save the marriage are relatively rare (16.7 percent). Cases in which one spouse actively opposes the divorce and the other supports the idea are much more common. The couples (13.5 percent) in which the cessation of marital relations by one partner came as a surprise to the other probably also fall into this category. It is interesting that both husbands and wives were around twice as likely to say that they, and not their partners, were against the divorce. It is also interesting that 28.6 percent of the respondents said that neither they nor their spouses had made any effort to prevent the divorce. This might sound untrue, but studies conducted abroad testify that young couples faced by this kind of conflict often prefer (44 percent of the men and 31 percent of the women) to wait and see what will happen next (3). Couples often separate to avoid "emotional displays." In our sample group, 66 percent of the couples lived separately during the pre-divorce period, and the separation lasted longer than 6 months in only 18 percent of the cases. In comparison to the data of D.M. Chechot (74 percent) (4) and P.P. Zvidrinsh (50 percent) (5), the last indicator is quite low, reflecting a tendency toward the sharp reduction of the interval between the separation and the application for divorce. According to L.V. Chuyko, much here depends on the age of the respondents (6).

Another sign of the passivity and indecision of the spouses during the pre-divorce situation is the attempt to gain outside support. When conflicts arose between young spouses, 46.2 percent of them (60 percent of the women and 32.4 percent of the men) asked someone else for advice: 75.8 percent asked their mothers, 51.8 percent asked their friends, and 39.2 percent asked their fathers. These are the most influential people in the married couple's social group. They are more influential than other relatives, and much more than lawyers (10.2 percent of all applications), psychologists, physicians and others (4.9 percent).

It is indicative that the people closest to the couple prefer not to interfere: "Do what you have to do" (66.9 percent). The advice to try to change the partner's mind (43.3 percent) and to divorce (40 percent) was also common. The suggestion that the person change his or her own behavior was much less common (21.6 percent), and the need to consider the interests of children and the possibility of temporary separation were mentioned in an equal number of cases (14.7 percent each).<sup>3</sup>

What were the reactions, in the opinion of the respondents, of those to whom they turned for advice most frequently? Table 1 indicates that the friends and mothers of wives were the most likely to approve of the decision to divorce. Fathers (especially the husbands' fathers) preferred to refrain from extreme judgments. Apparently, when young couples ask their parents (primarily their

mothers) and friends for advice, they are usually certain of their support in advance.

Table 1: Feelings of Parents and Friends About Impending Divorce, %

Attitude	Mother		Friends		Father	
	wife's	husband's	wife's	husband's	wife's	husband's
Opposed	17.7	20.0	6.4	5.3	11.3	19.2
Noncommittal	26.4	32.1	19.3	29.8	26.0	33.2
Approve	34.7	21.1	38.5	26.0	27.6	13.2
Do not know about divorce	9.8	9.4	16.2	18.9	9.4	11.3
No response	11.4	17.4	19.6	20.0	25.7	23.1

It is significant that the people closest to the wives were more likely to express approval of the impending divorce and less likely to oppose it than the people closest to the husbands. In view of the fact that women are more likely to consult anyone before a divorce, we can assume that their decision to break up the marriage depends more on the opinions of "significant others."

Table 2: Attitudes of People Closest to Divorcing Couples in Cities of Different Size, %

Feelings about divorce	Moscow	Tula, Voronezh	Difference*
Outside opposition			
Fathers	46.9	53.1	+6.2
Mothers	58.0	42.0	-16.0
Other relatives	48.7	51.3	+2.6
Friends	34.0	66.0	+32.0
Fathers-in-law	42.9	57.1	+14.2
Mothers-in-law	55.3	44.7	-10.6
Outside approval			
Fathers	55.6	44.4	+11.2
Mothers	53.4	46.6	+6.8
Other relatives	53.1	46.9	+6.2
Friends	51.5	48.5	+3.0
Fathers-in-law	54.4	45.6	+8.8
Mothers-in-law	54.1	45.9	+8.2

\* A plus sign means a more tolerant attitude toward divorce in Moscow than in Voronezh and Tula, and a minus sign means the opposite.

We know that larger cities have higher divorce rates and more anonymous forms of communication, and that the combination leads to more liberal behavioral standards and idea about the acceptability of divorce. The data in Table 2 corroborate this conclusion in general, although the differences in cities of different sizes are not great. The mothers of husbands and wives are an exception to the rule: The mothers in Moscow are much more likely than those in Tula and Voronezh to oppose the divorce, although they do approve of the decision in the majority of cases.

Table 3: Feelings About Divorce in Relation to Children, %

Attitude	Children			Difference*
	Yes	No	No response	
Outside opposition				
Fathers	55.6	40.7	3.7	+14.9
Mothers	56.0	40.0	4.0	+16.0
Other relatives	56.4	38.5	5.1	+17.9
Friends	61.3	35.5	3.2	+25.8
Fathers-in-law	50.0	44.1	5.9	+5.9
Mothers-in-law	52.1	43.6	4.3	+8.5
Outside approval				
Fathers	39.8	55.6	4.6	+15.8
Mothers	43.9	52.7	3.4	+8.8
Other relatives	46.9	49.4	3.7	+2.5
Friends	48.0	49.7	2.3	+1.7
Fathers-in-law	48.9	47.8	3.3	-1.1
Mothers-in-law	50.0	45.9	4.1	-4.1

\* A plus sign means a more tolerant attitude toward divorce if the couple have no children, and a minus sign means the opposite.

Our data indicate that the breakup of a marriage is harder on couples with children. This also influences the attitudes of the people around them (see Table 3). Only in-laws are more likely to approve of divorce when the couples have children, and we feel that the reason for this could be prejudice against the daughter- or son-in-law.

We drew several general conclusions from our study. Above all, it is interesting that the pre-divorce situation and the period of separation are short in the majority of cases of young divorcing couples (usually less than half a year). By the time a couple applies for a divorce, the family has already ceased to perform its main functions, even though the spouses still feel an emotional attachment to one another. It is possible that this is due to the fact that many of the young couples (44.5 percent in our sample group) were living with their parents right up to the time of the application for divorce. This kind of situation presupposes the sharing of household responsibilities by the two generations and therefore does not aid in the development of the young couple's sense of themselves as a "we" or the development of some supra-individual family characteristics.

The next observation concerns the interrelations of marriage partners in the pre-divorce situation. Young spouses often take a onesided view of the situation, ascribing a reluctance to interact to the partner and exaggerating the features of the partner's behavior that led to the dissolution. As a result, it is quite common for one of the spouses to say that he or she initiated the divorce but to feel that he or she was "forced" to take this step by the improper behavior of the partner.

In general, the emotional relationship in many young couples is something like a self-contained entity and cannot be controlled at will. This may be the



reason that around a third of the respondents made no effort to prevent the impending divorce, but waited to see if the relationship would "heal itself." Some of them (more often the wives) turned to others for advice in this situation. Couples without children and inhabitants of large cities were more likely to gain outside support for their decision to break up the marriage. Unfortunately, we did not record a single case in which marriage and family counseling was sought. Parents and friends most commonly played the role of family counselors. The views of the former are usually quite obviously biased, especially when they share a household with the couple. In most cases, the partners have separate groups of friends. A description of the family situation by only one of the partners apparently stimulates the approval of divorce, which is regarded as a way of surmounting difficulties. This does not encourage the young couples to seek ways of improving their marital relations and also makes it easier for them to decide on a divorce.

In our opinion, these data indicate a lack of the communication skills needed for the resolution of interpersonal conflicts, and point up the great need for qualified assistance in the stabilization of the marital relations of young couples. Women are the most "willing" to seek this help. As far as the men are concerned, the stereotype of masculinity probably keeps them from reporting their unhappy marriages or emotional and psychological problems to others. The development of family services (including marriage and family counseling) could be of considerable social value in the preservation of viable young marriages.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. Even the presence of all of these phases does not make the dissolution of the family absolutely inevitable. Among the couples applying for divorces, 8-12 percent of those applying to courts and up to 15 percent of those applying to civil registry offices change their minds (1). More than 7,500 married couples were reconciled, for example, in 1982 in Moscow by the family legal commissions of civil registry offices and courts (2).
2. The choice of the "difficult to answer" response was interpreted as a sign of conflicting or ambiguous feelings for the partner.
3. The total exceeds 100 percent because the advice given by a single person could be contradictory or could change. Besides this, some respondents consulted several people.

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## SUBJECTIVE ASSESSMENTS OF THE STANDARD OF LIVING

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[Article by Valentina Dmitriyevna Sitnikova, post-graduate student at the Institute of Sociological Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and A.A. Michurin--a pseudonym. This is V.D. Sitnikova's first article in our journal]

[Text] Sociological studies of economic behavior require the constant revision of theoretical beliefs that once seemed self-evident. There is no question that they include the assessment of the standard of living exclusively in terms of money. Financial income is necessary as a crude and approximate indicator, but it does not measure actual welfare as much as it estimates the purchasing power of a specific group of people, and the abstract possibilities the amount of money in circulation offers for the satisfaction of consumer needs. The use of these possibilities, however, depends primarily on the presence of sufficient goods and services in the market. This is where differences of vital importance, differences transcending the bounds of theoretical directives, originate. It might seem that a ruble is always a ruble, but its "price" is not the same in a rural community as in the capital; the same monthly income is quite sufficient in Voronezh and not enough in Baku; wages spent on vodka are quite a different matter from travel expenses; and despite the "lines of shame," alcohol is more accessible than vacation trips with guaranteed good service. In short, there are substantial extra-economic differences in the standard of living that can seriously impede the stimulation of public interest in the results of labor. Real material welfare still frequently depends less on the person's specific labor contribution and, consequently, on the amount of remuneration than on the ability to "come by" things. This popular term means nothing other than an extraeconomic, artificially created difference in the standard of living, which some people are too embarrassed to admit. Actual consumer standards, however, depend largely on the ability to "come by" things, and not on income. Obviously we must remember that high income is sometimes the result of the person's "convenient" position in the distribution network. But this is a different matter. What interests us is this: In view of the extraeconomic differences in the standard of living, the measurement of material welfare in terms of cost is not an accurate reflection of the objective situation. Budget studies provide a more accurate picture, but perhaps the most complete information about the economic behavior of the population and its way of life in general can be provided by

sociological analyses of subjective appraisals. They are based on common "principles" of life. What is better: to economize on food but wear the latest styles, to save money for a car or spend it at a health resort, to buy a book by Bulgakov instead of a cassette player? These questions are not merely academic.

Scientists are greatly interested in the sociopsychological standards of consumption and changes in the "significant variables" symbolizing material welfare. For example, it has not been that long since the owner of a car was confidently pointed out as one of the "extremely wealthy." Today a car of one's own already means little, and even the make of the automobile is not always a differentiating factor. In any case, it is completely obvious that the "ruble" stands for "images" of life with irresistible appeal. But what are their typical features?

An all-union sociological study of the way of life of Soviet people, conducted under the supervision of I.T. Levykin in 1980 and 1981 (footnote) (The authors express the deepest gratitude to the researchers in the Sector on the General and Regional Features of the Way of life at the Institute of Sociological Research, USSR Academy of Sciences, for the information they provided), used the procedure of the sociopsychological appraisal of the standard of living, based on the following "images" of differing consumption potential.

Type A: "We live from paycheck to paycheck, we often have to borrow money for vital necessities, and savings are out of the question."

Type B: "We have enough money to cover daily expenses, but even buying clothes is a problem for us. We have to borrow or save up for this."

Type C: "We have enough money in general, we can even save a little, but our savings are not enough to buy expensive durable goods (refrigerators, television sets, etc.), and we have to borrow money or buy them on credit."

Type D: "Buying durable goods is no problem for us, but buying a car or taking an expensive vacation is still beyond our means."

Type E: "There is virtually nothing we cannot afford at this time."

As we can see, these verbal "images" are based on a cumulative scale of priorities with qualitative criteria: vital necessities, plus clothing, plus expensive durable goods, plus a car and expensive vacations, and finally "being able to afford everything." Obviously, this procedure does not take "nuances" in consumer priorities into account, and we still cannot judge the significance of these "images" for various social and sociocultural strata of the population. This is less a matter of individual and reasonable consumer standards than a matter of the mass consumer consciousness, where universally significant (and therefore "nobody's") interests and values prevail. The procedure does, however, provide a differentiated picture of subjective assessments of financial well-being.

The first noteworthy feature of the results (see table) is that the pattern is almost the same for the urban and rural population. There is a higher level of



variation in the rural population, however, and the "extreme" groups are quite large here: Almost 10 percent of the rural inhabitants, including 12 percent of the kolkhoz members, can afford anything they want. Only 6.2 percent of the urban population said this. As far as social differences in consumption standards are concerned, the significant number of non-specialist employees with a low income is noteworthy. This agrees with data on their wages. Oddly enough, they ranked second among the "richest." Part of the reason is that many of the non-specialists are women who are married to specialists and highly skilled workers. But the percentage of specialists and highly skilled workers among the "richest" is still lower than the percentage of employees. For this reason, this fact still needs to be explained--if, of course, it is not a mistake.

Table: Self-Appraisals of Material Welfare, Percentage of Respondents

<u>Categories</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>E</u>
Regional					
Rural	12.6	21.2	36.5	16.8	9.8
Urban	9.8	25.1	43.0	15.9	6.2
Social					
Workers	11.1	21.9	42.6	16.6	7.8
Kolkhoz members	10.9	19.1	36.2	21.8	12.0
Employees--non-specialists	12.8	25.1	38.9	13.7	9.5
Employees--specialists	9.0	17.7	40.8	23.8	8.7

There is reason to believe that the current reorganization in the country will make significant changes in the patterns and dynamics of consumer behavior. We should expect more pronounced differences in income, both in urban and rural areas, and the extreme points on the scale will probable be "filled out." Adequate supplies of food and manufactured goods in the market will promote the quicker differentiation of actual welfare, and this process will be a natural and essentially progressive one. When economic behavior is freed from the shackles of shortages and the related extraeconomic regulators of consumption, it will finally become the most important means of accelerating socioeconomic development.

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## REGIONAL DIFFERENCES IN REPRODUCTIVE BEHAVIOR

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[Article by Irina Aleksandrovna Manuilova, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences and department head at the All-Union Center for Post-Natal Health Care, and Lidiya Leonidovna Yun, post-graduate student. This is their first article in our journal]

[Text] There are quite perceptible regional differences in birthrates in the USSR. For example, whereas there are around two births for each woman in the republics located in the European part of the country, there are more than four in Central Asia. Furthermore, the differences are not confined to the number of children, but are also reflected in many other features of reproductive behavior--in the total number of pregnancies, in the intervals between them, in family planning methods, etc. Medical and biological studies testify that all of these differences can have a significant effect on the health of mothers and infants. For example, insufficient awareness of modern birth control methods frequently forces women to resort to artificial abortions, which are known to have a number of negative consequences--miscarriages, premature births, and even barrenness. The early or late birth of the first child, short intervals between births, and other factors have negative consequences.

We conducted a comparative medico-social study (in 1985) to try to determine the distinctive features of the reproductive behavior of women in regions with substantially diverging birthrates, to be used subsequently as a basis for the planning of measures to prevent disruptions of the reproductive function. We surveyed 750 women employed at a textile enterprise in Fergana (Uzbek SSR) and 300 women at the Moscow Lace Curtain Association imeni E. Thaelmann. The information was obtained with the aid of two questionnaires. The first, which was filled out by the respondents, included questions about the woman's reproductive aims and her feelings about various methods of preventing pregnancy and methods of family planning. Reasons for refusing to use contraceptives were also elucidated. The second questionnaire was filled out by a physician during a gynecological examination. It recorded data on the gynecological state of the woman and information about her use of various contraceptive devices, her number of pregnancies, and their results. Besides this, we analyzed what is known as the "rate of illness chart," based on the medical history in the last 3 years.

The two groups were almost the same in terms of age. The average age of the respondents was 32.4 in Moscow and 31.2 in Fergana; 7.6 percent of the women in the first group and 3.8 percent in the second were under 20, and the respective figures for women from 20 to 39 were 65.1 and 76.1 percent.

The data in the table testify that there is a tendency for women in Moscow and Fergana to marry earlier. In both of the groups surveyed, the average marriage age was appreciably higher for the women over 40 than for those under 20. In the groups as a whole, the average age at which women marry was 21 in Moscow and 19.6 in Fergana.

Table: Some Features of the Reproductive Behavior of Women  
Groups: 1--Moscow, 2--Fergana

Features	Under 20		20-29		30-39		Over 40	
	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>
Average marriage age, years	18.0	18.3	20.5	19.7	20.8	19.9	22.0	20.1
Average length of marriage, years	1.0	1.0	3.3	4.1	10.9	11.4	17.7	18.8
Total number of births, per 100 women	30	0	90	140	130	240	140	340
Total number of abortions, per 100 women	70	0	120	50	280	230	280	310

The number of births per 100 women is much higher in Fergana than in Moscow. In the age group over 40, there are 1.4 births for each Moscow woman and 3.4 for each woman in Fergana.

The reproductive behavior of women in regions with different birthrates differs not only in terms of the number of births but also in terms of the length of the protogenetic interval (the interval between the wedding and the first birth): 13 months in Fergana and 19 months in Moscow. We conducted a retrospective analysis of the use of contraceptives during the period prior to the birth of the first child to determine the factors influencing this indicator. Various methods of preventing pregnancy were used by 8.2 percent of the women in Moscow before the birth of their first child. As for the women in Fergana, virtually none used contraceptives. For the majority of them (92.5 percent), the first pregnancy resulted in a birth, whereas the indicator for the Moscow women was 80 percent. The first pregnancy was terminated by an artificial abortion in 1.6 percent of the cases in Fergana and 20 percent of the cases in Moscow. Furthermore, only 22 percent of the women in Moscow who terminated their first pregnancy with an artificial abortion were married. In general, 50 percent of the respondents in the Moscow group and only around 30 percent of the women at the Fergana enterprise use some form of birth control.

Although most of the first births in both groups surveyed came at the start of the woman's married life, the time of the second birth differed. For example, the women in Fergana are three times as likely as those in Moscow to give birth to their second child in the first 5 years of marriage. The interval between the first and second births is 2.6 years in Fergana and 5.3 years

in Moscow. The families of the women in Moscow are almost complete by the end of the fifth year of marriage, and the average number of children in the family is 1.2, whereas the women in Fergana have 2.1 children on the average and complete their families by the end of the 10th year of marriage.

These data agree with the results of an analysis of reproductive case histories, which we conducted to determine the "high-risk" age group in the termination of pregnancies. We learned that the highest number of births took place when the women in both groups were from 20 to 24. Pregnancies are more likely to be terminated, however, by women in Moscow when they are only 22, whereas it is only at the age of 33 that women in Fergana begin terminating more pregnancies than they maintain.

The most common reasons for artificial abortions are pregnancy out of wedlock for women under 20, the presence of a nursing infant or poor housing and living conditions for women from 20 to 29, and the desire not to have any more children for women from 30 to 39.

Therefore, the comparative study of the reproductive behavior of women in regions with different birthrates indicated that women in Fergana are slightly younger when they marry and plan to have much larger families than the women in Moscow; the women in Fergana first strive to have the number of children they want and only resort to birth control methods afterward, whereas in Moscow there is a tendency to use birth control methods after the birth of the first child; the "high-risk" group in the termination of unwanted pregnancies consists of women over 22 in Moscow and women over 33 in Fergana. The distribution of modern contraceptive devices to this group could reduce the number of artificial abortions substantially.

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## ALCOHOLISM IN THE CITY: FROM PROHIBITION TO ELIMINATION

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[Article by Anatoliy Zakharovich Rubinov, chief of the socioconsumer issues division of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, member of the USSR Union of Writers, Honored Cultural Worker of the RSFSR, USSR Union of Journalists Prize winner, and author of the books "Ot chego gorozhaninu nekogda" [Why the Citydweller Never Has Enough Time] (1976), "Taksi! Taksi!" [Taxi! Taxi!] (1976), "Operatsii bez sekretov" [Unclassified Operations] (1980), "So sluzhebnogo vkhoda" [From the Start of the Career] (1980) and "Semya, odinochestvo, lyubov" [Family, Solitude, Love] (1986), and others. This is his first article in our journal]

[Text] The larger the populated point, the more dangerous alcohol abuse can be. Even a single intoxicated pedestrian can cause an accident in a big city. Some countries have extremely harsh traffic laws: Drivers who have killed a careless pedestrian sue the relatives of the recently buried cause of the accident to recover the cost of repairing dents and broken headlights.

Narcologists in Moscow recently conducted an experiment. They spent some time on duty in the city vehicle inspection agency and went to the scene of accidents. A device called an "alcometer" was used in the experiment to register the level of intoxication--low, medium, or high. Without keeping the First Aid physicians who had also rushed to the scene from doing their work, the narcologists found out whether or not the accident had been connected with the use of alcohol. It frequently did not take any kind of tests to know that many victims were simultaneously the perpetrators. Cases of collisions or speeding in which at least one of the parties involved in the accident was intoxicated constituted the majority. Some of the people swore that they had not had a drop of wine or vodka that day. And they were telling the truth: They had been drinking the night before, but the sensitive device took only a few seconds to register the exact percentage of alcohol in the person's blood at the time of the test.

Another regrettable fact that was learned during the experiment was that the drunk driver injured from five to eight other people in the average accident. Almost half of the passengers on a tourist bus traveling along the Vladimir highway to Suzdal had to be sent to the hospital one day because the driver of a Zhiguli had been drinking.

A drunk is not only dangerous on the road. The same team of narcologists went to several stores and tested 100 salesclerks. It goes without saying that they did not insult anyone with unjust accusations. The physicians walked along the counters and asked certain people to step into the office of the store director. These were people whose past behavior suggested that they might not be completely sober. Not even one of these people was called in by mistake! The device showed that some of the people behind the store counters were slightly, moderately, and even heavily intoxicated. It turned out that there were more of these people in furniture stores and in meat and produce departments. Who could calculate how many conflicts have arisen through the fault of these clerks, how many moods have been spoiled, and how much strength it has taken for people to regain their composure! Trade personnel of this kind can create great problems for customers. People who have been drinking are bullies and are spoiling for a fight. Any neuropathologist can cite cases in which apoplexy or the aggravation of some other disease began in a store.

It was not until recently, when the new government decisions on the prevention of alcohol abuse went into effect, that alcohol statistics, which had never recorded a single positive trend, finally began moving in the other direction. Alcohol sales decreased, and so did the number of accidents and crimes. Before this it seemed that no power on earth could change the situation with regard to alcohol. Many people seriously believed that modern life, with its urbanization, the turmoil of traveling to and from work, and the unavoidable stress force the weak and impressionable to resort to alcohol. These pessimistic conclusions seemed to be completely warranted: No matter how many measures were taken to combat alcohol abuse, no matter how many campaigns were announced, they could not stop the rise of the statistical curve.

Alcohol destroys health and injures the economy more than any other careless practice. The World Health Assembly concluded that problems connected with the use of alcohol, especially to excess, are among the main health problems in the world. In other words, alcohol abuse hurts people just as much as cardiovascular diseases, cancer....

The average consumption of alcoholic beverages doubled in the economically developed countries in the postwar period. The figure now ranges from 8 to 24 liters per person a year. Averages, however, are not always accurate reflections of the real state of affairs. Infants, as everyone knows, do not drink vodka, and they only improve statistics by taking on part of the sins of others. Opponents of alcohol abuse and of alcoholism are also included in these averages.

Experts from the World Health Organization compared the situation in different parts of the world by analyzing statistics for 1950 and 1976. In the middle of the 20th century there were only two countries in which the average statistical citizen tipped more than 8 liters of the intoxicating poison a year. A quarter of a century later there were 2 such countries. The highest rates of alcohol consumption, calculated in pure alcohol, are in France, Italy, Portugal, and Spain--countries where the people primarily drink wine.

The mistaken belief that only hard liquor was dangerous was common opinion in our country for a long time. Attempts were even made to lower the prices of

the "fine" wines to encourage "sophisticated" drinking habits. This was a mistake. Any sobering station has the facts to prove that the most miserable drunks prefer precisely this sweet poison--strong wine.

Today there is no longer any doubt that alcohol's destructive effects on the organism are completely in line with the laws of elementary arithmetic--the degrees add up. Around 9 percent of the French (1 out of every 11!) consume "fine" beverages containing 150 grams of absolute alcohol each day. This is equivalent to 375 grams of 40° vodka, a liter of wine of 15-16°, or three liters of "harmless" beer. Here is the result: This country, with 54 million inhabitants, has 2 million alcoholics and another 4.5 million people who "drink to excess"--that is, potential alcoholics. United States statistics put the number of alcoholics at 10 million. Wherever alcohol is consumed in large quantities (regardless of the form it takes--wine, whiskey, or vodka), there is a high rate of death from cirrhosis of the liver....

We can find some comfort in the fact that our country is not at the top of the sad list of pure alcohol consumers and that the level of alcohol use and the official indicators of alcoholism are lower in the USSR than in the developed capitalist countries. The effects of alcohol on the human organism, however, are the same everywhere. Insurance companies in the United States were motivated by concern for their own financial well-being to conduct studies which indicated that the companies were taking a great risk in issuing life insurance policies to clients who abused alcohol--they die 20 years earlier than non-drinkers. Insurance agents make every effort to learn a future client's attitude toward the bottle. Particularly high premiums are set for drunks--the companies cannot be sure that they will last a long time.

Soviet researcher M.Ya. Kopyt cites alarming figures: Accidents, poisoning and trauma head the list of the causes of death for male alcohol abusers (47.6 percent); cardiovascular diseases rank second (28.7 percent); and cancer ranks third (7.4 percent), followed by diseases of the digestive organs (5.7 percent). Furthermore, these people die at the most productive time of their life.

Drunks are a problem for medical establishments. The accidents they cause keep doctors from helping other people. There are certain times (on the eve of holidays and on paydays) when First Aid vehicles rush through the streets just to help drunks who have overimbibed. Meanwhile, a genuinely ill person waits for assistance, but it comes too late because all of the vehicles have been sent out.

A few years ago, one of the hospitals in Moscow was assigned to treat only alcoholics, so that the odor of alcohol could be driven out of the others. How the hospital personnel suffered! The rendering of medical assistance was not their main problem. It was harder for them to force a drunk with a bashed-in skull and broken arms to accept this assistance. The hospital had to call a policeman. During the operation, when the drunk was lying peacefully on the table, a man in a policeman's uniform, hidden under a white coat, learned the identity of the patient and searched for his address, so that he could later be presented with at least a small bill for the treatment--we must say that this was an extremely justified deviation from the principle of free medical treatment!

Although drunks are not inclined to take care of themselves, they nevertheless fill polyclinics and hospitals when poor health forces them to consider their own well-being. Experts believe that the rate of illness in groups of male alcohol abusers is 20 percent higher than the rate for the male population of a city. In addition to accidents, poisoning and trauma, there is also a high rate of mental disorders, hypertension, tuberculosis, chronic lung diseases and, mainly, liver diseases among them.

All of these diseases--together or separately--usually develop after the age of 40. By this age the effects of an irregular lifestyle become more apparent, and it is at this age that "moderate" drinkers usually turn out to be full-fledged alcoholics, without noticing the boundary separating the moderate but constant imbibitor from the person who is incapable of refusing a drink.

The fatal addiction to alcohol develops gradually. The urban way of life promotes it. In the city a person has more opportunities for interpersonal communication, and yet there is less communication. A citydweller who still has memories of crowded communal dwellings is inclined to be depressed, even if only subconsciously, by his completely comfortable but monotonous life in a separate dwelling with all of the modern conveniences. Living in a huge world of tenuous relationships and traveling to and from work surrounded by strangers, the citydweller longs for communication with others like himself, even though the exhausting hustle and bustle of urban life arouses a constant wish for peace and quiet.

Strangers who are crowded into a small territory can only live together when mutual boundaries are set. Most of the recent arrivals from rural areas do not realize this, and their unconstrained emotions set them apart from the urban multitudes. Under the conditions of the anonymous urban way of life, these sometimes lead to a feeling of impunity. A person can only learn to live in a city through his own personal experience.

The urban craving for socializing is understandable, but why should two people who sit down opposite one another at a table drink more and more alcohol?

Many elderly people long for the days when they visited friends just for tea. Socializing in the home, however, does not strike me as the greatest evil. Taking little sips at work is a much more harmful practice than it might seem on the surface. The waste of working time is not the biggest problem created by this new custom. This is a much more effective way of developing a drinking habit than holiday binges at home. The table where the family gathers is not that rigid. It can make allowances. The table at work is not like this. False ideas about prestige force people to raise their glasses. Everyone knows about the strict law of the first paycheck, which flourished until recently: The new arrivals at a plant had to treat the others. The custom demanded generosity--the bottle had to be expensive, and therefore stronger.

At one of the meetings of the Alcoholism Prevention Commission of the Irkutsk Aviation Plant, one of the workers, a young man with an unhealthy pallor, asked for assistance--he could not get on the right track by himself: His



habit of celebrating all events at the plant and in his personal life with alcohol was too strong. He described how difficult the first round of drinks at a table had been for him to endure. Strictly speaking, it was not a table, but an overturned crate in an alley. It was a celebration of his first paycheck. The host's show of bravado kept the others from noticing how difficult it was for him to raise his glass and concealed his revulsion. The men praised him, slapping him on the back, and he, despite his revulsion, wanted to seem just as manly as they, to look like an adult. It was not easy for him to get used to alcohol. Now he wanted to give up his excessive drinking, which was ruining his health, but the way back seemed even harder.

Everyone has seen the secret fidgeting that used to begin after lunch in respectable establishments! Glimpses of items that did not belong in offices, such as stacks of dishes, were sometimes seen, as if the place were a public cafeteria instead of a project planning institute. The secrecy, however, was maintained only for outsiders, for applicants and customers, because there was no need to hide all of these preparations from co-workers.

This habit has not been completely eradicated. The clerks in the wine and vodka departments of grocery stores know more about this than anyone else. Drunks and alcoholics, who are recognized immediately by experienced clerks, buy one bottle, and two or three other people are usually waiting for them outside. People who look respectable, mainly women, buy alcohol by the case. Their friends are not outside--they are in the office, where no preparations can be seen yet, where the work is still going on, but will soon be interrupted when everyone gets together to drink the contents of the case before the end of the work day.

The first loud protests against drinking bouts in the home and at work were heard in the Estonian city of Tartu. They were group protests. The first temperance association in the country, called the "Anti-Bacchus Club," was established in Tartu. It was founded by former alcoholics, by those who had been to hell and had undergone incredible suffering to emerge from it. They had something to say, and they decided to talk about this as much as possible, so that they could get through to moderate drinkers. They did not want to give lectures: The people who would attend them would be non-drinkers. The members of the Anti-Bacchus Club do not avoid family and social gatherings. The club charter obligates them to spend more time with relatives and colleagues and to popularize temperance.

The funeral of a man who had died while he was drunk was attended by several members of the temperance club. They sat down with everyone else at the table to eat and drink, but they interrupted the first toast. One stood up and, without worrying about insulting the deceased, who was a close acquaintance of his, he told the truth: The deceased had many good qualities, but they had been supplanted by alcohol, his vice had made his family suffer, and no one should forget this. No one interrupted the speaker. The widow began to cry, and the expressions on the faces of the people sitting at the table grew grimmer. He told them: "Turn your glasses upside-down! Let us not drink a single drop in memory of the deceased."

And everyone did what he asked.

The members of the Anti-Bacchus Club insistently pronounce the slogan "Turn your glasses upside-down" at all gatherings and set a personal example. In the beginning, when the club had just been formed, and its members were fully determined to begin a new life and were drawn to one another for help in overcoming their deadly addiction, drinking tea was their way of avoiding drunken gatherings. The members took turns holding sober gatherings and brought their wives and children along. At first they were not very happy gatherings, there was not enough of the wine which might have made them all feel more sociable, but the atmosphere gradually became increasingly natural. The wives must be given credit for this. Encouraging their husbands to live a sober life, the women competed with one another for the best table decorations, baked elaborate pies, and searched through cookbooks for new cake recipes. The atmosphere at these tea parties became even more relaxed when confirmed teetotalers began visiting the homes of the former alcoholics.

People who despise alcohol also have a hard life: They are always seated next to moderate drinkers and constantly hear persistent requests for friendly toasts. It is hard to refuse. When they drank tea with the former alcoholics, they felt relaxed for the first time.

Branches of the Anti-Bacchus Club soon came into being in the republic, and one of the places was Tallin. All members take a solemn oath in front of their comrades to never drink alcohol again. Not all of them are able to do this. There are occasions when people succumb to the deadly addiction. They have to confess this to the other members. This usually helps them. But sometimes the demonic spirit of the addiction forces a person to resume his previous way of life. His family begins to suffer again, but his place at the tea table remains unoccupied, serving as a silent reminder.

Some psychiatrists believe that the solemn promise never to drink alcohol again impedes the resumption of temperance. This kind of pledge is opposed by Alcoholics Anonymous, which has spread to many countries in the last quarter of a century. This genuinely urban organization has an extremely noteworthy precept: The fight against alcohol addiction should not be impeded by considerations of prestige--a person has the right to conceal his identity, so that no one can ruin his reputation at work or in the community.

In the Paris branch of Alcoholics Anonymous (to conceal its function from the unsuspecting public and still be recognizable to its own kind, it calls itself AA, and in its international emblem the letters are followed by periods, A.A.), no promises are accepted from a new member, and they are hastily refused if the long-suffering alcoholic carelessly makes them, accompanying them with solemn vows. Anyone seeking support in his attempt to stop drinking can join the organization. The meetings are filled with confessions. The alcoholics tell their friends with no surnames about the unfortunate incidents they usually concealed from others. The other members are aggressive--they ask leading questions and demand details. The founders of the organization regard this as the most important element in the struggle against their weakness: The person must feel completely ashamed of everything he has done and must clear his conscience of every secret transgression. The more sincere the confession, the greater the chance of recovery. The people seated at the

table, drinking tea or coffee, have expert knowledge of the soul of the drunk. They are inveterate alcoholics, and they can ask the kind of questions that would not even occur to a non-drinker--questions about precisely what the person would like to forget.

People who have thrown off the alcoholic yoke maintain that it is precisely this atmosphere and these public confessions that promote an awareness of the pernicious effects of alcohol abuse. Former alcoholics sometimes see their fellow-addicts standing in a bar or sitting in a sidewalk cafe. If they are publicly drinking whiskey instead of Coca-Cola or Schweppes, they hear no reproaches. The organization charter stipulates that recovery cannot be immediate, it can only be gradual. And it is this that encourages the repentant alcoholics to recover as quickly as possible. After a man has unloaded all of the shameful contents of the innermost recesses of his soul, and he can only do this when he is with people who have had the same experiences, it is easier for him to give up his past.

Members of Alcoholics Anonymous walk and drive around Paris with cards inscribed with the address and telephone number of the organization and an invitation to come to the meetings. The members give out these cards to drunks sprawling on the sidewalk: "We know how you feel. Come to us, we will sympathize with you and, if you want help, we will help you. Alcoholics Anonymous--AA."

Not all psychiatrists are convinced of the effectiveness of the self-treatment or mutual assistance of alcoholics. Nevertheless, some of the experience of AA is even being used in our medical practice. Some self-supporting polyclinics have begun giving appointments with narcologists to anyone making this request, without asking for identification. The patient can call himself by any name, and no one will ask for his address. Dr N.M. Khodakov, who has worked with anonymous patients for several years, feels that their treatment has been more successful than the treatment of those whose identity is known. Anonymous patients can be more frank, and this alone makes the treatment more productive.

Many doctors believe, however, that the treatment of alcoholism demands active, and not passive, methods. One of them is used widely at the 17th Moscow Narcological Hospital, where the treatment consists of medication, group labor, and selective forms of interpersonal communication. The patients live in the hospital, work at the Motor Vehicle Plant imeni Likhachev, and then return to the hospital by bus. The highly structured environment, the atmosphere of trust, participation in productive labor, and the concern of the doctors have transformed many patients....

Modern urban life offers a great variety of leisure activities. We are starting to pay more attention to the ways in which people use their free time. And this is the right thing to do. After all, centers and palaces of culture are usually located next door to the enterprises that own them. The people employed by the enterprises, however, live in different parts of the city. In the past the owners of these beautiful buildings were not disturbed by the fact that the auditoriums and offices were completely empty in the evenings



after work and all day long on the weekends. Many stadiums are still empty today for the same reason. The Lokomotiv Stadium in Moscow, a gigantic facility with seating capacity for tens of thousands of people, is located near the railway stations and is the scene of occasional soccer matches. The trip to the stadium is too long for the railway workers, and the stadium is therefore usually empty. But why is the use of the athletic facilities not granted to railway passengers?

Many remarkable but previously empty palaces of culture have recently lit up and come to life. Now the visitor is not asked about his departmental affiliation. It is not surprising that alcohol sales in these neighborhoods have dropped, and there are fewer conflicts requiring police intervention.

A person experiences a greater need for interpersonal communication in his youth than at any other time in his life. Parties and dances alone cannot satisfy this need. Young people in search of themselves want to talk to other people and hear what they have to say. But conversation requires a certain atmosphere. People had a reason for inventing the cafe--it was not for the sake of food or drink, but for the sake of communication. There is a good reason that the first cafe the Italian Procopio opened in Paris was a place where people drank only coffee, and the word "cafeteria" is Spanish and also means a place where people drink coffee.

In a conversation, there are times when a person must keep quiet. A self-conscious young person with little skill in the art of conversation needs something to do during pauses, when the conversation lags. Many dessert beverages have made their appearance in recent decades. There are now many more of these than new types of wine or other alcoholic beverages. People everywhere drink Pepsi-Cola, and domestic soft drinks--Baykal, Sayany, and Tarkhun--have become popular. They are quite appropriate for conversations, and we could even call them the water of communication.

"Tea vs. vodka." It is interesting that this slogan evoked laughter not long ago. Now that the struggle against alcohol abuse has been launched, the public has learned that tea, lemonade, and Baykal can rival alcohol and can unite people for a peaceful conversation that will not culminate in sudden rages and police intervention. More and more arguments have recently been cited to prove that the commercial advantages of the trade in alcoholic beverages are short-term advantages, if none of the ensuing consequences is taken into account, and in a short while this social bookkeeping will register the immutable fact that alcohol produces only disadvantages.

The situation has changed perceptibly since the publication of the decree of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers "On Measures To Surmount Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism." It would be hypocritical to say that all problems have been solved and that nothing remains to be done except the implementation of the decree, point by point. Nevertheless, many problems which have been debated for years have suddenly disappeared.

It took only a few examples of principled behavior to stop the practice of "taking little sips at work." No matter how many newspaper articles were



written and how many speeches were made at meetings in the past, the habit of celebrating birthdays and bonuses at work seemed impossible to break. The sheepish supervisors who were invited to celebrate the birth of a child or some other occasion a couple of hours before the end of the work day obediently went to the offices where briefcases were being removed from the desks and telephones were being set on the floor--the refusal to participate in the celebrations of subordinates was considered to be undemocratic. The participation of the supervisor in a little celebration, on the other hand, made it legal and turned it into a group binge.

Soon after the publication of the decree, rumors spread through many cities about the penalties incurred by certain high-level officials in ministries and departments who had visited liquor departments during work hours or had sneaked a glass or two in a sanatorium. This was enough to convince people of the strict enforcement of the new law, which was binding for all. Amazingly enough, all of the celebrating during work hours ceased. This alone made the decree worthwhile!

People who went to various establishments learned through their own experience that offices had become accessible, especially in the afternoons, which was the time when their doors had suddenly and secretly been locked in the past. It became easier to reach offices by phone. Many involuntary participants in the "little office celebrations" sighed with relief. The unpleasant custom which was awkward to avoid, because it was universally approved and had become, oddly enough, part of the very concept of collectivism, collapsed like a house of cards, and no one was the worse off for it. Only then was it learned that much of the alcohol purchased in the country was consumed precisely at these "little celebrations."

Alcohol consumption was reduced by a third in many parts of the country within the first few months after the publication of the decree. It is true that some people viewed the struggle against alcohol abuse as a simple matter of prohibition, forgetting that not all customs and bad traditions can be eradicated immediately by mere injunction. In some cities the number of stores still selling vodka, wine and champagne was too low, and this immediately led to the formation of long lines. They resulted in jokes and anecdotes that did not do much to promote the campaign. Soon afterward, the number of liquor stores in Moscow and other large cities almost doubled, and this backward step suggested that the struggle against alcohol abuse was another poorly conceived campaign that would sooner or later come to an end.

Incidentally, some people are still disturbed by the sad sight of the long lines in front of wine stores. They are called "lines of shame." The people in these lines are not only the inveterate drunks who have learned nothing from past experience. Many people who use alcohol have decided to give up this old and bad habit. Some need treatment--alcoholism is treated in hospitals in the majority of cases--and some people do not have enough self-control. Even the hospital cannot cure people in a day. The most determined people can have moments of weakness. How will this kind of line affect them, after they have stood in line with irresponsible people for several hours to buy a bottle?

The work with people who love alcohol will demand unceasing efforts. However useful a "dry law" might seem to be, it has not been passed--apparently so that sobriety can be a matter of conviction rather than prohibition. "Sober zones" and whole neighborhoods have been established in many parts of the country. Life there is cleaner and quieter, but this does not mean total temperance--weak-willed alcoholics go to a neighboring community and buy suitcases full of vodka.

It is apparent that the temperance society has an important role to play. It already has tens of millions of members. Speeches by confirmed non-drinkers and the offer of capable support to those who request outside assistance should be more effective than padlocks and long "lines of shame." In some places, however, branches of the temperance society have chosen the easiest course of action and have instituted formalist practices for the sake of impressive membership figures. Some of the society's members have no intention of giving up alcohol. Furthermore, they are not even asked to do this--they are simply asked to become members and pay dues. The public is already being amused by the sight of happy people standing in the "lines of shame" and waiting for a bottle while sporting the new round pin signifying membership in the society fighting against alcohol abuse. The authority of the mass movement could be injured from the very beginning by the practices of the branches of the society that are putting out their nets to catch all passersby instead of enlisting the aid of enthusiastic and committed opponents of alcohol abuse. And they are doing this for the sake of meaningless membership figures, for the sake of impressive reports.

Members of all population strata are seriously considering ways of putting an end to alcohol abuse. Some have proposed the issuance of ration coupons for vodka, and this is already being done in some places. Here is the result: A non-drinker who has no intention of buying alcohol is issued a piece of paper to use as he sees fit--he can "negotiate" it or pass it on to his neighbor. And he can even sell it, because rationing can bring out the worst in people.

There is something that can help much more in the fight against alcohol than ration coupons or additional barricades in front of liquor counters: We must find a good substitute for drinking and provide people with a better way of spending their time.

The new branches of the temperance society are relying solely on prohibition--in the majority of cases, they are offering no alternative way of spending free time. They have not even noticed that some sly people in the trade network, who had a trouble-free existence when alcohol was their most popular and saleable product, have invented ways of discouraging people from spending their free time in restaurants serving no liquor. Many of the cafes which do not serve alcoholic beverages have instituted a cover charge and a minimum service charge. Biology students at Leningrad State University wrote a letter to the editors about these new charges in a cafe frequented by youth. A trip to the cafe now costs from 3 to 5 rubles: The student is charged an entrance fee and is then charged for his food, which does not have to be eaten but must be paid for. Young people have no incentive to go to cafes whose administrators are still preoccupied with their own problems and are compensating for the absence of alcohol with expensive food.

Throughout the world profits are generated by even the smallest cafes, which, true to their name, serve only coffee, and which serve their patrons as a place for conversations or even for reading and writing poetry. Our public dining establishments' years of practice in getting people drunk have accustomed them to easy profits. Today it is obvious that many people in the trade network do not realize the importance of the decree aimed against alcohol abuse. Most restaurants are not open in the evening, and many cafes close their doors when they are needed the most--on Saturdays and Sundays. They must stay open these days so that patrons can bring their families with them, meet their friends, and talk to them without alcoholic stimulants.

Museums and libraries still close early. Amazingly enough, many of them are closed on Sundays. And the majority of stadiums, after launching all sorts of popular campaigns ("runner day" and "skier day"), are again showing preference to present and future champions rather than the "unpromising" masses, who can stay fit without trying to break records.

The fight against alcohol abuse will not be decided by mere prohibition. It will require comprehensive, carefully planned measures. It will take more than the reorganization of liquor departments in stores. It will demand the reorganization of our entire way of life and changes in the structure of trade services and in the patterns of everyday life and leisure activity.

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## THE MAN BEHIND THE SCENES

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[Interview by journal correspondent M. Manuilskiy with A. Saar, candidate of philosophical sciences and head of the Audience Analysis and Procedures Department of the Estonian SSR Council of Ministers Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting, and department researchers T. Paulson and A. Tamre; first paragraph is SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA introduction]

[Text] It would be difficult to overestimate the social role of the mass media. They are now an exceptionally effective way of influencing public opinion and largely determine the views and beliefs and even the actual behavior of the individual. The impact of the press, radio and television is not necessarily positive, however, and the issue of the operational consequences of the mass media and of the further improvement of their activity is an extremely pertinent matter today. As a specific instrument acquires stronger influence on the elaborate patterns of human thinking, we must use this instrument more carefully and choose the most skillful people to perform this responsible work. No editorial office today can operate only on the basis of sheer guesswork, aiming at arbitrarily chosen targets. This is why the mass media are striving to base their work on the data of empirical studies and are establishing their own sociological subdivisions. The Estonian SSR Gosteleradio (State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting) was probably the first in our country to make this decision. It did this more than 20 years ago. Today the committee's sociological subdivision is called the Audience Analysis and Procedures Department. It is headed by Candidate of Philosophical Sciences A. Saar. Our correspondent M. Manuilskiy recently spoke with him and with department researchers T. Paulson and A. Tamre. A transcript of their conversation is printed below.

Correspondent: Not every sociological office can boast of a permanent staff of interviewers. In your case, it is not just a local network, but a republic-wide system.

A. Saar: The permanent staff of interviewers is a powerful tool in the hands of the sociologist, but it can only produce a genuinely substantial return when it is given the necessary material and organizational backing. Modern data processing equipment and duplicating facilities are essential elements for



success. Our office is located in the computer center of the Estonian SSR Gosteleradio, and we therefore have no difficulties filling either requirement. A network of interviewers requires the transfer of all sociological work to a qualitatively new level. If the office does not have a carefully planned strategy and if specialists do not know which specific issues are the most relevant today, sociologists will always be tormented by the question: "What should our interviewers be asking?"

A. Tamre: Obviously, the failure to make full use of the network is a luxury we cannot afford. But this is not the main thing. After all, one of the main advantages of the staff is that regular participation in surveys allows a person to acquire important skills and abilities. If the interviewer does this only occasionally, he can fail to accumulate the necessary skills, lose these skills, or even refuse to continue working with us.

Correspondent: I think that there will also be people who are eager to use the network. Unfortunately, an obsession with questionnaires is quite common among sociologists, especially among those who put on airs. Rephrasing a famous statement, we could express this attitude in the following words: "Give me a questionnaire (and a staff of interviewers), and I will turn all of your ideas about the world upside-down." Then, in line with this principle, clients and the public are showered with the results of studies with a single purpose--to get people excited.

A. Saar: There is no question that this "strategy" is useless in surveys conducted for practical purposes. These studies hurt science and management by confusing them. I would like to stress that the creation of a permanent network should be part of the overall strategy of departmental operations. It should be based not only on specific methods of sociological work, but, above all, on a thorough understanding of the social aspects of the organization's functions, so that decisions can and must be made only by a sociologist. Of course, even the most progressive ideas will not go beyond the stage of good intentions unless they are provided with the necessary organizational and procedural foundation.

Our office does not want to turn the ideas of the administrators of Gosteleradio or of journalists upside-down. We want to help committee members surmount the kind of situation that is aptly summed up in the saying "not seeing the forest for the trees." In other words, we are striving to provide the members of the editorial staff with the necessary information about the audience's needs and help them cultivate public interest in the mass media and high standards in the use of the media.

A. Tamre: The history of our office can answer many of these questions. Its establishment was preceded by sociological work resulting in the accumulation of a great deal of analytical and practical experience. The surveys were initiated by Ado Samoylovich Slutsk, who was then the deputy chairman of the Estonian SSR State Committee for Radio Broadcasting. In 1958 committee members began conducting several preliminary studies to learn the composition of the radio audience in small cities and rural communities, the position occupied by Estonian radio in relation to other mass media, etc. Seven years later the sociological office was established. Within 2 years it had acquired

the status of an independent subdivision. The year of 1965 marked the beginning of regular studies of the radio audience. The scheduling surveys of the permanent survey network, however, did not begin until the 1970's. The period between these two dates was a time of vigorous efforts to perfect data collection procedures and define the main fields of our work. We studied the sociodemographic structure of the audience and the attitudes of the population, constantly monitored the quality of programs, and secured two-way communication between the editors and the audience. Our main function, of course, consisted in making practical recommendations. For example, one of our studies indicated that listeners were not satisfied with cultural and entertainment programs and, as a result, were listening to foreign radio stations. We decided to establish a second Estonian-language radio station. Another survey half a year later told us that 15 percent of the fans of modern music had stopped listening to foreign stations and preferred local broadcasts.

I should say a few words about the informational situation in which Estonian radio and television operate. The first now has three stations with a combined air time of 35 hours a week, and the programs of the second last around 4 hours a day. Besides this, people in the republic can tune in to the first station of the all-union radio network, "Mayak," and various foreign stations, and can watch the first channel of the central TV network, a Leningrad channel and two Finnish channels. It does not take a sociologist to realize that it is not easy to win the attention of viewers and listeners.

A. Saar: I have to add that almost every family has two radios and a television set. The average adult spends 1 hour and 52 minutes watching television each day. He listens to the radio for 3 hours and 47 minutes on weekdays and for 34 hours a week.

A. Tamre: Our schedule surveys do not tell us why people turn to a certain channel, what they like, and what they do not like. They do provide grounds for some assumptions, and these must be verified by special studies. We have conducted around 40 of these since 1958. We have studied the time schedules of the population (four times), audience tastes, attitudes and expectations, the functions of the mass news and propaganda media, the satisfaction of people with the propaganda and news aspects of editorials, the public interest in sports and music programs, and the needs and wishes of students and young adults. These are the objects of our constant scrutiny.

A. Saar: The sociologist must view the individual not merely as a listener with specific tastes, but also as a participant in certain sociocultural processes. In the system of the mass media, behavior is influenced not only by broadcasts, but also by many "extrainformational" factors: from the profession to the nature of family communication. And it is completely obvious that before a question makes its appearance on a questionnaire (and this also applies to the questionnaire), it must be analyzed. For this reason, we keep up with the latest scientific literature and maintain contacts with colleagues. In particular, we conduct joint studies.

A. Tamre: In addition to using the questionnaires, we also make extensive use of other methods, such as content analysis, the telephone survey, and the

observation. Once the researchers of our office spent an entire weekend on the beach. They spent less time tanning and swimming, however, than recording the radio programs the other people on the beach were listening to. We also conduct experiments. In one of them we investigated the relationship between people's verbalized and actual attitudes toward certain works of music. We were supplied with a bus equipped with tapes and audio equipment. We drove around the republic for several days. We periodically stopped the bus and asked certain people who had been selected for the project to name and evaluate musical genres and styles. Then we asked them to listen to certain tapes and evaluate specific works. The results of the experiment were used in the compilation of music programs.

Correspondent: Now that we are discussing the audience, what are the characteristics of today's listeners and viewers, and which elements of their behavior do you use as your main points of reference?

A. Saar: If we consider the amount of time the population allots to different sources of information, we see the following picture. Radio is in first place, followed by television, and then by newspapers. Furthermore, radio programs usually serve as background accompaniment for work in the production sphere or at home.

A. Tamre: In the 1970's, when television established itself in virtually every home in the republic, some skeptics began to say that radio was dying. After experiencing a decline, however, it took the lead again. Recently, television has been attracting fewer viewers.

Correspondent: Today the increasing amount of time children and teenagers spend watching TV is an acute problem.

A. Saar: We recently conducted a study of children in the first through fourth grades. Our survey indicated that children in happy families spend much less time watching TV than the children in unhappy homes. The former are more likely to watch television with their parents. This fact seems particularly important to me. Watching TV together helps to make up for a lack of communication, helps parents learn more about their children, and aids in the cultivation of more sophisticated listening and viewing habits. In general, radio and television have recently played a more important role as means of cultural enlightenment. The public is also taking more interest in programs dealing with matters of vital importance to the republic. Incidentally, our office was one of the initiators of the now popular programs about people's control and the work of trade unions.

As we know, one of the main reasons for the appeal of radio and television is their ability to take people to the scene of an event and allow them to experience and evaluate it for themselves. Our experience has shown us that sociological research can produce the same result in a certain sense. In any case, in letters to the committee and during our surveys, people frequently express a wish for the more extensive media coverage of research findings. We received the greatest number of these requests during a public opinion poll. We conducted this poll immediately after the 27th CPSU Congress. We



have not finished processing the data, but we can already say that the party forum and the preparations for it provided strong momentum for increased public activity. People are making frank and, what is most important, concerned statements about acute problems, and they regard public opinion studies as an effective way of combating shortcomings and an important channel of individual participation in public affairs.

Correspondent: Sociologists have probably addressed the radio and television audience more than once.

A. Tamre: We do not inform the population of the results of each study. Obviously, there is no need for this, because many of our findings are of strictly professional interest. Our main contribution to the dialogue with the audience consists of recommended improvements in editorial policy. Besides this, the conclusions and advice of sociologists are heard frequently in various types of programs. The information (including information about the results of our studies) we present from time to time on radio and television and in newspapers lets people know that their opinions are taken into account when programs are scheduled, increases their trust in the sociologist, and facilitates our work. At the same time, new problems arise. In addition to taking an interest in our service, people begin complaining about it, saying that they want more detailed explanations of the results of surveys, asking why no one ever surveys them.... In short, the new policy of keeping the public informed is affecting the sociologist.

T. Paulson: I remember one incident. After one of our regular studies we received several angry letters from respondents. The authors were furious: We said in the questionnaire that we are not pleased with the scheduling of movies--they are shown too late. Our opinion, however, was not taken into account. Why has there been no change in the schedule? Why did they bother to ask us then? We had to make a special appearance on television to explain the results of the survey.

Correspondent: You have already said that the committee officials pay attention to the recommendations of sociologists. Can you give me an example of a decision that was made in line with your comments?

A. Tamre: Four years ago we conducted a survey of retired people. It resulted in a program for the elderly, "The Eyeglass Case." It is shown during the day, at a time that is "unprofitable" for the television station, but convenient for the retired people. The most diverse issues are discussed on this program: social, medical, personal. Viewers can receive answers to questions, hear useful advice, and see their favorite performers. In general, the program is quite popular. Here is another example. We always keep an eye on the young audience. We gradually arrived at the conclusion that it needs an entertainment program in the evening. This kind of program has been on for a few years now, and it is competing successfully with similar programs on foreign radio stations. Now we are preparing recommendations based on a study of the pre-school audience.

Correspondent: Radio and television represent a type of aesthetic activity, and defects in form quite often discredit the content....



A. Tamre: We have been paying closer attention to this recently. We conduct a content analysis of programs each year. Our researchers spend a week studying the texts (with the exception of fiction) and images on the screen (with the exception of movies and televised plays). The content analysis reveals the optimal correlation of themes, genres, and methods of transmitting information.

During our surveys we learned that some respondents are not satisfied with political commentaries. Why not? We conducted a psycholinguistic study. It turned out that some listeners did not understand some of the terms--for example, "political leadership," "confrontation," "apartheid," and "segregation." Radio commentators made certain adjustments in their style of delivery on the basis of our data. We just recently completed a study of radio language. We conducted the following experiment. Respondents listened to excerpts from reports read in different tones of voice by professional actors. We learned the different responses to reports delivered in tones expressing different emotions. These data will be quite useful in heightening the impact of public information.

Correspondent: Tell us something about your relationship with your clients, and about the way in which projects are instituted. Who receives information from you, and what kind of information do they receive?

A. Saar: The department puts out a news bulletin (from 3 to 20 pages) almost every month. It contains the most important research findings and conclusions. The document is distributed to around 30 people--primarily committee officials and chief editors. The latter pass the information on to their staffs. The reports often give rise to quite spirited discussions. Researchers from our office have frequent meetings with editorial teams. We explain research results, conclusions, and proposals in detail. Of course, we also maintain daily contact with program directors to provide them with current information and discuss broadcasting plans (air time, potential audience, etc.).

Correspondent: Now I would like to hear more about the main procedural instrument--the permanent staff of interviewers.

T. Paulson: We have built a sample group representing the adult population (450 Estonians and 300 people of other nationalities). The group is formed in several stages. In the final stage the respondents are chosen in line with quotas. The following characteristics are taken into account: gender, age, education, socioprofessional standing, and place of residence. As we receive new statistics, we make the appropriate adjustments in the representation of various groups in the sample. In addition to organizing schedule surveys, we conduct surveys to investigate various aspects of media activity. In this case we usually use a sample group consisting of 1,000 or 1,500 people. Its members are chosen in a similar manner.

Correspondent: Therefore, the sample group has been formed, and now the respondents have to be located and surveyed. Why did you decide to establish a permanent staff of interviewers instead of recruiting new ones each time?

T. Paulson: The survey is conducted quarterly (and twice a year in the case of the non-Estonian population). You know that to make this kind of research

reliable, the sociologist would have to spend all of his time "in the field," searching for interviewers and training them each time. Incidentally, when we conduct special surveys, we still have to hire people in addition to our "staff" of assistants (160 people). Besides this, the procedure of the schedule survey presupposes interviews with the same people (with the gradual replacement of the group) within a specific territory. This is another argument in favor of a permanent staff. Finally, the interviewer must master certain skills and meet certain special requirements. It is not an easy matter to quickly find this kind of person.

An interviewer cannot occupy certain positions, and he must not have subordinates among his potential respondents. We strive for the unconditional observance of this principle.

There is also another important requirement. The interviewer should not be overloaded. In a schedule study he should make certain that four or five diaries are kept (there is the expectation that from 5 to 7 percent of the questionnaires will not be returned). Therefore, we strive to match up the interviewer with a certain socioprofessional group, so that he will not have to go far or take a long time to find the necessary respondent. For example, we ask an interviewer who works in a plant to survey workers and engineering and technical personnel, we ask a salesclerk to survey trade personnel, etc. In addition to taking part in the scheduling surveys, the permanent interviewer usually also participates in one special survey--and no more. From time to time we give the interviewer a "vacation" and do not send him any questionnaires.

A. Tamre: A neutral attitude toward the respondent and the observance of anonymity are the two principles we constantly impress upon our voluntary assistants. Incidentally, the interviewer is allowed to call himself a freelance researcher of the computer center of the Estonian SSR Gosteleradio. Five or six surveys usually reveal the person's capabilities. Incidentally, this is the critical time: Either the interviewer acquires the basic skills and continues to work with us, or he loses interest and gives up the job soon afterward. Requests for more detailed information are an indicator of the interviewer's interest. Without this kind of two-way communication, we simply cannot foresee all of the different variables in the survey, and even the most sophisticated monitoring system cannot secure highly reliable information.

The interviewer is paid 2 rubles 50 kopecks for each correctly filled out questionnaire, and he is paid 3 rubles if a large-scale study is conducted. The relationship is secured by a contract. It stipulates the obligations of both sides and the deadlines for the submission of completed questionnaires. Most of the communication with interviewers is accomplished by mail.

Seminars are held for the interviewers once every 2 or 3 years. We inform them of the results of our studies and discuss problems arising in the work. They hear reports by specialists in the methods and psychology of communication and by committee officials and hear lectures on current sociopolitical issues. The program usually includes a theater tour and the awarding of

souvenirs to outstanding volunteers. Communication is easier if we do not forget such details as sending cards on holidays and birthdays.

Correspondent: Although your network is permanent, it sounds as though your interviewers are gradually replaced.

T. Paulson: No, we have a fairly stable group. As I already said, if a person crosses the frontier of five or six surveys and does not stop working with us, he usually keeps doing this work for many years. Obviously, there are cases in which people move to a new place or suffer a grave illness, but most of our volunteers have been interviewers for a long time. Sometimes a person has to stop working with us for procedural reasons. The scheduling study presupposes three surveys of the same respondent, after which he is replaced. Otherwise, he gets used to the questionnaire and the probability of misinformation increases. For this reason, there are frequent cases, especially in small communities, when all of the people meeting the requirements of the sample group in the community have already been surveyed. Obviously, it would be unreasonable to expect the interviewer to travel to another community. In these cases, we have to part company. Incidentally, more and more people have recently expressed the desire to be respondents or interviewers. Our "retiring" volunteers often suggest good candidates to take their place.

Correspondent: Who are they, your interviewers?

T. Paulson: The overwhelming majority (98 percent) are women. Men throw themselves into the work with a passion at first, make all sorts of suggestions, and then quickly cool off. I think they do not have enough patience, tact, or consistency. Many of them quite quickly decide that the distribution and collection of questionnaires is beneath their dignity. Our interviewers include people of the most diverse ages: from 18-year-old girls (we now have two of these) to retired people. The group is even more diverse on the professional level. There are many bookkeepers, nurses, and traffic supervisors--in short, people who constantly deal with the public. Most of them have a secondary education and regard their participation in the surveys as a form of social work, which is quite an important consideration.

Correspondent: It seems to me that your research experience, which you and I have tried to describe in brief, will be of considerable value in applied sociology, and not only on radio and television. In my opinion, its significance transcends the bounds of the activities of the mass media.

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REPORT AND ELECTION CONFERENCE OF NORTH CAUCASUS DEPARTMENT OF SOVIET  
SOCIOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 4, Oct-Nov-Dec 86  
(signed to press 20 Oct 86) pp 170-171

[Report by V. F. Kamotskiy]

[Text] The second report and election conference of the North Caucasus department of the SSA [Soviet Sociological Association] was held recently in Stavropol. The conference was called to order by Secretary A.A. Korobeynikov of the Stavropol Kray party committee, candidate of philosophical sciences, who presented a brief introductory speech. He listed the current objectives of social scientists in the kray and specifically mentioned the tendency of sociologists, who are expected to reveal the deep-seated causes of conflicts, to take an overview and investigate self-evident developments and processes. This is probably one of the main reasons for the insufficient impact of projects. Some sociologists imply that some people are afraid, or reluctant, to see the "whole truth." This is far from accurate. Reveal the whole truth and you will sense the acute need for it in all branches of the national economy and all spheres of public life. Everyone knows how much lower labor productivity is in the USSR than in the technically developed countries. But which of us has studied the psychological factors inhibiting people's desire to work better, and what are these factors? No one has done this. But after all, we are appealing primarily for the psychological reorientation of personnel. Sociologists must work with social psychologists to find ways of changing the opinions of people and implementing the theory of acceleration. Time is fleeting.

Today there is no more important objective in agriculture in our kray than the transfer of all kolkhozes and sovkhoses to self-funding. The experiment began this year. No difficulties have been encountered. We have a small self-supporting team of sociologists in the kray agroindustrial administration. Their wish to investigate the progress of the experiment is understandable. They have drawn up a program. Everything seems to be fine. But any new project requires the careful study of past experience and past mistakes, the verification and reverification of the first results of innovations, and the comparison of results with data for different regions and types of labor collectives. The quality of this preparatory work will decide the main thing—concentration on real processes rather than processes dreamed up in an office.



But this is precisely what is not being done well everywhere. In our case, for example, the objects of research are not defined correctly in the self-funding research program. Mistakes of this kind will probably make the results useless.

The attempts of some researchers to rely on the repetition of past accomplishments in their research, to blindly copy the ideas of others that seem to pertain to their research, and to make the minimum effort to add to the list of so-called scientific achievements do not meet the requirements of professional ethics. We expect something else from sociologists--carefully considered but genuinely ingenious recommendations of real practical value. We must firmly believe that sociology is capable of putting an end to bureaucratic excesses and eradicating irresponsibility, presumptuousness and arrogance.

A detailed report was presented by department Chairman S.P. Goryunov, candidate of historical sciences. He analyzed the activities of the research sections and branches of the department and of collective and individual members of the association in detail.

The speaker said, in particular, that a great deal of sociological work is being performed in the region, and the network of establishments with professional sociologists on their staff is constantly growing. The North Caucasus Scientific Research Institute of Economic and Social Issues was founded, for example, at the beginning of 1986 (in Rostov-on-Don). The status of sociological support centers has rightfully been assigned to the Krasnodar Sector of the ISI [Institute of Sociological Research], USSR Academy of Sciences, and the Sociology and Law Sector of the Institute of History, Language and Literature, Dagestan Affiliate of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Budget-carried scientific subdivisions of autonomous republic governments and the self-supporting groups and laboratories of VUZ's and research institutes are playing a perceptible role in the development of applied sociology. Social development offices are being established at industrial enterprises. Around 100 sociologists and social psychologists now work in these offices. The sociological services, staffed by volunteers, of party kraykoms and obkoms also have some achievements to their credit.

Many of the research projects conducted by sociologists in the region have been of great practical value. The most prominent among them is the study of the management of labor collectives and the stabilization of personnel, during which 7,000 people in three autonomous republics and two krays were surveyed. Extremely indicative empirical data revealing the connection between discipline and the quality of labor standards at local industrial enterprises were obtained in Cherkessk. The sociological analysis of political indoctrination work in connection with the implementation of the Food Program has been of great help to ideological personnel in several rayons of Karachayevo-Cherkess Autonomous Oblast. Many problems in the improvement of the economic mechanism, the reinforcement of the family, and the optimization of artistic consumption were analyzed by sociologists in the Kabardino-Balkar ASSR, who are now conducting this work with the procedural assistance of scientists from the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences and Komsomol Central Committee Higher Komsomol School. Other projects appreciated by clients dealt with the following topics: "The Effectiveness of the System of Political Education," "Public

Opinion on the Career Plans of Schoolchildren" and "The Politico-Ideological, Labor and Moral Training of Young Students."

The speaker commended the work of sociologist V. Konstantinova from Grozny. Her recommendations, which have been implemented in only one plant shop to date, have already saved around 10,000 rubles. Her study of collective forms of labor organization culminated in the discussion of her findings by the enterprise administration and public organizations. As a result, the number of workers covered by the brigade contract increased by 19 percent.

Shortcomings in the work of the department and its structural subdivisions were discussed at length by S.P. Goryunov. Speakers who took part in the subsequent discussion of the report analyzed the causes of miscalculations and omissions and suggested ways of avoiding them in the future.

Elections to the administrative bodies of the SSA department were held. S.P. Goryunov was re-elected chairman, and L.R. Usov was elected academic secretary.

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ANNUAL MEETING OF ARMENIAN DEPARTMENT OF SOVIET SOCIOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION

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(signed to press 20 Oct 86) pp 171-173

[Report by K.A. Salakhyan]

[Text] The annual meeting of the Armenian Department of the SSA [Soviet Sociological Association] was held in Yerevan. It was called to order by Academician Secretary G.A. Brutyan of the Armenian SSR Academy of Sciences, who praised the work of republic sociologists in general. At the same time, he advised them not to rest on their laurels but to strive for better and more efficient research. A report on departmental activities was presented by department Chairman L.M. Karapetyan, doctor of philosophical sciences. After presenting a detailed description of the work of the five research sections--on the methods and procedures of sociological research, on industrial sociology, on culture and ethnosociology, on the sociology of party work, and on the study of public opinion, lifestyle and the quality of life, and deviant behavior--the speaker listed the problems preventing the performance of more productive work. The shortage of sociological personnel is still a "painful" issue. Non-specialists represent 80 percent of the staff of sociological subdivisions in the republic. In this connection, great hopes have been invested in the recently founded School of Applied Sociology at Yerevan State University.

Various types of schools, seminars and advanced training courses can be of great value in the training of sociological personnel. Unfortunately, enterprise managers do not always recognize the need for this. It takes a great deal of effort to achieve full enrollment for these courses. Although several interesting studies have been conducted in recent years, particularly the study of the social impact of the new forms of economic management under the conditions of the broad-scale economic experiment and the brigade form of labor organization, the disclosure of the career plans of youth, the analysis of indicators of cultural consumption, and the determination of the effectiveness of political educational work and the state of atheistic propaganda in the republic, only a negligible portion of the research findings have been discussed in special literature and periodicals. The mass media should give the activities of the sociological service more extensive coverage and constantly enhance the sociological awareness of the population. Karapetyan underscored the importance of surmounting certain shortcomings, such as the

preoccupation with purely analytical projects and the lack of interest in the issues on which the future of the region will largely depend. One of these issues, requiring basic sociological investigation and vigorous social action, is the development of the alpine regions of Armenia, where there has been a catastrophic decline in population figures in recent years.

The speaker concluded by stressing the great importance of scientific and creative contacts with central sections of the association and with sociologists in other regional departments, advised more extensive joint studies and the publication of collective monographs, and encouraged participation in the work of conferences, schools and seminars.

The discussion of the report reflected the profound interest in the resolution of pressing social problems. In the opinion of Doctor of Philosophical Sciences E.S. Markaryan, it is the duty of sociologists to take an active part in elaborating the analytical premises of the ecological experiment to be conducted soon in the Armenian SSR. The experiment will include interdisciplinary studies of the ecological situation in the region and an analysis of the causes and origins of the tension and disparities connected with man's technological activity.

Candidate of Philosophical Sciences B.V. Megrabyan agreed with the recommendation in the report that sociologists concentrate on several priority matters in the improvement of social relations. In particular, issues connected with the reinforcement of the principles of social justice and social equality are extremely pertinent today.

After describing the activities of the criminological research section of the Armenian Department of the SSA, now engaged in a study of the social conditions of crime and the planning of crime prevention measures, Doctor of Juridical Sciences G.S. Sarkisov underscored the importance of the closer cooperation of jurists, sociologists, psychologists, and specialists in other related fields of science.

G.O. Sayamov, chief of the Department for the Sociological Study of Labor Organization of the Armenian SSR Ministry of Light Industry, discussed the main problems of plant sociologists. The speaker justifiably criticized the administrators of the SSA department for their failure to pay enough attention to practicing sociologists. The activities of the latter are still essentially amateur projects. The training of sociological personnel and the constant exchange of experience with specialists from other republics must be organized.

The report of the auditing commission and the elections to the bureau of the SSA department were followed by a scientific session. A report by Candidate of Philosophical Sciences G.S. Kotandzhyan was enthusiastically received. On the basis of considerable documented information, he cogently revealed the essential purpose of imperialism's ideological subversive activity in connection with the "Afghan question" and substantiated ways of counteracting these efforts. Candidate of Philosophical Sciences A.A. Tatevosyan reported on some of the results of the work of the sociological offices of republic party organizations. The speaker listed the main principles governing the work.



Above all, there must be complete agreement between sociologists and representatives of party organizations, whether the matter in question is routine party work or the special procedures of applied sociological research. The considerable improvement of research tools would also be expedient, because the use of traditional methods often cannot ensure the reliability of the information obtained. The time has come for the constant collection of socially significant information with the aim of sound decisionmaking. And, finally, the main principle governing the work of sociological offices is the need to keep the public informed. Party decisions based on research results should be discussed in labor collectives, in the press, and on radio and television. This will reinforce the laboring public's belief that its participation in sociological research is a form of participation in the management of society and will provide the best publicity of the science of sociology and its role in the improvement of the socialist way of life.

Participants in the session listened with great interest to the report by Candidate of Philosophical Sciences L.A. Arutunyan on the social problems of the enhancement of material welfare in the Armenian SSR. A sociological analysis of the detailed family time schedules prepared in the republic from 1972 to 1981 testifies that social class differences in welfare are reflected primarily in the unequal consumption of material, cultural and consumer goods and services and the unequal use of recreational opportunities by members of different social groups. For example, the amount spent by employees on purchases of commodities per family member exceeds the amount spent by workers by 23.4 percent, including 37 percent in the case of manufactured goods and 2 percent in the case of groceries. As we know, differences in labor contribution lie at the basis of the inequality in the socialist society. Social programs were adopted in recent decades to eliminate inequalities based on differences in social status, and both their positive and their negative results have been more sweeping than anticipated. The equalizing processes have had a perceptible effect on the awareness of the principles of social equality and distribution according to labor. According to the results of a survey, more than 10,000 respondents were fully aware of the first principle and insufficiently aware of the second (when they assessed their own standard of living, more than 50 percent of the respondents compared it to the standard of living of others, and only 8 percent compared it to the value of their personal labor contribution). In Arutunyan's opinion, the time has come to reinforce the social role of wages and make full use of their differentiating and rewarding abilities.

A discussion of the social and ideological substantiation of economic reforms was proposed by Candidate of Philosophical Sciences G.A. Pogosyan. In an atmosphere of thorough economic reorganization, it is especially important to keep the public informed and to provide labor collectives with timely and thorough information about innovations. According to a special sociological study, around 80 percent of the workers surveyed did not know that their enterprise was included in the broad-scale economic experiment, and 40 percent of the engineering and technical personnel could not explain the essential purpose of the experiment. Even a document as important as the Law on Labor Collectives has not received the necessary publicity: Over 60 percent of the workers had never heard of it. The speaker went on to stress that the most

important factors in the acceleration of the socioeconomic development of the country are social reserves--that is, new forms of labor organization and incentives. Above all, these include the reinforcement of the worker's sense of proprietorship, the augmentation of inner motivation for labor, and the inclusion of personnel in production management. Sociological studies indicate that there are many unutilized reserves in the expansion of production democracy. For example, around 60 percent of the workers surveyed expressed a wish to participate in various forms of production management, but only 14 percent actually do participate. More than anything else, the workers would like to participate in the activities of people's control committees and product quality control offices, and in the distribution of housing, bonuses, travel authorizations, motor vehicles, etc.

The meeting of the Armenian sociologists helped to reveal shortcomings in the work of the republic SSA department and to plan measures for its further improvement.

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## PROBLEMS OF YOUNG FAMILY DISCUSSED

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[Report by Ye.V. Foteyeva]

[Text] The Family Sociology Section of the SSA [Soviet Sociological Association], the Family Sociology Department of the ISI [Institute of Sociological Research] of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and the Komsomol Central Committee held an interregional applied science conference in 1986 to discuss "Current Problems in the Study of the Young Family in Line with the Decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress." Conference participants, who represented sociology, demography, psychology, pedagogics, medicine, and jurisprudence, discussed the scientific substantiation of social policy, the improvement of research procedures, the standardization of working documents, and the guarantee of the comparability of results.

The augmentation of the family's social potential and the reinforcement of marital and family relations are directly connected with the efforts to carry out the program for the accelerated socioeconomic development of the country and the effective use of the human factor. The attainment of these objectives, as SSA Vice President A.G. Kharchev, doctor of philosophical sciences, stressed in his report, will presuppose family studies of high quality, the united efforts of specialists investigating these matters, and a reliable system for the implementation of scientific recommendations.

The new phase in the development of family sociology will require the clarification of several analytical premises. The absence of a single approach to their interpretation will impede the generalization of information obtained by various researchers and will inhibit the advancement of science. The failure of some researchers to deal with the specific problems of our way of life will also impede the planning of effective measures for the exertion of positive influence on the family. The speaker mentioned the need to direct the attention of scientists to the study of the conflicting tendencies interfering in the complete disclosure of the socialist family's social potential.

Commenting further on this topic, Candidate of Economic Sciences A.G. Volkov (Moscow) discussed new trends and problems connected with the changing living conditions of the young family, revealed during the course of an interregional

study conducted by the Scientific Research Institute of the USSR Central Statistical Administration. The speaker started a lively discussion of the prospects for the development of socialist marital and family relations.

Speakers noted that the needs of practice must be used as a guide in choosing research topics and in processing and interpreting results. Purposeful influence on the family by state establishments and public organizations is particularly important. Candidate of Economic Sciences L.Ye. Darskiy (Moscow) commented that research results are not being used often enough in the legal regulation of marital and family relations. A stronger connection between science and the activities of legislative bodies is an important part of more effective family policy.

The effects of social policy on the birthrate were described in a report by Doctor of Philosophical Sciences A.I. Antonov (Moscow). The purpose of public influence on the family today, in his opinion, consists in stabilizing the birthrate at the level of three or four children. The attainment of this goal will depend largely on the development of the family's economic-production functions and on the enhancement of the value and prestige of the larger family.

Alcohol abuse occupies a special place among the factors with a negative effect on the health and raising of children and the stability of the family. As N.V. Osetrova (Lvov) stressed in her speech, however, the mechanism and characteristics of the influence of marital and family factors on the spread of alcoholism have not been studied sufficiently. This has seriously inhibited the planning of effective preventive measures.

An important aspect of population quality was discussed by Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences I.A. Manuilova (Moscow). The health of women and, consequently, of their children depends to a considerable extent on the use of modern family planning devices and methods. At present, however, methods of contraception, the availability of contraceptive devices in many parts of the country and, finally, the system of public information do not correspond to the scientific achievements in this field or to the needs of married couples.

A report on the second conference topic, problems in the improvement of research procedures, was presented by Candidate of Philosophical Sciences M.S. Matskovskiy (Moscow). He remarked that family sociologists had collected a great deal of empirical information in the last 15 or 20 years and had accumulated some experience in its generalization and analysis. Some idea of the methodological and procedural results of this work can be gained from the research procedures and program reports prepared by the Family Sociology Department of the ISI, USSR Academy of Sciences. There is still a disparity, however, between the quantity of information collected and the level of its interpretation. The development of theories about the family is being complicated by the failure to work out a system of variables related to the basic concepts of sociological research and reflected in a precise system of empirical indicators. M.S. Matskovskiy proposed an analytically sound system of variables and of standard empirical indicators for marriage and family research.



The discussion of this report proved that this is a matter of great relevance from the analytical and practical standpoints. Although no agreement has been reached on the standardization of procedures, the idea of standardization won the approval of conference participants. In particular, Candidate of Philosophical Sciences V.B. Golofast (Leningrad) said that the proposed system of variables could be used as a point of reference in this kind of research, as the first phase of a process that must not be confined to the improvement of the system of variables and indicators. In this context, the development of efficient, impersonal methods of obtaining information and the compilation of a catalogue of empirical research findings could be quite helpful. Some conference participants, including A.G. Volkov and Candidate of Psychology L.Ya. Gozman, stressed the counterproductivity of separating the content of research from its organizational framework and proposed the standardization of the organizational structure and the processing of research results as well as procedures.

Speakers directed attention to the positive and negative aspects of the standardization of procedures and objected to the absolutization of this idea. In the opinion of A.I. Antonov, standardization should not exclude the right to develop original procedures, especially in basic research pertaining to marriage and the family. Agreeing with this point of view, L.Ye. Darskiy said that the accumulation of theoretical knowledge and the appearance of new problems are accompanied by the development of new procedures.

The conference reaffirmed the productivity of the interdisciplinary approach to the study of marital and family relations and the stronger connection between research and the practice of social regulation.

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## USE OF THE RURAL FAMILY'S LABOR POTENTIAL

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[Report by S.I. Zavyalov]

[Text] An all-union applied science conference on the use of the labor resources of the rural family was held in Makhachkala. Calling the meeting to order, Secretary Z.F. Pulatov of the Dagestan CPSU Obkom pointed out the need to use the potential of the family contract to the maximum. The contract has been used in the republic for a long time. Now around 4,000 families, working 6,500 hectares of land, are working on this basis.

Doctor of Economic Sciences G.I. Shmelev (Moscow) commented in his report that science and practice had lost sight of one of the most important functions of the family--the economic function--and that this had broken the chain of objective social interrelationships and interests (individual--family--group--society). There is still a bias against family economic activity, partly because it has not been studied enough and is not always analyzed by scientists as a positive process. Past experience indicates, however, that the social nature of the family contract and the private subsidiary farm is not contrary to socialist production relations, because most of the family members also participate in social production, usually following the same plan as the collective farm and using public funds or personal means of production whose quantity and structure are controlled by society; distribution depends on the labor contribution and its results. The time has come--and the 27th CPSU Congress has made this clear--to put an end to all of the false rumors and biased talk about family forms of economic management.

G.I. Shmelev went on to stress the fact that the family contract is a form of organizing social production, and not some other type of production. The speaker cited domestic and foreign statistics to illustrate its economic-production impact (production results, product quality, and worker income are frequently augmented by a factor of 1.5-2 within a short time), and several beneficial features and positive social effects (the strong unity of the participants in the labor process, the simplicity and efficiency of methods of remuneration, the inclusion of little-used or unused resources in social production, the stabilization of the population of small communities, etc.). There is also the possibility that the family contract can evolve into inter-family and other, broader forms of cooperation.

Researcher I.I. Akhlakov from the Dagestan agroindustrial administration discussed the spread of the family contract in the republic. The mountainous terrain, the small fields, the poor soil, and other factors minimize the profitability of agriculture (around 30 percent of the kolkhozes in the republic are operating at a loss). It is precisely under these difficult conditions that the family contract can display its positive features, especially in regions with no winter pastures. There are already many cases of the successful use of this contract in the republic: in dairy farming, sheep farming, vegetable farming and viticulture. This form, however, is not being used on a mass scale, and this is what is required. The main reasons are the lack of knowledge about the distinctive features of this form of labor organization, the inability to put it to use, and the low impact of scientific recommendations.

Hero of Socialist Labor V.Ya. Udam, member of the Central Committee of the Estonian Communist Party and party raykom first secretary, used Pyarunskiy Rayon to illustrate his discussion of problems in the development of subsidiary farms. The lower percentage of these farms in the rayon is the result of the high level of production collectivization and of shortcomings in the organization of the private sector: the failure to satisfy public demand for calves and piglets, the poor quality and variety of feeds, difficulties in the sale of surplus products, etc. Several problems stem from "structural" factors: the centralized development of rural communities (reducing the area of accessible meadows), and the larger young rural population with no wish to work in animal husbandry, which reduces the number of private livestock. To surmount these negative trends, the current five-year plan envisages expanded housing construction in rural areas, a return to old villages (with the preliminary repair and remodeling of buildings), and the improvement of trade services for the owners of private farms.

The denial of the social significance and usefulness of the family's economic functions, especially in rural locations, has inflicted substantial production, economic and social losses on society, Doctor of Economic Sciences I.N. Buzdalov (Moscow) said in his report. For a long time the substantial material and labor potential of the rural economy was not used. The present reversal, which is partly due to the positive experience of some socialist countries, will require the establishment of the necessary economic and legal-organizational conditions to stimulate the work of the rural family. The presence of strictly administrative measures introduces elements of instability, uncertainty, and unreasonable risk into individual labor. The widespread use of an effective system of contractual relations, based on the mutual economic interests and responsibility of the sides and similar to the one used in Hungarian agriculture, would be of particular value in surmounting these problems. One specific way of intensifying the use of the labor reserves of the rural and urban family, the speaker said, will consist in giving applicants unimpeded access to available homes and plots in rural locations, especially in certain unpromising zones. The administrative restrictions here are not backed up by any kind of intelligent considerations.

It is already time, despite the shortage of information, to analyze the different types of family contracts, said senior research associate from the Latvian SSR Economics Institute Ya.P. Zelenka. For example, the single-family

contract is used in sheep farming, viticulture, and the fattening of livestock, and the group contract is used primarily in dairy farming. Whereas the first type aids in the integration of private and social production, the second represents a self-supporting form of social production. Experiments conducted in Estonia and Latvia revealed the important advantages of the group family contract in the internal organization of labor: conflict-free relations, mutual aid, etc.; in the method of its remuneration, and in the augmentation of labor productivity, also proving that family forms of labor need no special incentives setting them apart from individual and group labor. The establishment of a few experimental centers in neglected zones of low-intensity farming, including cooperative groups consisting of from three to five families, which would improve the social conditions of labor, could compensate for the still apparent shortage of practical experience in the organization of family contracts.

The results of the experiment in the integrated fattening of livestock on subsidiary farms in a mountainous region (Carpathians) were discussed by Candidate of Economic Sciences A.K. Almashi (Transcarpathian Agricultural Experimental Station). The transfer of part of the public herd to kolkhoz members and their provision with part of the necessary feed supply and up to 5 years' access to meadows, located mainly in remote or almost inaccessible locations, helped to solve the extremely acute fodder problem, to heighten the intensity and efficiency of meadow use, and to reduce the amount of time required for the fattening of livestock while reducing feed expenditures from 20-25 quintals of feed units to 7.3 quintals per quintal of weight gain. The net income of the kolkhoz members was 486 rubles for each animal fed (these were cattle), and kolkhoz sales income per head increased by a thousand rubles. Relations between the kolkhoz and the kolkhoz members are based on contracts and the principles of cost accounting. In this case, the work performed at home is regarded as one form of labor in public farming, and this work is taken into account in the service record--30 work days per fattened head. This form of cooperation could substantially increase the output of animal husbandry products.

According to S. Rukhadze, chief of the Georgian SSR Agroindustrial Administration, the widespread use of family forms of labor in social production has produced a similar impact in the mountainous regions of this republic. The experience of the Iparskiy and Ushgulskiy sovkhoses in Mestiyskiy Rayon, which turned the entire public herd of cattle over to the families of workers and employees for maintenance in 1983, showed that an increase of 3-17 percent in the herd within just 2 years was possible, including an increase of 19-22 percent in the herd of cows, while the average weight of the cattle increased by 25-30 percent. Furthermore, losses of cattle and the mandatory destruction of calves and adult livestock virtually ceased. The authorization of families to use public land here also aided in the intensification of farming and increased the area of cultivated land. The output of milk and meat increased substantially, and the plans for their sale to the state are being overfulfilled. Family income is from 2 to 2.5 times as great, and sovkhos profits are from 3 to 7 times as great. Local employment has risen and the rate of migration has declined.



Candidate of Economic Sciences V.F. Vershinin (Moscow) discussed some aspects of the correct organization of the contract. The successful use of contracted forms of labor requires more than just their official acknowledgement. It also requires the establishment of a certain minimum number of conditions with a view to the physical workload, material and financial expenditures, reimbursement, and the choice of the suitable types of families. There will be no certainty of success unless measures are taken for the preparation of facilities, the mechanization of some operations, and the analysis of the group of potential workers. In some cases, the failure to consider all possibilities can lead to negative developments. In addition, this will also require a broader legal base and the compilation of a single set of instructions, so that the organization of the family contract and other contracts will cease to be the product of "local creativity." There will be no need for the standardization of contracts, because group, family and individual contracts can be used to meet specific conditions and needs. The more extensive use of these contracts could be an important way of developing informal labor initiative and of teaching the individual to treat public property conscientiously. In addition, it would be useful to determine the exact prospects and possibilities of this course of action and determine the degree to which the worker will be personally responsible for the results of labor and the personal risk involved in a system of guaranteed employment, guaranteed income, etc.

The close connection between the developmental level of subsidiary farming and the organizational activity of administrative bodies, especially the rayon agroindustrial board, is becoming apparent, Candidate of Economic Sciences I.Ye. Krivchanskiy (Kishinev) reported. The board, however, does not always render adequate assistance, and this sometimes leads to insufficient cooperation and integration in public subsidiary production. Various ministries and departments also influence the private farming sector. In this connection, there is an urgent need for the quickest possible compilation of a comprehensive special interdepartmental program for the development of subsidiary farms, to be approved and ratified by all departments. In addition to standard documents regulating the economic relations of the private farming sector with agroindustrial administrations and other organizations, other forms of organization should be developed for the realization of its full potential. The voluntary societies of rabbit breeders and beekeepers in Moldavia are an example of this. Associations of this kind should also be established in other fields of subsidiary and group production, and a single society of volunteers should be established to cover all of the needs and interests of the rural worker engaged in subsidiary farming. It could be a self-supporting organization and could be offered the use of the funds of consumer cooperatives and other departments. A local society of private plot owners has also been established in Kishinev.

Candidate of Economic Sciences P.D. Alimov (Tashkent) made several comments about the accumulated experience in the development of subsidiary farming in Uzbekistan. After pointing out the best features of the private sector--the self-sufficiency of the family, the augmentation of state food supplies, and the educational and recreational opportunities--the speaker felt the need to discuss some of its negative aspects as well, underscoring the excessive workload, the reduced participation of workers in public production for this reason and others, and the violation of certain standards. In the speaker's

opinion, the private sector's contacts with the consumer cooperative should be limited, because the cooperative frequently fails to meet the needs of this sector by arranging for the purchase of surplus products through kolkhozes and sovkhoses. In addition, it will be necessary to improve the work of kolkhoz markets--to heighten their interest in the better organization of trade, expand the network of trade service agencies, and eliminate the formalism in their practices. The standardization of hothouses on subsidiary farms is an extremely important matter at this time.

The family labor collective, Doctor of Juridical Sciences G.B. Chubukov (Moscow) said, is a natural phenomenon from the standpoint of legal standards and of social traditions (the labor dynasties). Of course, the sectorial, regional, intraorganizational and other conditions of agricultural production should be taken into account when these collectives are formed, but the excessive regulation or "regimentation" of their work should be avoided. The families should make their own decisions about the hiring and placement of workers and about the length of the work day, and should invite relatives to assist them in the capacity of temporary workers. The system of remuneration should be adapted to this form of labor, which requires a much less complex system than the collective contract. The framework of family labor should include not only contracted families, but also the owners of subsidiary plots and people who perform work in the home in fields connected in some way with the public sector.

Candidate of Economic Sciences N.K. Kadyrov (Ustinov) made several suggestions with regard to the organization of the family contract, basing his proposals on the experience of the Udmurt ASSR. At this time, he said, the family contract is still far from complete cost accounting. The family's responsibility for the results of economic activity is sometimes limited, and there are cases of wage leveling with no regard for the results of labor. These problems can be solved by making the contracted family a self-supporting affiliate of the public farm with a piece-rate wage. To heighten the material responsibility and interest of the family, it should be provided with means of production at the current state prices, without discounts, and all of its products should be calculated in these prices as well. In animal husbandry the families using the feeds should also prepare them. This would improve their quality and storage properties. People should be able to do what they wish with above-plan products, as this will make them less dependent on private plots and increase their interest in contracted production. The more active involvement of citydwellers in agricultural production on the basis of the family contract, N.K. Kadyrov concluded, will be expedient.

The results of the recommendations of local scientists and practical workers with regard to financial incentives and wages in connection with the family contract in the republic were discussed by Candidate of Economic Sciences Z.B. Isayev, Dagestan State University instructor. The combination of monetary wages and payment in kind, the advance payments in the amount of 50-60 percent of the value of projected output, and the retention of half of the above-plan output by the family have increased the local population's interest in the family contract in sheep farming, grain production, and animal husbandry and have increased the yield of some crops by a factor of 3-3.5.

Recommendations reflecting the majority of comments made at the conference and the general experience of leading farms were adopted at the end of the meeting.

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## CHRONICLE

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 4, Oct-Nov-Dec 86  
(signed to press 20 Oct 86) p 179

[Text] Reported by A.V. Kirkh: The Baltic Department of the SSA [Soviet Sociological Association] has had a young sociologists' section for more than 3 years now. It has been active in the advanced training of specialists and the exchange of experience. Its latest seminar was a conference held in Tallin to discuss the role of the automated data bank (ADB) in the research of young scientists. Conference participants learned all of the details of the "Sociology" ADB established in the History Institute of the Estonian SSR Academy of Sciences and discussed a number of important theoretical and procedural matters. Speakers noted that the reliability and comparability of results are the main prerequisites for the establishment and efficient operation of the system connecting the user with the display unit and the data bank. Recommendations adopted at the conference stressed that the creation of a regional bank of sociological and statistical data will aid in improving the management of social processes. The bureau of the SSA Baltic Department proposed the creation of a special section to investigate the possibility of organizing a sociological ADB. To secure the adequate comparability of results, it will be wise to draw up a list of the mandatory questions for any research project, systematically collect information about the indicators and instruments used and about their reliability, and develop a system for the identification of processed groups of data. The legal-ethical standards and the procedures of the exchange and use of information within the SSA should be defined. Courses must be organized to teach sociologists the methods of individual dialogue with the computer.

Unattributed report: A coordinating conference was held in the Institute of Sociological Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences for researchers of working and non-working time. Conference participants discussed questions connected with the standardization of methodological approaches and procedural recommendations and reached agreements on the exchange of comparable information and on the preparation of a joint report to social administrative bodies. They acknowledged the need to conduct time scheduling studies within the framework of Soviet-American and Soviet-Mongolian cooperation within the next 5 years.

Reported by N.M. Nayborodenko: An out-of-town session of the section for the "Communist Indoctrination of the Young Scientific, Engineering and

Technical Intelligentsia" of the Public Council for the Coordination of Scientific Studies of the Problems of Youth of the Komsomol Central Committee and USSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences was held in Tyumen to discuss the scientific elaboration of the social problems of young scientists in Tyumen and Sverdlovsk Oblasts. Reports were presented by section bureau member K.G. Barbakova, professor at the Tyumen Industrial Institute, and by Ye.P. Starodubtsev, director of the Sociological Laboratory at the Uraltyazhmash Plant. Representatives of scientific centers in Moscow, Leningrad, Kharkov and Novosibirsk took part in the discussion. Speakers stressed the relevance of studies of the social factors enhancing the effectiveness of the work of the young scientific, engineering and technical intelligentsia at a time of accelerated economic development through the incorporation of the achievements of the technological revolution. Attention was directed to the all-union comprehensive study of the creative activity of young specialists. The section's experience in holding out-of-town sessions was commended.

Reported by S.Ye. Grishin: A meeting of the rural sociology section of the Volga Department of the Soviet Sociological Association was held in the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the Socioeconomic Problems of the Development of the Agroindustrial Complex to discuss a theory on the development of the regional agroindustrial complex. Speakers made comments and proposals to clarify and amplify certain premises of the theory submitted for discussion. The results of the discussion were summed up by institute director and Honored Scientist of the RSFSR, Professor V.B. Ostrovskiy.

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## THE DEMOGRAPHIC SITUATION AND ITS PORTRAYAL IN THE DEMOGRAPHIC DICTIONARY

Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian No 4, Oct-Nov-Dec 86  
(signed to press 20 Oct 86) pp 180-187

[Review by Viktor Ivanovich Perevedentsev, candidate of economic sciences, senior research associate at the Institute of the International Workers Movement of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and author of the monographs "Population Migration and Labor Problems in Siberia" (1966), "Methods of Studying Population Migration" (1975), "270 Million" (1972), "The Soviet Union: Nature and Population" (1982), "I Pay My Debts and Lend Money to Others" (1983), "People, People..." (1986), and others, and of articles in our journal--"Population Reproduction and the Family" (No 2, 1982) and "Population Migration and the Development of Agricultural Production" (No 1, 1983), of the book "Demograficheskiy entsiklopedicheskiy slovar" [Demographic Encyclopedic Dictionary], edited by D.I. Valentey, Moscow, Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, 1985, 608 pages; passages enclosed in slantlines are printed in italics in source]

[Text] This book was published at the end of last year in an edition of extraordinary size for a book on demography (75,000 copies). All of the copies in Moscow bookstores had been bought within a few days, providing irrefutable proof of the general reading public's interest in demography and of the great demand for publications of this kind. The annotation says that the dictionary is intended to "reflect the current level of development of Marxist-Leninist demography and all of the fields of science studying population" (p 5). Besides this, we must add, this kind of dictionary should be an accurate portrayal of the demographic situation and of trends in its development.

The people who prepared the publication had to cope with certain difficulties. There is no demographic journal in the country yet, and there is little published literature dealing with demographic issues. Most of the credit for compiling a dictionary under these conditions must be given to the Population Research Center of the School of Economics at Moscow State University, under whose seal the book was published. In all, the dictionary contains around 1,600 articles. The 270 authors are Soviet researchers, representing all of the union republics and several autonomous republics, and foreign scientists.

Let us now take a look at the text of the book. I must immediately admit that publications of this kind, especially first editions, usually contain

many minor errors. I will not dwell on these. Let us take a look at just the two main "subjects"--reproduction and migration--and see how these terms are defined. The first is one of the fundamental concepts in demography, which is usually called the science of population reproduction. This is precisely how it is defined in the dictionary. "Demography...the science of trends in population reproduction and the sociohistorical factors influencing this process" (p 118).

In the long and extremely competent article "Population Reproduction," written by A.G. Vishnevskiy, there is probably only one flaw: The indicators of population reproduction in the USSR--the so-called gross and net ratios--stop abruptly in the middle of the 1970's; this seems rather early for a 1985 publication.

What are these ratios? What do they mean? Let us look up the corresponding articles, written by renowned Kievan demographer S.I. Pirozhkov. "Gross ratio of population reproduction, gross coefficient of population reproduction, indicator of replacement of generations, excluding mortality rate..." (p 50); "Net ratio of population reproduction, net coefficient of population reproduction, quantitative measurement of replacement of maternal generation by daughters, occupying the central place in the system of /population reproduction ratios/: general description of /population reproduction patterns/..." (p 285).

Here, as they say, there is nothing to add or subtract, because this is essentially a matter of terms known to any novice demographer. The reader has probably guessed that I had a reason for quoting these passages. I will discuss this below. First let us take a look at the article on the Belorussian SSR in the section on "Population Reproduction." What are the gross and net ratios? A table with the same heading as the section records the rates of birth, death and natural increase--that is, indicators of what is traditionally called the natural dynamics of population. This is a truly amazing surprise! If we look through the articles on all of the republics, we will find the same thing in all of the tables. What does the text have to say about this? We read: "In spite of the decline of the total birthrate (from 7.2 to 2.0), the expanded reproduction of the population was secured by the declining death rate" (pp 33-34). Does this refer to Belorussia? Not trusting my memory, I reached for "Narodonaseleniye stran mira" [The Population of the World's Nations], a reference work published in 1984. I looked up the population figures for Belorussia. The gross reproduction ratio in 1979-1980 was 0.91 (1, p 156), and the net ratio was understandably lower. As we can see, the reproduction of the republic population has been reduced substantially. In other words, the younger generation is not fully replacing the generation of its parents in the quantitative sense. In general, how can reproduction be expanded if the total birth ratio is 2.0? After all, this means that 100 women living to the age of 50 give birth to a total of 200 children, less than half of whom are girls. Furthermore, some of these children will not live to child-bearing age. This total birth ratio precludes expanded reproduction in principle. How could a statement of this kind be made in a demographic dictionary!

All of the articles about other union republics and the lengthy article on the USSR as a whole (pp 430-438) also make reference only to the natural movement of the population under the subheading "Reproduction."

The difference between population reproduction and natural population dynamics is a fundamental matter of extreme importance. It is extremely important because people who are not specialists in demography usually confuse the terms. I know this from my own experience, because I know the kind of questions a lecturer on demography is always asked. Here are some typical questions from the audience, including scientists: Why are demographers worried when the population is growing? Are increase and reproduction not the same thing? Why is population increase necessary at all?

Population increase simply means that the number of births exceeds the number of deaths. Reproduction, on the other hand, means the replacement of generations. Population increase can be present even when reproduction is reduced--that is, when there are not enough children to replace the parental generation. In the quantitative sense, daughters replace not their mothers, but their grandmothers and great-grandmothers. Now the average mother is around 25 when she gives birth to her daughter. This means that the average grandmother is around 50 and the great-grandmother is around 75 at this time. For population reproduction, daughters must replace the women of their mothers' generation. Of course, there is a connection between indicators of natural population dynamics and indicators of reproduction, because the process of reproduction is made up of births and deaths. The overall birth and death rates, however, are strongly influenced by the age and sex structure of the population. Children are borne by young women, and most of the people who die are old. If there is a high percentage of young women and a low percentage of old people in the population, total birthrate and increase indicators could be high even in a situation of contracted reproduction. In short, population increase is not an indication of a positive demographic situation.

The editors of the demographic dictionary committed a grave error when they substituted indicators of natural population dynamics for indicators of reproduction. We are dealing here with the vulgarization of basic demographic terms.

Obviously, this will not mislead scientists who know /demographic/ statistics. But after all, they will represent the minority of the book's readers. What about the economist, teacher, propagandist or practical worker? According to the publishers' annotation, the dictionary is intended precisely for them. I think that a reader who is not a demographer will be much more interested in the situation in his own republic than in the "fine points" of demography, so that the articles on Belorussia or Lithuania will be read by many more people than A.G. Vishnevskiy's article on population reproduction, although it, as I have already said, deserves the highest praise.

It is interesting that in many of the articles on the population of foreign countries, the indicators of natural population dynamics are accompanied by gross ratios, and even by net reproduction ratios in a few cases. It is impossible to understand why the gross ratios for the union republics could

not be cited as well. After all, these data are traditionally published in the previously mentioned reference work, the third edition of which was published in 1984. To give the reader some idea of population reproduction in the USSR as a whole and in the union republics, I will cite a table from this reference work to graphically illustrate the dynamics of the reproduction process from the end of the 1950's to the beginning of the 1980's (1, p 156).

Table: Gross Ratios of Population Reproduction

<u>Republics</u>	<u>1958-59</u>	<u>1969-70</u>	<u>1979-80</u>	<u>1980-81</u>
RSFSR	1.27	0.97	0.92	0.93
Ukraine	1.14	1.00	0.96	0.95
Belorussia	1.36	1.13	0.91	0.99
Uzbekistan	2.45	2.76	2.38	2.35
Kazakhstan	2.16	1.62	1.42	1.43
Georgia	1.25	1.28	1.09	1.10
Azerbaijan	2.43	2.27	1.61	1.58
Lithuania	1.27	1.15	0.98	0.97
Moldavia	1.73	1.26	1.16	1.18
Latvia	1.08	0.94	0.91	0.92
Kirghizia	2.09	2.37	2.00	2.00
Tajikistan	1.92	2.89	2.88	2.76
Armenia	2.29	1.57	1.16	1.15
Turkmenia	2.48	2.90	2.49	2.41
Estonia	0.94	1.05	0.98	0.99
USSR	1.36	1.18	1.06	1.10

Net reproduction ratios are 0.06-0.07 points lower than gross ratios for the nation as a whole.

By the end of the 1970's population reproduction had become simple reproduction in the country as a whole and contracted reproduction in the RSFSR and all of the republics in the European part of the USSR with the exception of Moldavia. Central Asia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan made up for the "poor yield" in these republics. The birthrate declined everywhere in the 1970's. Unfortunately, the demographic dictionary does not reveal this significant and alarming situation. It soothes the reader by telling him that everything is fine, that population reproduction in all of the union republics is expanded reproduction, that the demographic situation is positive.... It is therefore impossible to understand why demographers are worried. Everyone knows that there have been more children in recent years.

What does the dictionary say about the current demographic situation in general?

"The demographic situation, the state of demographic affairs, the state of demographic processes, the composition and distribution of the population at some specific time, usually in a specific year" (p 409). The brief and concise but accurate and informative article ends with the words: "For the



specific features of the demographic situation, see the articles on...World Population, Global Population Problems, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."

When we look up these articles, we find virtually nothing about the demographic situation in the first two. The last one does not contain any indicators of reproduction itself. It is true that it does contain data on the so-called total birth ratio, from which the demographer can easily derive the gross reproduction ratio. I repeat, however, the dictionary is not only for demographers....

The dictionary conveys the impression that the demographic situation in the USSR in general and the situation with regard to population reproduction in particular are completely positive. Is this true?

Negative trends in the demographic situation were already being discussed at the 25th CPSU Congress. The 26th congress mapped out an entire series of measures to raise the birthrate and improve the indoctrination of the younger generation. The 27th CPSU Congress continued and developed this line. The group of demographic policy undertakings in the 11th Five-Year Plan had a perceptible demographic impact, but the increasing number of births in recent years has also been due to structural factors. The largest generation in our country, born in the second half of the 1950's, reached prime child-bearing age. Nevertheless, the average annual number of births was the same at the start of the 1980's as at the end of the 1950's: an average of 5.3 million births a year from 1958 to 1960 and from 1982 to 1984. This fact alone provides clear evidence of the approximately simple reproduction of the national population. This means that it will age quickly and soon cease to increase. Besides this, the continuation of the current trend could lead to the same kind of demographic decline as in the 1960's (the average number of births a year was only 4.1 million from 1967 to 1969). The reduced number of births in the 1960's was the reason for the absence of an increase in the working-age population in the 12th Five-Year Plan. If the same kind of decline should occur in the second half of the 1980's and the beginning of the 1990's, the population will age more quickly, and in two decades there will be a decrease in the working-age population and other undesirable consequences. Only the young family can improve the situation, because mothers now give birth to three-fourths of all children before the age of 30 (as compared to around one-half in the pre-war years). The problem of the birthrate, therefore, is a problem for youth to solve, and its resolution will be extremely difficult. The technological revolution requires young men and women to spend more time and energy acquiring a general and specialized education, and the national economy now has a special need for young workers. How can the main functions of youth be balanced in just the right way, so that education and labor do not stifle the demographic function?

Long-range tendencies toward lower reproduction indicators (the net ratio was 1.26 in 1958-59 and 1.00 in 1979-80) could certainly prevail again in the future. One of the main causes is the rapidly rising percentage of city-dwellers and the corresponding lower percentage of rural inhabitants. In 1980-1981 the gross reproduction ratio was 1.58 for the rural population, and only 0.91 for the urban population (1, p 156). Incidentally, the long article

on "The City" says absolutely nothing about the low reproduction indicators of citydwellers, and the statement that the birthrate in small cities is lower than in larger ones is inaccurate. The larger the city, the lower the indicators of population reproduction, all other conditions being equal. From this standpoint, the clearly defined process of population concentration in the largest cities is also demographically unpromising.

As we can see, the actual demographic situation in the country is complex and far from unclouded. The dictionary, however, makes optimistic statements and passes off wishes as realities. Demographic problems? These occur in developing countries (the population explosion) and in the capitalist world (contracted reproduction), but in our country we have nothing but achievements and successes.

It would be difficult to imagine anything less consistent with the spirit of the times. The materials of CPSU congresses and other party documents state the need for the quickest possible resolution of demographic problems, but the people who should know more than anyone else about them are pretending that the problems do not exist and are trying to convince readers of this fact. General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M.S. Gorbachev has said that the main internal difficulties objectively impeding our economic growth and social development are demographic (in the L'HUMANITE interview), but the dictionary tries to prove that nothing of the kind exists in our country....

The reader is given an inaccurate, distorted, and varnished version of the truth. This is intolerable, if only because the extremely serious situation with regard to population reproduction in the country can only be corrected when the three-child family becomes the norm and when the importance of raising the birthrate is realized by the general public. The demographic dictionary, unfortunately, does not promote this, and it could even have a tranquilizing effect on public opinion.

As for the many articles on foreign countries, some of the population reproduction figures here are also suspicious. For example, the book says that the gross reproduction ratio in the United States in 1979 was 1.85, whereas it was actually 0.91 (1, p 176). Apparently, the author, proofreaders and editors confused the total birth ratio with the gross ratio. This is an unforgivable mistake for specialists!

While we are on the subject of the discussion of various aspects of reproduction in the dictionary, I must say that I, as a reader, was completely satisfied with the articles of a general nature with some connection to this subject matter—for example, "Marriage," "Marital Status," "Family," "Divorce Rate," etc. Most of them were written by our outstanding demographers from the Scientific Research Institute of the Central Statistical Administration, the Institute of Sociological Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and other research establishments, and by scientists from the union republics and from many cities in the RSFSR. The editors must be given credit for their choice of competent authors, regardless of their place of employment (which had an extremely positive effect on the general scientific level of the dictionary!). This observation certainly does not contradict what I said

before (the articles in publications of this kind are autonomous), and it certainly does not relieve the editors of responsibility for the poor quality of many articles.

In my opinion, the articles on "Family" (by A.G. Volkov and M.S. Matskovskiy) and "Divorce Rate" (M.S. Tolts) are especially good. In particular, the following statement seems extremely important for the general reading public as well as for specialists: "The current alarming trends in the development of marital and family relations (the declining birthrate, the increasing frequency of divorces, the increasing number of broken homes, and the rising number of single people) are indications not of their collapse, but of the difficulties involved in the socially dictated transformation of the institution of the family and its functions..." (p 396). The article contains quite informative tables and is accompanied by a carefully compiled list of sources in the Russian and English languages. Unfortunately, the two latter features are not common to all of the articles. Sometimes the text is so overloaded with numbers that it is difficult to read, and tables would obviously be quite appropriate here. In some cases there is evidence of unaccountable tendentiousness in the choice of bibliographical items.

There are many omissions in the glossary of terms connected with population reproduction. Of course, it is a good thing that the term "marriage market" made its way into the dictionary, even if it is enclosed in quotation marks. But why are there no articles on "Alimony," "Demographic Waves" (footnote 1) (This term signifies the alternation of small and large generations, which is typical to some extent of our national population. This phenomenon has many negative consequences. Perhaps this is precisely why it was not included in the dictionary), "Love" and many, many others?

The absence of an article on the "Demographic Revolution" is amazing. It is true that there is a terse cross reference to the article on the "Demographic Transition." I think, however, that the editors' apparent preference for the latter term is wrong. The phenomenon known as the demographic transition is only one facet or aspect of the demographic revolution. The demographic revolution certainly cannot be confined wholly to the transition from one type of population reproduction to another. It encompasses all aspects of the love-marital-familial relations between the sexes and, in general, all relations within the family. Besides this, the term "demographic revolution" was used and analyzed by scientists much earlier than the term "demographic transition." It is interesting that there are scientific monographs on this subject (including the well-known book by A.G. Vishnevskiy), but there is no article in the demographic dictionary.

I am fully aware that the editors and publishers were limited by the length of the dictionary. Unfortunately, no one can say that all of the available space has been used economically. The information in tables is repeated in the text, there is unjustifiable verbosity, and, besides this, too much space is quite needlessly taken up by sex and age pyramids of the population of all foreign countries. These pyramids say something to demographers and virtually nothing to the mass reader. Concise tables of the age and sex structure of the population would have been much more informative and, besides this, would have allowed readers to compare data for different countries.



Now let us move on to the second "subject"--population migration. The key here is the long article with the same name, in which the essence and history of migration itself and the history of migration studies are examined. The article is informative. Many of the facts presented in it, however, are seriously doubtful. I will cite a few examples.

"In connection with the establishment of the new industrial base in the east of the country, new arrivals from other regions increased the population of the Urals, Siberia and the Far East by more than 3 million between 1926 and 1939. In all, from 8 million to 10 million people moved from the European part of the country to the eastern regions, including the Urals, between 1939 and 1958. In the 1960's, however, there was a negative balance of migration in the eastern regions of the RSFSR" (p 254).

More than 20 years ago, Siberian researchers proved that the quicker growth of the Siberian population in the late 1920's and the 1930's was due to a higher natural increase in the regional population (2) and that Siberia lost many inhabitants as a result of migration in the 1950's--in other words, the balance of migration was negative even then (with the exception of the period when the virgin lands were developed). It is important to draw a clear distinction between the number of migrants and the increase resulting from migration. This was not done in this case, and the reader who is not a specialist might think that the population of the eastern regions increased by 8-10 million as a result of migration between 1939 and 1958.

"According to 1970 census data, 5.3 million people moved from one city to another, 4.4 million moved from rural locations to cities, 2.5 million moved from one rural administrative region to another, and 1.7 million moved from cities to rural communities. In general, the annual number of migrants in the early 1970's exceeded 11 million" (p 254).

The fact that the annual number of migrants exceeded 11 million during this period is indisputable. We can only wonder why the figures are not more precise.

According to the data of regular statistics, 9.9 million people arrived in cities in 1974, and 1.7 million moved from cities to rural locations. Besides this, we can deduce from a number of indirect data that more than 4 million people moved from one rural administrative region to another. Therefore, the total number of migrants can be estimated at 15-16 million (1, p 413).

Furthermore, the article does not specify when these people moved, but merely says "according to 1970 census data," not to mention the fact that this is not the number of "people who moved," but the number of people who had lived in a specific place less than 2 years at the time of the census, and it does not count the people who were born here but then left. These are the people who lived in a different place 2 or more years prior to the census. During this period many of them moved more than once, many returned to their native regions, and not all categories of migrants were taken into account.... As we can see, the book can be quite misleading.



In addition to these inaccuracies--to put it mildly--there is also the surprising absence of any mention in the article (which was written by V.M. Moiseyenko) of many typical features of contemporary migration: its youthful appearance, the concentration of the population in big cities and agglomerates, the dramatic differences in the intensity of migration in different regions and by members of different nationalities, etc.

In general, there is some indication that the role of migration in our life today is obviously underestimated. According to the 1979 census, however, 47 percent of the national population, 56 percent of the urban population, and 32 percent of the rural population were not living in the same places where they were born (3, p 51). Migration--i.e., territorial mobility--is connected with social, educational, professional and qualificational mobility. Population migration is one of the most important elements of our entire contemporary way of life. The importance of transmigration to people and to society as a whole is the reason for the constantly rising territorial mobility of the population. Some idea of this is provided by the changing percentage of people who have lived in their permanent place of residence for less than 2 years. The figure was 3.5 percent of the USSR population at the time of the 1926 census, 5.8 percent in the 1970 census, and 7.7 percent in the 1979 census (3, p 38).

It is possible that the underestimation of the importance of migration is the reason for the extremely meager glossary in this section. For example, the reader will not find articles on "Migration Factors," "Migration Motives," and many others which, in my opinion, are necessary in this kind of publication, especially in view of the fact that these matters have been the subject of many excellent scientific works.

Unfortunately, some of the articles included in the section are not informative enough. For example, the article on the acclimatization of new settlers is extremely brief and does not contain any data on its level in different parts of the country. The practical significance of raising this level, especially in regions of new economic development, is colossal, because it would be difficult to call the current situation satisfactory. Incidentally, it is not clear why the only monograph dealing specifically with this topic in our scientific literature (Zh.A. Zayonchkovskaya, "Novosely v gorodakh" [New Settlers in Cities], 1972) is included in the bibliographical list of only the article on "Social Adaptation." Of course, it has some connection with this term, but it is a much weaker one than its connection with acclimatization.

I would like to make one other comment. We know that territorial differences in the life of the population influence migration considerably. There is an article on the "Standard of Living" in the dictionary, but it does not say anything about territorial differences. As for living conditions--a term widely used in studies of migration and other demographic processes--there is no article at all on this topic.

In my opinion, the main defect of this section (on migration) is the same as in the one discussed previously (on population reproduction)--there is no mention of problems.

In principle, the dictionary says nothing about the migration problems of the country as a whole or its separate regions, particularly the regions of new development. But after all, there are many published works dealing with this subject matter (and these are informative and astute works). For some unknown reason, the compilers of the dictionary made no use of available literature. I think that this is a fundamental flaw in the work, which is incapable, in the discussions pertaining to migration, of even approximately reflecting "the current level of development of Marxist-Leninist demography and all of the fields of science studying population," as the editors advertise (p 5). Sufficient evidence of this can be gained from a comparison of the corresponding sections of the dictionary with even just the articles published in SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA alone (on the northern Tyumen regions, the BAM zone, Central Asia, and the Nonchernozem Zone).

We can only guess why this happened. In any case, the authors were obligated to read the "literature in their field," which is incomparably richer, more interesting, and more meaningful than the contents of the dictionary.

Many articles were obviously poorly proofread and badly edited. The article on "Abortion" is a good example. Here is what it says. "Total abortion ratio (TAR)--an indicator used in foreign statistics; the number of abortions performed per 1,000 female infants during the entire reproductive period on the condition that the age levels of abortion ratios on the data of calculation remain the same throughout the period and that all girls of this age group live to the age of 50 (for example, a TAR of 849 for a specific year means that in the presence of the stipulated conditions that same year around 85 percent of the women in the corresponding age group resorted to artificial abortions)" (p 7).

Reader, please take a look at the parenthetical explanation. Do you not find it suspicious, even if you are not a demographer, that 85 out of 100 women could have abortions in a year? But the proofreaders and editors apparently saw nothing strange in this.

Let us summarize our discussion. The organizers, authors, editors and publishers of the dictionary performed a great deal of work. Many of the articles in it are good. Unfortunately, they testify only to what this publication could be, and not to what it is. Both the glossary and the quality of many articles in the dictionary are inconsistent with the current level of demographic analysis in contemporary scientific literature and with the correct approach to the elucidation of socioeconomic issues, the approach characteristic of the materials of the 27th CPSU Congress and all of the party's current analytical work.

This is why the dictionary will be of varying value to different categories of readers. There is no question that it will be of some use to the specialist in demography. He will recognize its flaws, use the information he needs in his work, disregard the errors, and forgive the blunders. As for the "general" reader, it is obviously not his lucky day. Regrettably, the sections of interest to the non-demographer are inferior in many respects.

The author of these comments has concentrated on the demographic aspect of the dictionary. Economists, sociologists, historians, and ethnographers should also express their views, because the dictionary, according to its compilers, "is intended to elucidate the main elements of the population-related subject matter of the basic social sciences, and of all the sciences and fields of science making up the system of knowledge about population" (p 5). It seems to me that everything might not look right from the sociological standpoint either.

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## DEVELOPMENT OF POPULATION IN BAM ZONE

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[Review by A.I. Natashin of book "Formirovaniye naseleniya v zone BAM" by Ye.V. Belkin and F.E. Sheregi, Moscow, Mysl, 1985, 149 pages]

[Text] A region which has been little-developed in the economic and geographic sense is also usually a little-researched topic in science. This is precisely what happened to the zone of the "second trans-Siberian railway." Most of the publications dealing with the BAM [Baykal-Amur Trunkline] zone, with the exception of S.N. Zhelezko's monograph "Sociodemographic Problems in the BAM Zone" (1980), are based on the economic analysis and generalization of statistics, but only partial sociological data. The monograph under review will do much to fill this gap. It is based on the results of a sample sociological study the authors conducted from 1981 to 1983 in the labor collectives of 14 populated points in the BAM zone and at the Atomash Plant and Kuybyshev Automobile and Tractor Electrical Equipment and Carburetor Plant. In all, around 6,000 people were surveyed (in line with sex, age, and professional status quotas).

There is no need to prove how acute the problem of involving labor resources in the economic development of new territories is today. It cannot be solved unless all socioeconomic factors contributing directly or indirectly to the stabilization of the population and to positive changes in the sociodemographic features of the population are taken into account. The authors of this book proceeded from this immutable principle. The principle itself is immutable, but its implementation can be extremely difficult.

The scientists discovered a contradictory situation. On the one hand, some economic managers blame the failure to complete plan assignments and the slow achievement of projected capacity in new facilities on the shortage of personnel. On the other, they are striving to expand construction under the conditions of a low level of mechanization and automation, which creates many jobs with unproductive manual labor and increases the number of administrative personnel. There is the fear, which was specifically expressed by M.S. Gorbachev during his tour of the Far East, that the continuation of this labor-wasting tendency will inevitably have a negative impact. After all, a region occupying 62 percent of the territory of the USSR and possessing a



gigantic crude mineral base is inhabited by only 12 percent of the national population (pp 11-13). In the last two decades industry developed more quickly in Siberia and the Far East than in the nation as a whole. This is where two-thirds of union coal deposits, much of our oil and natural gas, and around 70 percent of our hydraulic resources are concentrated. We can only wonder who will develop the territory.

The wishes of people do not always coincide with plans for the efficient distribution of productive forces. According to Belkin and Sheregi, only 30 percent of the people who arrive in the zone as members of construction teams plan to stay for 5 or more years. Most of them have no intention of staying after their labor contracts expire (in 3 years). It is true that around 60 percent of the people who arrive as a result of job transfers are prepared to work on the project for a long time (p 15).

The authors analyze migration patterns primarily from the standpoint of ethnic and demographic features and professional skills. The comparison of planned and spontaneous forms of manpower distribution is absent, although this could have enriched the book considerably. After all, spontaneous migration flows, including migration to the BAM zone, do not grow weaker as time goes by, but even grow somewhat stronger (1, p 79). For the future, it will be important to know which of these two forms of migration is the most appropriate. This would probably be the social appeal, in which there are no time limits. Its advantages are even more obvious when it is compared to construction teams and to resettlement on the basis of labor contracts. Most of those who answer the appeal intend to stay a long time, and only 10.6 percent plan to work only a year (1, p 84).

The prolonged underdevelopment of the socioconsumer infrastructure is one of the main reasons for the flow of migration out of the BAM zone. This has created a paradoxical situation: A zone of new development, experiencing an acute shortage of skilled manpower, has turned out to be a "personnel forge" for settled regions. After all, the people from here usually move to Central Asia and the Transcaucasus. Of the people coming here, however, 53 percent are from the RSFSR, and only 6.7 percent come from Central Asia and the Transcaucasus (pp 34, 37). There is reason to believe that the main source of new manpower will be depleted to a considerable extent in the 12th Five-Year Plan. This will almost certainly have a negative effect on the size of the BAM population.

The authors drew several important conclusions from an analysis of data for 1975-1976 and 1981. First of all, the group of new arrivals has changed little since the beginning of the project. Second, the sociodemographic structure--and even the professional structure to some extent--of the permanent population in the future will depend largely on the mechanical increase, which should represent from 15 to 20 percent of the necessary increase in the BAM population up to 1990 (and this will hardly meet its needs). Besides this, in view of the fact that Siberians represent most of the new permanent workers, this will result in a personnel shortage in the settled regions of Siberia and the Far East, where the mechanical population increase is already quite low (p 42).

Although the authors' predictions do not sound dubious in general, the statement about the instability of the new arrivals to the BAM zone from Central Asia and the European part of the country (p 42) requires some clarification. According to other studies, the outflow of manpower from the Central Asian republics as a result of the social appeal has increased substantially in recent years (1, p 81).

We agree completely with the main thesis of the book, which serves as the methodological basis for a group of practical recommendations. It is the belief that in the future, in addition to improving forms of territorial redistribution, it will be necessary to establish a higher standard of living in regions of new development than in regions with a labor surplus (p 15). It seems that this could be one of the most effective and fairest ways of using public consumption funds.

This book by Belkin and Sheregi will also be granted a long life because it presents a social description of the historic moment when the railway was built, a moment which will never come again. Living conditions in the zone will gradually become the same as in the settled parts of the country. This will probably give rise to different problems. For example, new people are no longer needed in many sectors today; furthermore, there are questions about whether they are needed here at all. The population of Tynda is now 70,000, instead of the planned 50,000.

In our opinion, the authors lost sight of an extremely important aspect--the mechanism of economic incentives for labor. The mechanism in the north is unique and has not been studied sufficiently. In particular, the high wages, especially the guaranteed wage, first served as an incentive to attract manpower and to stimulate more productive labor. In time, the 1.7 differential has an inhibiting effect if it is paid on the same conditions as in settled regions (regardless of the final result). For example, the operators of the BelAZ heavy freight cars and the American Unitracks stay home from work on the slightest pretext (bad weather or easily corrected breakdowns), but they still receive their wages (of 500-700 rubles). What can counteract this, what values can take the place of the romantic and heroic enthusiasm of the first years of development? The book does not answer this question. Is this why the authors' conclusion that "the attraction of additional manpower will be the deciding factor in the successful development of the BAM zone" (p 19) sounds so debatable? The time has come to decide exactly who should be attracted and how they should be employed.

The reader of the book is left with the impression that there is a predominance of facts over commentary, and that the analytical portion of the work is inferior to the empirical portion in terms of volume and quality of delivery. For example, the paragraph on the motives for coming to the BAM zone contains extremely interesting information, but this part of the text is poorly planned on the analytical level. The book contains unjustifiably tedious passages and excessively detailed descriptions of secondary matters connected either with the organization and procedures of the research or with the research findings. All of this only complicates the comprehension of the main thesis--the very thing on which the authors are insisting and for which

they are appealing. Shortcomings of this kind, however, are easily eliminated. The detailed descriptions of the ambitions of upperclassmen (p 69) and the research program and tools could be abridged without hurting the book at all.

The interest in BAM is nationwide. The publication of a sociological work on this topic has been awaited impatiently by the general reading public, and not only professionals. We can confidently say that this work by Belkin and Sheregi will enhance the prestige of the science of sociology and will cogently demonstrate its ability to accomplish much, its ability to analyze acute social problems and to propose solutions.

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